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I use a novel dataset based on 8,000 retail clients of a large brokerage house over four years 
to evaluate if individual investors take decisions according to one of the dominating 
decision-making theories – traditional Expected Utility Theory or behavioural Prospect 
Theory. Another key question of my research is the role of affect in judgements and its 
impact on investment results and behaviour.  
The thesis includes three related empirical chapters. In the first empirical chapter, I explore 
how (ir)rational are retail investors and what are the boundaries of their rationality proxied 
with the relation between realised risk and return. In the second empirical chapter, I examine 
how the correlation between risk and return for the same group of investors varies in Live 
trading environment versus virtual Contest environment highlighting the role of emotions in 
correlation dynamics. In the third empirical chapter, I keep the emphasis on comparing Live 
and Contest investment settings, but now I evaluate the impact of emotions on profitability 
and various manifestations of risk behaviour.     
My research contributes to the academic literature in the domain of finance and investments 
that is trying to establish the positioning and the role of emotional account in the judgement 
and decision-making of economic agents. I provide empirical evidence that feelings have a 
substantial impact on investment results and risk behaviour of individual traders. The 
empirical nature of my analysis involving a large group of private investors grants significant 
support to prior findings that predominantly developed using neuro-physiological, 
interview-type and experimental methodologies. Besides, I present empirical support for the 
long-lasting debate concerning traditional and behavioural financial theories. Analysing the 
relation between risk and return, I manage to validate that investors in my sample manifest 
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all behavioural patterns implied by Prospect Theory: they are risk-averse in the gains 
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The history of the modern theory of decision-making under risk and uncertainty represents 
80 years of a nonstop academic debate on the hot topics of human behaviour, rationality, 
risk attitudes, performance as well as its reasons and implications among the other similarly 
vital elements of our existence. Over this long historical time frame and beyond, the 
understanding of the core premises of risky choice has radically evolved several times.  
Initially, the theory started from the psychology-grounded explanations by the prominent 
predecessors from Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiment to John Maynard Keynes’s 
concept of Animal Spirits. Next, it was followed by stringent mathematical rules and 
rationalisations of the Expected Utility Theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), 
widely accepted and adopted in the majority of modern theories and models in Economics 
and Finance. Finally, it was enriched by the modern psychology-based behavioural Prospect 
Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and supplemented by the reinvented emotions-
focused ‘Risk-as-Feelings’ model by Loewenstein et al. (2001) and theories alike that are 
gaining momentum in the new century. For the outside observer, it may seem that the history 
of thought has made a full circle as the concept of ‘emotions’ in economic context has made 
a journey from the recognition in the work of Adam Smith to almost complete oblivion in 
the second part of 20th century and back to a growing credit in the contemporary papers 
frequently appearing in finance academic journals that I review in the literature section. Yet, 
the real picture is far more challenging than that.           
Since the 1970s, when Prospect Theory was formulated (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), 
the world of finance has been increasingly living in the way of a dichotomy of behavioural 
and neoclassic explanations of behaviour. Traditional theory’s tenets warrant all widely 
accepted modern models in finance, for instance, (Modern) Portfolio Theory (Markowitz 
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(1952, 1959)), asset pricing models (e.g. Sharpe (1964), Fama and French (1992)), Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (Fama (1965)) and other, which are firmly grounded on the axiom of 
economic agent’s rationality. Behavioural perspective is gaining power along with the 
mounting evidence of human irrationality in all domains of finance and economics – from 
unwise behaviour of individuals, e.g. taxi drivers (Camerer et al. (1997)) to the unwise 
behaviour of financial markets that grow into bubbles and then burst with devastating 
consequences (Shiller (2016)). Methodologically, Behavioural Economics is still lagging as 
its primary weapon so far – laboratory or field experiments – is frequently challenged for 
the issue of scalability (see Al-Ubaydli et al. (2017) for discussion). Nevertheless, updated 
theoretical agenda is continuously emerging, for instance, the concept of hyperbolic 
discounting in intertemporal choice (Laibson (1997)), Behavioural Capital Asset Pricing 
Theory (Shefrin and Statman (1994)) or Behavioural Portfolio Theory (Shefrin and Statman 
(2000)) to name a few. Still, empirical confirmation of behavioural theories remains a largely 
unfilled gap of this alternative economic perspective of decision-making.         
In my research, I come across considerable heterogeneity of behaviour, which corresponds 
to other studies in the same area, for example, the empirical research on disposition effect 
(Dhar and Zhu (2006)) or overall performance of day traders (Barber et al. (2014)). This fact 
leads to the assumption that there are vital psychological forces behind individual decision-
making dynamics. Kahneman and Tversky in their Prospect Theory explained the properties 
of the S-shaped value function curve in terms of psychophysical processes. However, 
growing evidence exposes emotions1 as a robust potential factor that can elucidate many 
behavioural artefacts that Prospect Theory is unable to embrace. In some life situations that 
invoke strong feelings, there is evidence that decision-making and behaviour can even be 
 
1  For simplicity, I use the notions ‘affect’, ‘feelings’, ‘emotions’ interchangeably throughout the thesis 
following most of finance scholars, although modern psychologists would insist that these terms have unequal 
meanings (see, for example, Frijda (2007), Scherer (2005)). In Section 2.1, I provide the explanations of the 
psychological terms I frequently use in my research.  
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reversed to the predictions of any of the consequentialist theories, which comprise both 
Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory. Preference reversals serve as a good example 
of this phenomenon of the emotional impact. As Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) show in 
their study, sexual arousal may provoke multiple self-destructive behaviours, which would 
not be elicited in the calm state. In the literature review section, I discuss more examples of 
that category.  
In the last twenty years, the effect of emotions on decision making under uncertainty became 
the area of interest to researchers from several scientific disciplines including Finance, 
Psychology and Neuroscience. This research has summed up into a series of theoretical 
conceptualisations known as dual process models of individual decision-making. These 
theories recognise that individuals in their decisions are impacted to a varying extent by the 
current or anticipatory degree of internal emotional state. Dominating feelings may change 
the routine process, whereby the decision is inherently consequentialist, i.e. the decision-
maker multiplies the value derived from a value function by the decision weight drawn from 
the decision weighting function, and both functions evolve predictably and uninterruptedly. 
Dual process models of behaviour become an alternative framework of judgement and 
decision-making with ‘Risk-as-feelings’ hypothesis (Loewenstein et al. (2001)) being one 
of its most notorious representations. According to this perspective, the processing and 
outcome of decisions are highly dependent on the degree of affective charge of the 
environment in which a choice is made. Some factors, for example, the vividness of potential 
outcomes, the immediacy of an outcome, duration of an emotion-eliciting event, personal 
characteristics, etc., raise the emotional intensity of choice, which has a distorting effect on 
the realised behaviour. The theory contends that the higher is the emotional charge of the 
dominating environment, the stronger the individual’s decisions and behaviour depart from 
thoughtful undertakings. Furthermore, Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) demonstrate 
experimentally that feelings tend to aggravate the dynamics of the ‘standard’ value function 
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contemplated by Prospect Theory. That is, in the more affect-rich environment, concave 
(gains) part of the function will tend to become even more outwardly curved, and convex 
(losses) part even more inwardly curved.  
To align between Prospect Theory and dual process theory, I construct a theoretical model 
of portfolio choice following the studies of Vlcek and Hens (2011) and Jakusch et al. (2019) 
with the aim to test the impact of affect-poor and affect-rich parameters of the value function, 
probability weighting function and loss aversion on various aspects of individual investor’s 
behaviour. For instance, the relation between an investor’s realised risk and performance, 
disposition bias, risk-taking practice in the domains of gains and losses. 
 
1.1. Introduction to the first empirical chapter. Do 
individual investors make rational decisions? 
Prospect Theory view on the negative relation 
between risk and return. 
 
A critical part of the disagreement between traditional and behavioural frameworks lies in 
the idea of the rationality of economic agents. In the view of prescriptive Expected Utility 
Theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)), a rational person in the pursuit of self-
interest should favour a choice that would maximise the expected output per the unit of risk 
of not achieving the desired level of output, so that the decision value function has a concave 
form across the whole spectrum. In the application to finance, an investor should strive to 
maximise expected return per unit of deviation of return. In contrast, Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that is a descriptive type of model, suggests that concavity 
will only be sustained for gambles involving gains. In the losses domain, most individuals 
would tend to prefer more risk to less risk for the same level of return. This situation will 
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make the decision value function convex for losses, and therefore falling out of the 
rationality scope. Hence, Prospect Theory’s value function has its famous S-shape. 
Consequently, this controversy between theories poses a challenge for the empirical 
observation of individuals: are they indeed demonstrating rational behaviour in real life? I 
undertake to investigate this question in my first empirical chapter. More specifically, I apply 
my research question to the empirical study of individual investors and formulate it in the 
following way:  
Do individual investors change their risk behaviour subject to positive or negative trading 
results?   
In my theoretical model in Section 2.10, I draw the prediction that given Prospect Theory-
based preferences by an investor and certain other assumptions as formulated in the 
theoretical models by Barberis and Xiong (2009), Vlcek and Hens (2011) and Jakusch et al. 
(2019), individuals are inclined to reveal disposition effect, a positive relation between risk 
and return in the gains domain (relative to the reference point) and a negative relation 
between risk and return in the losses domain.   
To find an answer to the research question and test the predictions of the theoretical model, 
I explore the database that contains full trading statistics for more than 8,000 individual 
investors over four years. I aim to focus on the analysis of the correlation between return and 
risk that I measure as a statistical deviation of return. Intuitively, this variable should be 
directly related to realised (ir)rational behaviour and is an appropriate candidate for its proxy. 
Zero correlation between risk and return would mean risk neutrality, positive correlation 
coefficient should be a sign of risk-averse behaviour, while negative correlation must 
indicate that an individual is exposed to risk-seeking. I conjecture that the strength of the 
coefficient should also matter. Even though both theories under consideration hypothesise 
non-linear relation between return and risk, a larger coefficient should denote a more robust 
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connection, hence more compelling risk-averse or risk-seeking behaviour. Stating that, I 
must stress that the link between the degree of rationality and investment performance is 
very far from being clear. Investment results can be impacted by other essential variables, 
such as skill and mere luck. Therefore, it is possible that an individual trader exhibiting a 
strong positive correlation between return and risk simultaneously would have negative 
investment performance. In my study, I devote special attention to exploring this aspect of 
behaviour.    
If Prospect Theory holds and investors’ behavioural patterns correspond to the S-shaped 
value function, the following three empirical outcomes should be observed (Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992)): investors should demonstrate risk-averse behaviour (positive correlation 
between risk and return) above the reference point, and risk-seeking behaviour (negative 
correlation between risk and return) below the reference point. Additionally, loss aversion 
bias should be demonstrated, i.e. losses should loom larger than gains (negative correlation 
should be higher than positive in modulus).  I identified all these effects in the theoretical 
model in Section 2.10, and they were statistically significant. 
The investigation that I pursue reveals that roughly 72% of the subjects in my selection can 
be attributed to S-type (i.e. Prospect Theory-guided) behaviour. Only 8% of investors show 
the evidence of fully risk-averse model that corresponds to the Expected Utility Theory. 
Another group of traders, an impressive 20%, adhere to convex value function for losses and 
gains, which indicates risk-seeking behaviour and does not fit any existing theoretical 
framework. To investigate the assumed link between rationality and performance and pave 
the way for future research, I split investors into ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ according to their 
overall positive or negative performance. I find that outperforming investors, on average, 
demonstrate a much clearer tendency towards rationality, i.e. positive relation between risk 
and return. For example, the share of ‘Gainers’ that manifest fully risk-averse behaviour is 
16% against only 4% of ‘Losers’. For the registered cases of entirely risk-seeking behaviour, 
P a g e  | 14 
 
the proportion is reversed – 7% and 26%, respectively. At the same time, I also manage to 
conclude that the link between performance and rationality is far from perfect. 41% of 
‘Gainers’ have a negative correlation between risk and return, while 32% of ‘Losers’ are 
featured with positive risk/return relation. Even though rational behaviour is capable of 
predicting trading success, other factors like skill or luck seem to be essential as well.  
In the same empirical chapter, I attempt to examine what factors are influencing the degree 
of rationality represented by the correlation between risk and return. I collect a broad array 
of personal, trading and risk variables that are regressed on the calculated correlation 
coefficients for investors. Also, I run several model specifications – one for ‘Gainers’ group 
of investors, one for ‘Losers’ and a model for all investors. I discover that some variables 
have an unequal impact on outperforming and underperforming subjects. For example, in 
the set of activity variables, the number of completed trades does not influence ‘Gainers’, 
while playing a positive role for ‘Losers’. Turnover – the value of all completed trades – also 
has no impact on ‘Gainers’, but in this case, the negative effect on underperformers. At the 
same time, the time duration of an average trade, positive risk (positive semi-deviation of 
return) and the use (proportion) of stop-loss conditional orders all have a positive influence 
on the risk/return correlation for each of the groups. The opposite effect is observed for such 





P a g e  | 15 
 
1.2. Introduction to the second empirical chapter. 
The role of affect in the degree of rational 
behaviour 
 
In my second empirical chapter, I examine the expectations of dual process models 
embodied in ‘Risk-as-feelings’ hypothesis with application to rationality that I continue to 
proxy by the correlation between risk and return. I formulate the following research question: 
“What is the effect of emotions on risk and return relation?” To test it, I explore if investors 
adjust their degree of rationality when taking standard investment decisions in two 
environments that are distinct from the affective charge point of view.  
To approach such research, it is necessary to identify and analyse two settings that are 
different in terms of emotional charge and at the same time, show the closest possible 
similarity in all other aspects. Unsurprisingly, most studies conducted in the area of the 
influence of feelings are carried out purely in an experimental setting. Rarely these are field 
experiments. The main problem of such arrangements is the difficulty to induce natural 
emotions in humans when they know they are under surveillance, not to mention ethical 
challenges of modulating fear, anger and other strong emotional states. For example, 
specifying the directions for future research, Rick and Loewenstein ((2008), p. 150) contend 
that “[There is a] need to study stronger emotions that have generally been examined in the 
empirical literature. Many vitally important decisions are made “in the heat of the moment”, 
and indeed important economic decisions […] often evoke powerful emotions. But studying 
the impact of such emotions is difficult – in part because it is difficult if not impossible to 
manipulate such strong emotional states experimentally and in part because people generally 
do not like to be studied when they are in heightened emotional states”.  
I achieve the goal by isolating the two investment environments that encompass a high 
degree of resemblance in all properties except for the level of emotional charge. For that, I 
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make the selection of the same group of Live investors (i.e. with real money and real risk) 
as in the first empirical chapter, but now I complement it with another type of data. In 
addition to providing Live trading accounts, which are funded by investors themselves, the 
brokerage house that provided the statistics runs a trading Contest, which is basically a 
trading game that entirely replicates Live trading environment, including the marketplace 
(electronic platform), orders, fees, execution, etc. It is a serious venture where top performers 
get high-value real prizes credited on their Live accounts, and that gathers around 1,000 
contestants every month for around five years. Further, I match investors having both types 
of accounts – Live and Contest and obtain 618 such individuals. Effectively, I assume that 
the only fundamental factor that is different for Live and Contest accounts of the same trader 
is the degree of emotional intensity or vividness that is comprised in the opening, 
maintaining and closing a trading position. It represents a natural control for an ‘emotional’ 
variable and gives an excellent and rare opportunity to conduct empirical testing of the dual 
process theories. Consequently, I designate Live environment as ‘affect-rich’ and Contest 
environment as ‘affect-poor’. As a result, I fulfil both conditions outlined by Rick and 
Loewenstein with respect to my subjects: I can gauge the behaviour ‘in the heat of the 
moment’ and compare it against less emotionally-charged but qualitatively identical 
decisions, and the subjects do not ‘feel’ the researcher behind their back when they make 
these decisions in both types of trading environments.  
I reinforce the analytical approach above with the assumptions of the theoretical model that 
I draw in Section 2.10. In the model, I approximate the affect-rich and affect-poor 
environments by taking the model parameters from the two sources. First, it is the original 
Prospect Theory model (Kahneman and Tversky (1992)) that has been worked out in an 
affect-poor experimental setting. As an affect-rich counterpart, I take the parameters from 
the model of Jakusch et al. (2019). They conducted their parametrisation based on Live 
trading results of individual investors (very similar to my dataset). I evaluate the resulting 
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consequences of the two sets of parameters on the relation between risk and return. My 
model, just as my analytical framework, predicts the statistically significant difference in the 
correlation coefficients between the two environments. However, in the model, I reveal the 
significant difference only for the correlation in the losses domain.   
In my findings, I discover the presence of noteworthy disparity for the two settings, which 
makes from 0.20 to 0.25 in correlation terms depending on the measurement method. The 
difference is significant at the 1% confidence level. Live aggregated correlation coefficient 
proves to be stronger (more negative) than in Contest. After breaking total risk measure into 
positive semi-deviation of returns (representing gains domain) and negative semi-deviation 
of returns (representing losses domain), I find that the shift in correlations between settings 
is to a large extent derived from the convex (losses) part of the value function, while the 
change in concave (gains) part is much more reserved. My results confirm the assumptions 
of ‘Risk-as-feelings’ models – in the more affect-rich setting (Live) the subjects become 
more risk-averse in gains domain and more risk-seeking in losses domain that reflects the 
growing effect of ‘valuation by feelings’ versus ‘valuation by calculation’ (Rottenstreich and 
Hsee (2004)). It is equally valid for underperforming and outperforming investors. These 
results cannot be explained by either Expected Utility Theory or Prospect Theory. The 
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1.3. Introduction to the third empirical chapter. The 
role of risk and emotional engagement in 
trading behaviour and the manifestation of 
behavioural biases by investors 
 
In the third empirical chapter, I continue expanding the investigation of the role that 
emotions play in risky decision-making beyond the implied rationality of behaviour. 
Although traditional economic theory treats emotions as a by-product of the decision-
making process, there is growing evidence, theoretical, empirical and experimental, 
promoting an alternative view of a much more extensive function of feelings and its impact 
on profitability and risk that draw my attention. Furthermore, I use the same dataset of 
investors possessing two types of trading accounts – Live and Contest – that I exploited in 
the second empirical chapter. Altogether, 523 individual investors fall under the criteria of 
the subsequent research.   
I break the last empirical chapter into three separate parts, each examining distinct aspects 
of affective interference with financial behaviour. The first part investigates the differences 
in performance between Live and Contest trading modes, the second part addresses 
emotional transformations of risk, and the third part strives to combine return and risk into 
a single framework using multiple regression analysis.   
In Part 1, I assess the following research question:  
Does variation in emotional intensity pertaining to the investment decision influences 
financial performance? 
My goal is to examine the assumption derived from the literature (see Loewenstein et al. 
(2001) for review) advocating the emotional perspective in a way that the difference in 
emotional charge between Live and Contest would impact the financial decisions of 
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individual subjects, translating into the essential modification of trading behaviour and 
significant performance disparity. To corroborate the assumption of return inequality 
between Live and Contest, I undertake to isolate and compare trading returns in both settings.  
After the conducted analysis, I discover a substantial shift in performance between the two 
environments. Surprisingly, against the widely accepted belief of the industry and investors 
that is spread in the professional internet forums, Live is found to outperform Contest on 
average, yet it should be noted that Live average performance is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, while Contest results are negative. The difference between the 
two equals 0.022% per average trade and is significant both economically and statistically. 
Furthermore, I find that the difference in trading results comes along with the altered 
investment patterns. When in Live, investors become more focused on their trading activity 
and possibly get more ‘myopic’ or concentrated on the short term. This can be inferred from 
the fact that they start relying on market orders much more than they do in Contest – the 
share of conditional orders drops from 43% in Contest to 23% in Live. Next, in Live, intraday 
trading practice becomes more popular – the share of intraday trades rises from 65% in 
Contest to 78% in Live. Another essential effect is the increase in the average number of 
transactions – from 448 in Contest to almost double 877 in Live, and a corresponding drop 
in the average duration of a single trade – from 7.82 hours in Contest to only 4.11 hours in 
Live.  
The second part of my study is devoted to the analysis of risk. Unlike the neoclassic model 
of decision-making, in Prospect Theory framework risk is a multifaceted phenomenon 
comprising three risk factors: the form of the value function, the form of probability 
weighting function and loss aversion. I employ several alternative methods to test my 
hypotheses about each of these manifestations of risk. For the evaluation of the impact of 
feelings on the value function, I compute the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman (1985)) 
P a g e  | 20 
 
and complement it with the comparison of positive and negative semi-deviations in the two 
environments.  
The other two manifestations of risk behaviour – loss aversion bias and the probability 
weighting function – are hard, if possible, to evaluate using market orders, therefore, I focus 
on the statistics of realised conditional orders.  
Regarding loss aversion, I assume that the bias should motivate investors to place take-profit 
orders2 closer to the market price and have them executed swiftly. With stop-loss orders, it 
is expected to be different, as individuals in the ‘risk-seeking mode’ should be mentally 
urged to prevent losses from realising or ‘to give it a chance if it goes wrong’, hence they 
would place sell conditional orders further away from the market price. Stop-loss orders 
should be found to get realised less frequently based on this logic because the market would 
have to move a longer distance to fill such a conditional order. Therefore, I aim to test for 
two assumptions: first, that the absolute return of stop-loss orders is higher than the absolute 
return of take-profit orders; and second, that the number of realised conditional stop-loss 
orders is smaller than the number of realised take-profit orders.  
Further, the form of decision weighting function as a risk variable is examined. In my 
analysis, I concentrate on the test of two possible alternative scenarios of affective influence: 
optimism/savouring and pessimism/dread that both alter the elevation of the probability 
weighting function. I speculate that both emotional states should have an effect on decisions 
regarding the placement of conditional orders. Specifically, savouring can lead to over 
appreciation of objective probabilities for gains and undervaluation of objective probabilities 
for losses in case of more affect-rich environment. Dread might have the opposite effect. 
 
2 It is a common practice of traders to place conditional orders together with opening a trading position, 
therefore, conditional orders serve as a good indicator of investors’ plans and emotional experiences at the 
moment when it is not yet known how the open position will evolve.  
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Consequently, for empirical evidence of the shift in optimism, the profitability of take-profit 
orders in Live should exceed the one in Contest, while for stop-loss orders Live should 
underperform Contest3, equally because investors in Live will tend to place both types of 
orders further away from the market price. A contrasting picture should be observed if the 
sensation of dread prevails. In this scenario, investors would lean towards placing stop-loss 
and take-profit orders closer to the current market price, hence it is expected that Live stop-
loss orders will outpace Contest and Live take-profit orders will generate smaller return than 
in Contest.  
In the study, I find evidence of the impact of emotions in all three facets of risk behaviour.  
For example, there is a statistically significant disparity in disposition effect in both 
environments that is accompanied by the shift in realised volatility from Live to Contest. My 
study demonstrates that only positive semi-deviations in Live and Contest are substantially 
dissimilar, and Live positive semi-deviation is indeed more concave as hypothesised by 
‘Risk-as-feelings’ hypothesis, i.e. in the gains domain, investors turn more risk-averse in the 
more affect-rich realm. As for negative standard-deviation, statistical tests fail to reject the 
null hypothesis about their equality. In the chapter, I discuss the possible explanations and 
implications of this effect.  
I uncover that loss aversion is present in both environments that I explore. Take-profit orders 
turn out to be significantly more profitable in modulus than stop-loss orders, which is an 
indication that stop-loss orders are, in general, placed closer to the market price. The 
frequency of realised conditional orders also confirms this: I reveal that the number of stop-
loss orders exceeds take-profit orders by the factor of two. Nevertheless, I fail to find any 
difference between loss aversion bias in Contest and Live.  
 
3 It should be recalled that stop-loss orders reside in the losses domain, therefore, if an investor places such 
orders closer to the current market price, she cuts her realised loss if the price moves against her and raises her 
overall profitability compared to more distantly placed orders.   
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The results that I obtain point to the presence of the dread account in the behaviour of 
investors. I discover that stop-loss orders in Live outperform Contest, and the opposite effect 
is observable for take-profit orders. There is a good chance that it is the surge in pessimism 
in affect-rich environment responsible for the equality of negative semi-deviations in Live 
and Contest that I discussed above. Grounded on ‘Risk-as-Feelings’ model, I develop an 
analytical framework, in which an investor should become substantially more risk-loving 
when experiencing a loss of real money from the value function perspective, yet the 
excessive risk-taking is suppressed by the overestimated fearful reaction to the small 
probability of the disastrous negative outcome. This reaction urges an investor to place stop-
loss orders closer to the market price, and they get frequently filled (realised), which curbs 
negative performance.    
 
1.4. Contribution of the thesis 
 
To the best of my knowledge, my study represents one of the first attempts to conduct the 
empirical examination of rationality and emotions perspectives attributable to individual 
investors in the context of a real market environment. I use this setting to test the degree of 
rationality pertinent to individual economic agents as well as the role that feelings play in 
the decision-making process.  
Both topics – rational behaviour and emotional account in decision-making – receive close 
attention in the academic literature. However, the principal instruments in the research of 
these areas are traditionally grounded on experimental methodology. The latter is frequently 
criticised for small and concentrated samples, intricate research designs, lack of authenticity, 
etc. The natural validity of the experimental environment is a particularly acute problem for 
the study of feelings. Strong emotions are hard to invoke, regulate and guide into the 
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direction demanded for the purpose of the research, simultaneously remaining within the 
moral and ethical boundaries. Besides, the subjects, when they know they are observed, tend 
to behave unnaturally. In this regard, my real market data set that permits to proxy the degree 
of rationality and to control for the factor of affect, grants the opportunity to corroborate the 
validity of several important economic models of individual behaviour. 
In the first chapter, I manage to demonstrate empirically that the majority of investors follow 
the decision-making mechanism of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)) rather 
than Expected Utility Theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)), which follows from 
the observed sequence of investment decisions. In the second and third chapters, I conclude 
that stronger emotional charge of investors results in a significant change in risk/return 
relation, behavioural patterns, profitability and risk behaviour. These findings confirm the 
assumptions and predictions of ‘Risk-as-feelings’ model (Loewenstein et al. (2001)). The 
implications of my research can foster further investigation of the impact of affect on 
financial decision-making testing some of my findings with new data and research design. 
The emergence of novel data sets in investments, payments, loans and other retail financial 
domains should largely assist the academic progress in this area.                     
Another contribution that is attributed to my first empirical chapter is the established 
empirical link between rationality and performance. Unfortunately, this question is not 
properly covered by the existing literature. I reveal that both properties are positively related. 
Outperforming investors tend to exhibit a higher degree of rationality than underperforming 
investors. Moreover, for gaining individuals, the correlation between risk and return is on 
average above zero, while for losing traders, the coefficient is negative. At the same time, 
my findings show that the level of rationality is only one of the set of variables that have an 
influence on profitability. There are gaining investors with a negative correlation between 
return and risk and underperformers, who proved a high degree of rationality as measured 
by the methodological approach adopted in my analysis. The aspect of the interaction 
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between rationality and investment results should be further examined with the help of 
additional methods and data, but my study and findings provide the initial platform for such 
an investigation.      
Further, I contribute to the extant literature on behavioural biases, especially the hypothesis 
of their affective roots. In the second and third chapters of the thesis, I explore loss aversion 
and disposition effect. My results suggest that loss aversion is deeply ingrained into 
investors’ behaviour and is so psychologically robust that the change from affect-poor to the 
affect-rich environment does not have a significant effect on it. My subjects were prone to 
overweighting losses over gains, even with the mere paper risk involved. Besides, I offer a 
new methodology to assess loss aversion that is based on the analysis of conditional orders. 
The approach is founded on the assumption that loss-averse individuals should tend to place 
stop-loss conditional orders significantly closer to the current market price of a financial 
instrument than take-profit orders. Fearing losses more than savouring gains, investors will 
try to play with the conditional orders to ensure the psychological comfort from the trading 
activity. The alleged scenario must lead to more frequent execution of stop-loss orders 
compared to take-profit orders considering that the market value follows a random walk 
pattern. Using the method, I find the evidence that stop-loss orders get realised two times 
more often than take-profit orders. Studying the disposition effect, I confirm that the bias is 
statistically significantly different in affect-rich and affect-poor settings. It contributes to the 
literature that identified the emotional explanations behind the disposition effect using an 
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1.5. Thesis structure 
 
The thesis is organised as follows. Section 1 starts with the general introduction into the 
research. After that, each of the three empirical chapters is introduced in separate sub-
sections, followed by the description of their academic contribution.    
Section 2 outlines the relevant literature on consequential decision-making theories that 
include traditional models like Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory. The difference 
between them is described and analysed. The remainder of the literature review is devoted 
to the non-consequentialist perspective and how it can impact performance and diverse 
manifestations of risk behaviour. Further, I provide the mathematical description of Prospect 
Theory model and develop my own model of investment choice for the investors with 
Prospect Theory-based preferences. The purpose of the model is to explore the predictions 
regarding the relation between risk and return for the modelled decision-maker. The section 
is continued with data set description and the overview of the methodology used throughout 
the thesis.  
Section 3 introduces the first empirical chapter that is focused on the analysis of the 
rationality of individual investors. The degree of rationality is proxied via the correlation 
between realised risk and profitability. Correlations are computed and evaluated at two levels 
– individual-investor level and pooled-data level.   
Section 4 covers the second empirical chapter that examines and compares the correlation 
between risk and return on two types of accounts – real money account that is dubbed ‘Live’ 
environment, and paper money account that is called ‘Contest’ environment.  
Section 5 describes the third empirical chapter that expands the comparison of investors’ 
behaviour in ‘Live’ and ‘Contest’ and the evaluation of the role of emotions in other 
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important domains – profitability, the form of the value function, the form of probability 
weighting function and loss aversion bias. 
Section 6 summarises conclusions of the empirical chapters and provides a discussion of the 
results. Also, implications and limitations of the research are examined, followed by 
considerations for future research.     
 
2. Literature Review 
 
I start the literature review with the introduction to the terminology used in the economic 
and financial papers dealing with the role of affect and emotions on decision-making. I focus 
on several critical affective notions that I frequently use in the thesis. Further, in this section, 
I revise two related frameworks of decision-making. The first framework is the traditional 
consequentialist perspective that implicitly treats the process of risky choice as a genuinely 
conscious, cognitive activity. The second framework claims a better descriptive power of 
human behaviour, introducing an important adjustment that integrates affect into the 
judgement routine. Both standpoints contend that individuals make decisions by combining 
the value function with the probability weighting function. However, the compelling factor 
of feelings in the non-consequentialist perspective is believed to guide and alter individual 
behaviour under risk for many real-life judgements. After examining the relevant literature, 
I discover the gap in the empirical testing of the non-consequentialist model in the financial 
domain and the role of feelings in financial decision-making. The literature review sections 
are structured as follows. In Section 2.3., I present two main consequentialist theories of 
decision making – Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory, highlighting similarities 
and differences between them. Next, in Section 2.4. I describe the evolution and principles 
behind the non-consequentialist framework. In the same section, I review the papers that 
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explore the influence of emotions on the performance of individual decision-makers. Finally, 
I look at the research examining the role of emotions in various facets of risk behaviour.  
At the end of Chapter 2, I provide the detailed mathematical description of Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky (1979,1992)) and develop a theoretical model of portfolio choice 
by the investor with Prospect Theory preferences.   
 
2.1. Psychological terminology in economic 
research 
 
Throughout my thesis, I frequently use psychological terminology. Psychological research 
makes a clear distinction (certainly not without exceptions) between such phenomena as 
emotions, feelings, affect, mood, sentiment (Elster (1998), Frijda (2007), Fairchild (2014)). 
However, it is almost impossible to define clear boundaries between them, just as there are 
no clear boundaries for emotions centres in the brain (Barrett (2006)). The empirical dataset 
that I use in the current research does not provide for the chance to control for the specific 
sensations expressed by the subjects. Usually, to introduce such controls, it is required to 
apply different research methods, for instance, using various forms of experimental designs 
(I describe them in more detail in Section 2.5). Nevertheless, it is customary for behavioural 
economic science that makes use of psychological principles and concepts in economics and 
finance, to apply specific terms interchangeably, especially, emotions, feelings, affect and 
visceral factors. Although I generally follow this tradition in my study, I find it essential to 
provide an overview of different classes of the sensations and explore their application in 
academic research during the last few decades. 
 




In economic research, affect is frequently used as a collective concept of emotions (for 
example, Loewenstein and Lerner (2003). Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2004) follow this 
practice, and implicitly include emotions (anger) and visceral factors (fear, hunger, sexual 
desire) into the concept of affect. Several papers (Rottestreich and Hsee (2001), Pachur et 
al. (2013)) use the term affect to distinguish between affect-rich and affect-poor prospects 
and highlight the presence of 'affect gap' in behaviour and decision-making. However, such 
application is conceptually very close to emotion.  
 
2.1.2. Visceral factors 
 
Visceral factors, also known as visceral influences, have a closer connection to physiological 
states than psychology (Loewenstein (1996)). The typical examples of such conditions 
include the drive states like hunger, thirst, physical pain, fear, cravings, etc. Loewenstein 
(1996) identifies two defining characteristics of visceral influences. First, a usually negative 
direct hedonic impact, which is featured with immediate attention switching to the 
developing inner state. Second, a direct effect on the preferences of particular goods and 
actions. Visceral states frequently lead to sharp changes in behaviour. Humans describe such 
situations as being 'Out-of-control'. Because of their mostly negative nature, the described 
psychological/physiological conditions produce the behaviour that is detrimental to an 
individual's self-interest. For example, Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) find that sexual 
arousal can generate deeply anti-social motivations and actions.  
Visceral factors are substantially different from tastes or preferences – two notions 
frequently used in traditional economic studies. Unlike tastes, visceral factors are mostly 
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influenced by unexpected external stimulations or deprivations and hence are far more 




The term 'emotions' is the one that is the most frequently used in the economic literature to 
refer to psychological sensations of individual decision-makers. Elster (1998), Scherer 
(2005) and Frijda (2007) give their classification of emotions' attributes to distinguish them 
from other affective phenomena. These classifications substantially overlap, hence I will 
provide only one of the views provided by Scherer (p. 699-702, (2005)).  
1. Emotions are event focused – there should be a cognitive antecedent to elicit the 
sequence of the emotional reaction of the organism. The events can be prompted by 
other people or external circumstances or by an individual's own actions or thoughts. 
Notably, the event must have a meaning for the person to cause the emotional 
reaction.  
2. Emotions are appraisal driven – the emotion-generating event must be relevant for 
an individual's concerns. A person should care about the event itself or the changes 
to the environment that the event brings about.  
3. Emotions produce response synchronisation – response preparation is a complex 
process in the organism that requires the combination and synchronisation of 
multiple physiological and psychological processes.  
4. Emotions are transient, rapidly adapting states – events and their appraisal of 
relevance occur frequently and change quickly. Emotional reactions are usually 
unstable and naturally adjust to the ongoing appraisal process and modification of 
circumstances.  
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5. Emotions are featured with high intensity – comparing to other states, for instance, 
moods, emotions usually are intense enough to refocus the attention of an individual 
to the ongoing psychological process so that a person can cognitively experience the 
inner sensation.  
6. Emotions have a relatively short duration – emotions engender the mobilisation of 
many processes in the organism. Very long emotional experience can be harmful to 
a person's physiological or psychological state. In terms of duration, emotions can be 
positioned between more intense (and more destructive) visceral factors and less 
intense moods.  
   
2.1.4. Feelings 
 
The term 'feelings' is the most frequently interchanged with 'emotions'. However, Scherer 
(2005) defines feelings as only one of the components of emotions that helps to regulate the 
organism-environment function. Scherer (p.699, (2005)) contends that "using the term 
feeling, a single component denoting the subjective experience process, as a synonym for 
emotion, the total multi-modal component process, produces serious confusions and 




Scherer (2005) defines mood as a dispersed affective state that is characterised by durable 
subjective sensations that can last for hours or even days. Unlike emotions, mood can arise 
without any specific reason that can be clearly connected to a straightforward appraisal. 
Other features of mood include a low level of arousal and little tendency to respond with 
action.   
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2.2. How to measure emotions? 
 
The measurement of emotions is a long-debated topic. Possible tools for such measurement 
have offered across all the three principal research methodologies of emotions: 
neurophysiological, experimental and empirical. 
One of the top researchers of emotions, Scherer (2005) explains that emotion is a collective 
phenomenon made of five organismic components (p.697-698): "The components of an 
emotion episode are the respective states of the five subsystems and the process consists of 
the coordinated changes over time". The components are – evaluation of objects and events, 
system regulation, preparation and direction of action, communication of reaction and 
behavioural intention and monitoring of internal state and organism-environment 
interaction. Some of the components can be cognitively evaluated, interpreted and measured, 
e.g. evaluation of objects and events. Such assessment and measurement take place through 
the interview or self-reporting questionnaire that contains the questions like: 
-          How pleasant or unpleasant is the event or object in general, independent of the 
current satiation? 
-          How different is the event from what the person expected at this moment? 
Other components – system regulation, preparation of action – can be measured through 
neurophysiological study. Such studies can include heart rate measurement following an 
emotional event, speed of breathing, dilating pupils, changes in facial expression, brain 
reaction, etc. I review some of the featured neurophysiological papers in Section 2.3.2.1. 
Some of the studies – primarily experimental in design – offer a different way of measuring 
emotions. In effect, they propose to identify a so-called affective gap by modulating the 
subjects into affect-rich and affect-poor internal states and evaluating any difference in 
behaviour and parameters of subjects' decision, for example, performance. Featured 
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examples of such studies are Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001), Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004), 
Pachur et al. (2014). Loewenstein et al. (2001) contend that the feelings-induced reaction to 
an event in the affect-rich environment (that engenders changes in behaviour) reflects the 
subjective sense of risk in individuals, rather than cognitively processed algebraic 
multiplication of severity and probability of outcomes of the same event. I extensively use 
the concept of affective gaps and the idea expressed by 'Risk-as-Feelings' hypothesis 
(Loewenstein et al. (2001)) throughout my thesis. Unfortunately, these concepts, just as my 
dataset, do not allow precise measurement of emotions. However, I manage to compare two 
real-life financial decision-making environments that are different only by the degree of 
affect-richness. It enables me to identify changes in risk behaviour, performance, and the 
relation between them and attribute these changes to emotions.     
 
2.3. Consequentialist view on decision making and 
the role of emotions 
 
In this section, I briefly review two fundamental theories of decision-making under risk, 
Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory. Even though the two models have critical 
dissimilarities in certain aspects, they are alike in the way of constructing the decision as the 
elicitation of maximum utility from consequential algebraic multiplication of each 
anticipated choice’s value (severity) by its subjective probability (likelihood). 
The classic framework of decision-making, risk and return is outlined in the Expected Utility 
Theory (Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)). The theory implies that individuals make 
choices based on the maximisation of the concave utility function. The Expected Utility 
Theory is grounded on the set of baseline rational behaviour assumptions about an 
individual: focus on the realised preference, dominant risk aversion, the ability to make 
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unbiased, optimal, wealth-maximising choice between all available prospects, unlimited 
processing capacity, exclusively financial character of objectives formulation, disposition to 
act in own best interests. The conjectured knowledge about future outcomes by a decision-
maker along with other assumptions allows the treatment of risk perception as an objective, 
parametric measure, which can be estimated using such statistical variables as standard 
deviation, skewness and kurtosis. In the Expected Utility Theory perspective, the perceived 
return is the average value of all outcomes weighted by the respective likelihood. 
Concerning the view of risk, traditional finance uses the concept of attitude to risk, which 
comprises the notions of risk tolerance and degree of risk aversion. The notion of risk 
aversion has been extended from the Expected Utility Theory to another notorious classical 
financial theory – Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) (Markowitz (1952, 1959)). Modern 
Portfolio Theory introduced an integrated risk-return framework, in which higher investment 
risk should be remunerated with a higher return, implying a positive correlation between the 
two, and both risk and return can be statistically measured. An investor can find an optimal 
risky portfolio by maximising the utility function, which, in turn, is a function of investment 
risk, the investment return and investor’s attitude to risk (degree of risk aversion).  
The behavioural economics’ approach to risk and benefit can be traced from its critical 
component, the (Cumulative) Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1974, 1979, 
1992). The researchers contend that the normative Expected Utility Theory is 
psychologically unfeasible in its core axiomatic assumption of invariance and dominance, 
or representation of outcomes in terms of total wealth. Prospect Theory introduces several 
conceptual modifications to the classic theory appropriated for better alignment with the 
actual behaviour of individuals. Their summary is presented in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Distinctions between the main attributes of Expected Utility Theory and Prospect 
Theory. Adapted from Tversky and Kahneman ((1992), p. 316).  
Category Expected Utility Theory Prospect Theory 
Objects of choice Probability distributions 
over wealth 
Prospects framed in terms of 
gains and losses 




Utility is a concave function 
of wealth 
S-shaped value function and 
inverse S-shaped weighting 
function 
 
Also, in contrast to the Expected Utility Theory, the authors of Prospect Theory distinguish 
between the two types of evaluation of outcome attractiveness by the decision-maker: 
experience value – the psychological degree of attractiveness or disliking actually 
experienced from an outcome, and decision value – the objective expected impact of an 
outcome in a choice4. The transformation, or mapping, of experienced subjective values to 
objective states is conducted by what Kahneman and Tversky (1984) called ‘hedonic 
psychophysics’. Kahneman and Tversky separate the value function from weighting 
function by recognising two categories of psychophysical processes: a) the psychophysics 
of value that predefines distinctive value functions for  outcomes framed as reference-
dependent changes in wealth (i.e. gains and losses with zero as status quo, or a reference 
point), rather than a single value function for absolute total wealth (as in Expected Utility 
Theory); and b) the psychophysics of chance representing a nonlinear function of subjective 
probabilities used to evaluate prospects5. When the two nonlinear psychophysics-shaped 
functions are combined, the result is the ‘fourfold pattern of risk attitudes’. Tversky and 
Kahneman explain ((1992), p.306): “[…] the shapes of the value and the weighting functions 
 
4 According to Kahneman and Tversky (1984), traditional theory of decision-making does not differentiate 
between the two because it is implicitly assumed that they are coherent, which is in agreement with the concept 
of rationality.  
5 Tversky and Kahneman ((1992), p. 303) explain the psychophysical nonlinearity of both functions – value 
and weighting (probability), with the principle of diminishing sensitivity: “In the evaluation of outcomes [value 
function], the reference point serves as a boundary that distinguishes gains from losses. In the evaluation of 
uncertainty [probability weighting function], there are two natural boundaries – certainty and impossibility – 
that correspond to the endpoints of the certainty scale. Diminishing sensitivity entails that the impact of a given 
change in probability diminishes with its distance from the boundary. […] For uncertain prospects, this 
principle yields subadditivity for very unlikely events and superadditivity near certainty.” 
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imply risk-averse and risk-seeking preferences, respectively, for gains and for losses of 
moderate or high probability. Furthermore, the shape of the weighting functions favours risk-
seeking for small probabilities of gains and risk aversion for small probabilities of loss, 
provided the outcomes are not extreme.”   
Considering the impact of affect on the performance and risk of decisions in the 
consequentialist framework, both EUT and PT share a coherent view. As demonstrated in 
Figure 2.1, the models imply that humans make decisions by careful cognitive analysis of 
the consequences of the choices they have (Loewenstein et al. (2001), p. 267). Emotions, 
affects, feelings are epiphenomenal in these theories, meaning they cannot and do not impact 
the desirability of choice outcomes. 
 
Figure 2.1 The perspective of consequentialist theories, Expected Utility Theory and 











The Expected Utility Theory sees risk attitude as a form of the value (utility) function, which 
is always concave, reflecting the inherent risk aversion of individuals. That is, when given 
two choices with the same expected outcome, a less volatile option will and should always 
be selected by a rational decision-maker. It implies the correlation between risk and return 
to remain positive across the whole spectrum of the utility function. In Expected Utility 
Theory world risk is a statistical parameter that can (and should) be measured when making 
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making process. Prospect Theory view on how decisions are made under risk is more 
flexible, reflecting the descriptive nature of the model. Kahneman and Tversky claim that 
the core principle of Expected Utility Theory that only final wealth is of value for people 
implies too long-term oriented thinking, which is psychologically unrealistic. In real life, 
humans take a short-term perspective on important (and not that important) decisions in their 
lives. In the boundaries of short-term thinking, absolute final wealth loses its grip, giving 
way to changes in wealth that become more significant. Changes in wealth imply the 
existence of a reference point, around which wealth fluctuates. In this framework, risk is not 
only the curvature of the value function (concave in the gains domain, and convex in the 
losses domain), but also the loss aversion – perceived dominance of losses over gains, and 
decisional weighting function – overweighting choices with extreme probability versus more 
probable choices. The correlation between risk and return also undergoes imminent 
transformation under Prospect Theory. The correlation remains positive only in the domain 
of gains backed by the concave form of the value function. In losses domain, risk-seeking 
behaviour entails correlation to drop below zero and turn negative. Besides, loss aversion 
bias leads to the expectation that negative correlation must be stronger in modulus than a 
positive one for the equivalent degree of outcome’s severity. I test these assumptions in my 
theoretical model in Section 2.10 and the first chapter of my empirical research.   
 
2.4.  Dual-process theories of decision making, risk 
and return 
 
In this section, I describe the models that strive to make a better approximation to real-life 
human behaviour by integrating emotions into decision processing. I also cover and review 
the literature that accumulated considerable evidence of the role that feelings play in the 
formation of decision outcomes, decision performance, and risky behaviour inherent into 
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decisions. These studies claim that ignoring emotions largely deteriorates the predictive 
power and reliability of traditional models.  
 
2.4.1. History and main principles of non-
consequentialist perspective 
 
The development and evolution of so-called dual-process theories have been associated with 
an augmented understanding of the role of affect in decision making over the last two 
decades. The cognitive-only view on choice and psychological biases was updated and, 
gradually, a more balanced view was taken. For instance, Kahneman (2003) revisits prior 
approach by granting equal position to cognition and affect, which he calls ‘a more integrated 
view of the role of affect in intuitive judgment’6. The sample of the dual-process framework 
is graphically represented in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2. The evolution of perspectives of the role of affect in judgment and decision 
















6 Kahneman ((2003), p.710) comments that “in terms of the scope of responses that it governs, the natural 
assessment of affect should join representativeness and availability in the list of general-purpose heuristic 
attributes. The failure to identify the affect heuristic much earlier and its enthusiastic acceptance in recent years 
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Generally, for all dual-process models, behaviour is the result of the interaction between 
cognitive and emotional processing. Several important conclusions follow from Figure 2.2. 
First, feelings can directly surface from anticipated outcomes and probabilities without the 
intermediation of cognition. Second, cognition and feelings may have different determining 
factors. The factors that are essential for the emotional charge at the moment of choice, such 
as vividness or immediacy of an outcome, have a minor impact on cognitive processing. 
Third, behaviour can be predominantly mediated by feelings, which can generate decisions 
that are reversed from what is predicted by consequentialist models.     
The starting point for models integrating affect can be attributed to Epstein (1994) and 
Sloman (1996) who formulate a dual-process theory7 of thinking and knowing grounded on 
prior psychological research (e.g. Brewer (1988), Bargh (1989), Fazio (1990)).  As the 
researchers suggest, humans process information and make decisions based on two systems, 
experiential (feelings) and rational (cognition), accordingly, System 1 and System 2 as 
labelled by Kahneman (2011), or analytic and intuitive (Epstein ((1994), p.710): “There is 
no dearth of evidence in everyday life that people apprehend reality in two fundamentally 
different ways, one variously labelled intuitive, automatic, natural, non-verbal, narrative, and 
experiential, and the other analytical, deliberative, verbal, and rational. […] Embedded in 
common language is evidence that people are intuitively aware of two fundamentally diverse 
ways of knowing, one associated with feelings and experience, and the other with intellect.”8  
 
7 The latest review and debate about the dual-process theories can be found in Evans (2008) and Evans and 
Stanovich (2013). 
8 Sloman (1996) labels the two systems of mental processing as associative and rule-based. He does not 
explicitly relate associative system to emotions, affect or feelings (these words even do not appear in the paper), 
nevertheless, when describing the associative system, he uses such affect-related notions as imagination, 
fantasy, or intuition. Sloman ((1996), p. 6) focuses on approaches to problem solving and reasoning when he 
claims that “two systems, two algorithms are designed to achieve different computational goals. One is 
associative, and it seems to operate reflexively. It draws inferences from a kind of statistical description of its 
environment by making use of the similarity between problem elements, interpreted using such aspects of 
general knowledge as images and stereotypes. The other is rule based and tries to describe the world by 
capturing different kinds of structure, structure that is logical, hierarchical, and causal-mechanical.” 
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Researchers demonstrate how the distinction between the two systems is explicitly 
manifested through common behavioural patterns and biases, such as irrational fears, 
superstitious thinking, religion, etc. This is how Slovic et al. ((2004), p. 313) illustrate how 
experiential and analytic systems coexist: “It was the experiential system, after all, that 
enabled human beings to survive during their extended period of evolution. Long before 
there was probability theory, risk assessment, and decision analysis, there were intuition, 
instinct, and gut feeling to tell us whether an animal was safe to approach or the water was 
safe to drink. As life became more complex and humans gained more control over their 
environment, analytic tools were invented to ‘boost’ the rationality of our experiential 
thinking. Subsequently, analytic thinking was placed on a pedestal and portrayed as the 
epitome of rationality.”  
Table 2.2. Two modes of thinking and deciding: System 1 versus System 2. Adapted from 
Slovic et al. ((2004), p. 313) 
 
System 1 – Experiential  System 2 – Analytic  
1. Holistic Analytic 
2. Affective: pleasure-pain oriented Logical: reason oriented (what is sensible) 
3. Behaviour mediated by ‘vibes’ from 
past experiences 
Behaviour mediated by conscious appraisal 
of events 
4. Encodes reality in concrete images, 
metaphors, and narratives 
Encodes reality in abstract symbols, words, 
and numbers 
5. More rapid processing: oriented 
toward immediate action 
Slower processing: oriented toward 
delayed action 
6. Associationistic connections  Logical connections 
7. Self-evidently valid: “experiencing is 
believing” 




Another version of behavioural dichotomy is offered by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 
(2004). In their two-system model of behaviour, individual’s motivations and decisions are 
placed between the extremes of ‘affective optimum’ and ‘deliberative (cognitive) optimum’. 
Some stimuli can activate only a single system, while others can trigger two systems 
simultaneously. Most of the time, both systems will work in unison, bolstering and 
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reinforcing each other. Nevertheless, occasionally, they may turn contradictory9. In such a 
case, the degree to which one system will prevail over the other concerning a concrete 
decision largely depends on stimuli specifications. According to the researchers, a salient 
parameter defining the primacy of one of the systems is stimulus proximity to the decision-
maker in one of the relevant dimensions, e.g. temporal, visual, or physical10. Generally, 
though, affective system will dominate over deliberative, but humans are empowered with 
willpower to control and overrule affective reactions.  
 
2.4.2. ‘Risk-as-Feelings’ model of decision-making  
 
The synthesis of dual-process conceptualisation and its key predictions are highlighted in 
the ‘Risk-as-Feelings hypothesis’ by Loewenstein et al. (2001). The authors dispute the 
historical view on feelings as a mere product of the judgment process as regarded by classic 
theories. Further, they argue that the introduction of a group of regret/disappointment 
theories that embrace emotional reactions does not significantly modify the existing 
consequentialist conception in the way how a decision-maker forms his behaviour. 
Loewenstein et al. (p. 267-268) name this type of emotions ‘anticipated’, which make part 
of a cognitive process and can be described as “a component of the expected consequences 
of the decision [and] emotions that are expected to occur when outcomes are experienced, 
rather than emotions that are experienced at the time of decision”. In contrast to the classic 
perspective, the researchers outline their own framework of the function of affect in 
 
9 Loewenstein and O’Donoghue ((2004), p.9) gave an example with food as a stimulus. The complementing 
activation of two systems may occur when the sight of food evokes the (affective) feeling of hunger together 
with a (cognitively processed) thought of the need to have a meal. In contrast, the contradictory activation of 
affective and deliberative systems may happen if in response to having a feeling of hunger a person remembers 
being on a diet, which demands self-rationing.     
10  The proximity parameter and its impact on behaviour is highly correlated with the intensity variable 
explained in Loewenstein (1996). High degree of proximity and intensity lead to more explicit activation of 
affective system and impulsive behaviour.   
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judgment. In this framework, the behaviour is tuned by anticipatory emotions rather than 
anticipated. According to Loewenstein et al. (p.267-268), anticipatory emotions are 
“immediate [unexpected] visceral reactions (e.g. fear, anxiety, dread) to risks and 
uncertainties”. The new perspective establishes two new meaningful and contradictory 
interactions, grounded on the prior studies of emotions. 
First, feelings reciprocally impact and inform cognitive reactions. The fact that cognition 
shapes emotional states has been known for a long time. For example, appraisal theories (see 
Forgas (2008) for review) argue that representations about past, current and future affective 
reactions are preceded by cognitive mechanisms. However, the role of feelings in informing 
cognitive processes is a relatively new domain of explorations. Nevertheless, a substantial 
amount of evidence posits that emotions and cognition complement each other to produce 
decisions and behaviour. As Loewenstein et al. (p.271) summarise: “affect typically […] 
provides inputs into decision making that help people to [cognitively] evaluate alternative 
courses of action, albeit not always in normative fashion”.  
Second, emotions can directly tune behaviour without (or at little) cognitive mediation11. 
Based on the alternative line of literature, affective reactions frequently depart from purely 
cognitively processed maximisation of wealth. In such cases, feelings commonly dictate 
behaviour. For example, Zuckerman (1994, 2007) put forth a theory according to which 
people engage in financial, social, legal, etc. risky behaviour for the sake of (Zuckerman 
(1994), p. 27) “seeking of varied, novel, complex, and intense sensations”12. Often, such 
sensation-seeking behaviour is wealth-destructive from a purely cognitive perspective, for 
instance, in the financial domain, several papers (Dorn and Sengmueller (2009), Dorn et al. 
 
11 Loewenstein et al. ((2001), p. 270) explained that “feeling states are postulated to respond to factors, such as 
the immediacy of risk, that do not enter into cognitive evaluation of the risk and also respond to probabilities 
and outcome values in a fashion that is different from the way in which these variables enter into cognitive 
evaluations. Because their determinants are different, emotional reactions to risks can diverge from cognitive 
evaluations of the same risks”.  
12 Sensation seeking has a clearly established link to human neurophysiology, as it directly correlates with 
androgen exposure and dopaminergic reward (e.g. Campbell et al. (2010)).  
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(2014)) provide evidence that trading by individual investors is substantially motivated by 
the search of new sensations, which generally leads to excessive trading and losses. Further 
support of emotional dominance over cognition can be found in the gambling literature (see 
Johansson et al. (2009), Binde (2009), Spurrier and Blaszczynski (2014) for review), where 
the destruction of wealth by gambling is mostly driven by affective motivations (e.g. dreams 
of the jackpot, seeking of new emotions or inducing the change of mood)13.  
In their model, Loewenstein at al. propose an approach to integrate the two competing 
instances – the complementary role of emotions in cognitive decision making, and discordant 
effect of anticipatory feelings – into a theory that attempts (Loewenstein et al. (2001), p.270) 
“to explain when and why emotional reactions diverge from cognitive evaluations of risk 
and to explain how these responses interact to determine behaviour”. The authors associate 
the divergence with two aspects – discrepancy in response to purely traditional 
consequentialist models’ inputs – probabilities and outcomes; and anticipatory emotions-
specific factors that classic models do not consider, such as affective vividness of a decision, 
or time lag between decision and outcome.  
 
2.5. The impact of feelings on performance  
 
2.5.1. Predictions under consequentialist and dual-
process perspectives 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, there are two alternative (and largely complementary) 
views on how emotions influence behaviour, and subsequently performance. According to 
the consequentialist-type models, we should not observe any meaningful impact: feelings do 
 
13 Accordingly, pathological gambling is closely related to dysfunctional impulsivity.  
P a g e  | 43 
 
not influence outcomes, or at least, they can be envisaged in advance and dealt with 
accordingly.   
For ‘Risk-as-Feelings’ hypothesis and similar theories, the relation between affect and 
outcomes is more intricate. As was outlined, emotions can be classified as anticipated 
(expected) and anticipatory (immediate). Expected emotions are, by definition, the product 
of cognitive processes that take place when an individual analyses the impact of decisions 
and actions on her future emotional state. Anticipatory emotions are felt immediately (and 
usually unpredictably) at the moment of a decision. Very often they are processed 
subconsciously and may generate impulsive behaviour that is causing actions against one’s 
realised cognitively-processed self-interest. Underlining this peculiarity, Rick and 
Loewenstein ((2008), p. 150) note that human actions under the effect of emotions are very 
much distinct from the thoughtful and rational multiplication of costs and benefits. In 
contrast, it is a far more chaotic process that “often drives behaviour in exactly the opposite 
direction from that suggested by a weighting of costs and benefits”. 
Non-consequentialist framework predicts that even under otherwise identical circumstances, 
performance may deviate in response to the change in immediate emotional intensity. Most 
of the time and for the most of decisions, these deviations will not be dramatic, and will keep 
the decision-making process generally within the boundaries of consequentialist model’s 
predictions. However, in rare cases, the more vigorous emotional intensity may bring about 
more massive departure from the standard expectations. It should be understood, though, 
that the power of the non-consequentialist framework is most efficiently elicited not for 
overturning the predictions of Prospect Theory but for correcting its precision.  
Consequently, it follows from the literature that the necessary adjustments to Prospect 
Theory are dependent on the ability to comprehend and identify the degree of emotional 
intensity attributed to the event. For this purpose, I explore the variables that are known to 
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mediate the level of the dominating intensity of affect. There are several factors described in 
the literature, for instance, the duration of the emotion-eliciting event, the time interval 
between decision and realisation of an outcome, nature of emotion, or personal 
characteristics of an emotion-experiencing person. Yet, one of the widely accepted key 
elements that shape human emotional reactions to stimuli is the vividness with which we 
mentally perceive the expected consequences possibly produced by interaction with these 
stimuli (Loewenstein et al. (2001)). However, vividness is a complex construct consisting of 
several constituents, which should be analysed because of their importance for the research 
question. Frijda (1986, 2007) and Sonnemans and Frijda (1994, 1995) mention concern 
strength, concern relevance and appraisal. 
Concern is defined as an integral of “motives, goals, both acute and latent, and preferences 
or aversions for particular classes of stimuli” (Sonnemans and Frijda (1995), p.485). 
Concerns may vary in terms of their significance to the subject, i.e. have a different degree 
of strength. The second dimension of concern is its relevance to the stimuli under 
consideration. Generally, the higher the strength of concern and the magnitude of stimulus 
value to a person, the more intense emotion should be expected. With respect to financial 
trading, a number of concerns have been discussed in the literature. Apart from classical 
explanations for trading, such as material welfare, liquidity management, retirement savings 
(Hoffman (2007)), some more extravagant concerns have been discovered: entertainment 
(Dorn and Sengmueller (2009)), sensation seeking (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2008)), rise in 
self-esteem (Barberis and Xiong (2008)), aspiration for riches (Kumar (2009)).  
Appraisal is a vital variable in the emotional intensity function. In addition to the appraisal 
of the relevance of the event or stimulus for the subject, there is a second dimension of the 
concept – contextual appraisal. It relates to the attributes of the event that are involved in 
emotional processing. Notably, one of the attributes is “how real the event is felt to be, i.e. 
whether or not it actually occurred, or whether or not it actually does have the implications 
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it might seem to have” (Sonnemans and Frijda (1995), p.486). Basically, it can be referred 
to as ‘a sense of reality’. Sonnemans and Frijda (1995) find that sense of reality is particularly 
well correlated with the emotion of fear14. They also encounter that the feeling of anger is 
boosted if there is someone else to blame for the situation. As is known from both popular 
and academic literature (e.g. Oberlechner (2004)), fear and anger are perpetual companions 
of financial trader.  
In Section 2.10, I develop a theoretical model to compare the predictions regarding some 
aspects of behaviour made under the affect-poor perspective (proxied by the parameters from 
the original Prospect Theory model) and the affect-rich perspective (represented by the 
parameters from the model of Jakusch et al. (2019).   
    
2.5.2. Extant literature on the influence of emotions on 
performance, methodologies and main findings 
 
The testing of the interplay between affect, behaviour and performance so far has been 
conducted along with the three methodologies that dominate existing literature: 
neurophysiological analysis, experimental analysis, and interview-type studies. Although 
the principal place in this domain of literature is devoted to a general workplace context, a 
limited number of papers discuss and examine the job and activity of (mostly professional) 
financial traders or lay people taking a broader set of financial decisions. Because of the 
scarcity of relevant empirical data sets, and the inability to properly manipulate feelings in 
the empirical settings, there is a clear gap in terms of empirical investigations of the impact 
of emotions on performance.          
 
14 They also found that when self-esteem is hurt by the event, the feeling of fear is reinforced.  
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2.5.2.1. Neurophysiological studies 
 
The standard approach under neurophysiological methodology is to gauge and establish a 
relation between a specific neurophysiological variable and trading performance. Examples 
of variables that were used in the literature include second-to-fourth digit length ratio (Coates 
at al. (2009)), the level of testosterone (Coates and Herbert (2008)), and heart rate variability 
(Fenton O’Creevy et al. (2012)). Typically, the studies focus on a small group of professional 
traders as subjects, primarily because of limited possibility to reach out larger professional 
and lay traders populations. The papers using this type of research methods generate mixed 
results on the role of affect in trading results. For instance, Coates et al. (2008) find that 
second-to-fourth digit ratio (that is known to be dependent on the prenatal exposure to 
androgenic steroids and postnatal sensitivity to testosterone circulation – a recognised factor 
in the emotional regulation of risk-taking) is positively correlated with performance. Traders 
with higher ratio demonstrate better adaptation to financial markers if measured by the long-
term results and survival criterion. Another evidence of the positive influence of emotions 
comes from the study of Coates and Herbert (2008). The authors demonstrate that traders 
with higher testosterone (associated with positive affect) morning level have significantly 
better performance during the day. In contrast, Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2012) show that 
higher level of affect (measured by the heart rate variability) has a moderate negative 
correlation with performance (proxied by traders’ annual remuneration). 
Fairchild et al. (2016) combine a neurophysiological design with the experimental setting of 
a simulated stock market game using a group of students as subjects. The authors collect and 
study the relationship between many individual variables: level of risk aversion, risk-
seeking, loss aversion, self-reported emotions, actual emotions measured with the help of 
GSR equipment that is combined with the results of a trading game (return and behaviour). 
The focus in this paper and the design of the simulated trading is made specifically on the 
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bear market. The intriguing results reported in the paper demonstrate several performance-
related findings—subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion exhibit lower performance, 
higher realised volatility and lower Sharpe ratio. The authors explain such a counter-intuitive 
result by suggesting that in a bear market, it does not pay off to be risk-averse. They also 
assume that the reason for the identified phenomenon can be psychological/emotion-based: 
higher risk-aversion together with a larger proportion of risky assets investment may produce 
anxiety and emotional paralysis.   
 
2.5.2.2. Experimental studies 
 
The experimental branch of literature is based on the two-step approach. Initially, 
researchers extract subjects’ emotions-related attitudes and other variables through a 
questionnaire or a survey. After that, this data is matched against a set of tailored decision-
making exercises. Again, as in the studies following neurophysiological methodologies, the 
conclusions regarding the positive or negative role of feelings in performance turn out to be 
mixed. For example, Seo and Barrett (2007) break down the affect variable into two 
dimensions: affective intensity (reactivity) and affective influence regulation (management). 
In the experimental stock trading game setting, they explore how the dimensions interact 
with the trading performance. The researchers discover that the personal trait of experiencing 
more intense emotions is positively related to individual trading results. The same conclusion 
is reached regarding better emotions regulation skills. Interestingly, the two dimensions are 
found to impact performance in the additive fashion and not interactive. The contrasting 
result is demonstrated in the papers of Schunk and Betsch (2006) and Lo et al. (2005). The 
first co-authors, using an experimental lottery design, construct subjects’ personal utility 
function that is matched against the result of the questionnaire on individual decision-making 
style (intuition or deliberation). They find that individuals with a more elaborate analytical 
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approach have more linear utility functions, hence smaller exposure to emotional biases (and 
closer proximity to expected return maximisation). However, it comes at the cost of longer 
average time spent on a decision. Lo et al. (2005) match paper and real trading performance 
of a group of financial day traders against their responses to the personality test and regular 
survey of current mood (using Mood Adjective Checklist inventory). The evidence they 
obtain suggests that traders with more intense affective reactions to both losses and gains 
tend to have worse returns than subjects manifesting weaker emotional reactivity. 
 
2.5.2.3. Interview-type studies 
 
Finally, the interview-type analysis technique implies obtaining affective variables from 
interviews with the subjects further comparing the variables to performance statistics. A 
featured example of such study is the paper of Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2011), in which the 
authors interview a group of professional traders with an attempt to elicit the role of feelings 
in the daily work and decision-making of a trader, the use of intuition and its effect on 
performance. These qualitative data are used together with performance statistics measured 
by total remuneration of traders. It is identified that the changes in mood resulting from prior 
good or bad trades harm the following results overall. Also, high performing traders have 
markedly distinct emotion regulation strategies compared to low performing traders. 
Specifically, high performers apply more cautious strategies regulating the impact of 
intuition on their decisions.  
 
2.5.2.4. Conclusion of the studies review 
 
The studies reviewed above use creative approaches to provide some interesting findings 
regarding the impact of feelings on decision performance. However, they clearly do not 
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extend to establishing whether more emotions are generally good or bad for a large 
population of people in the natural environment making, for instance, a sequence of standard 
financial decisions. Essentially, it is indicated that feelings’ effect is strongly heterogeneous 
and can play both positive and negative role in behaviour and performance depending on the 
angle of view and the defined methodology, scenario or conditions of the study. This fact 
corresponds to the bifurcation of a broader research perspective (see Loewenstein et al. 
(2001) and Seo and Barrett (2007) for the more detailed review), in which emotions are 
considered as either negative because they induce various biases that hurt decision-makers 
or positive because they operate as decision facilitators that power and enable the whole 
decision-making mechanics.  
Fenton-O'Creevy et al. (2012) also discuss the possible reasons behind the duality of findings 
concerning the impact of emotions on performance. They argue that both positive and 
negative effect revealed in the literature may be due to the distinction between the incidental 
and integral emotions. Incidental emotions are the class of experiences that are unrelated to 
the decision itself. For example, that can be the impact of a depressed feeling after a family 
conflict on the investment decision made later that day. Incidental emotions are generally 
considered in the literature to deteriorate the rational processing of information and produce 
biased decisions. Their role is mostly found to be harmful to performance. 
In contrast, integral emotions represent the type of experiences that are relevant to processed 
decisions. They are often unconscious and involve both past and current experience of the 
decision-maker specific for the judgement made. The papers that target integral emotions 
often find a positive impact on performance. Fenton-O'Creevy et al. (2012) argue that the 
two perspectives may not be in contradiction but rather complement one another. The 
authors also suggest that for successful decision-making, one should engage in emotion 
regulation such that the role of incidental emotions is cut short, while the experience-based 
integral emotions are duly capitalised upon.        
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As concluding remarks, it is essential to mention that the papers mentioned above and, more 
generally, methodologies share several vital issues. First, because of time, financial, data 
protection and other types of restrictions, researchers can hire a very limited number of 
subjects, usually few dozens, and focus only on the most professional traders from trading 
floors of major banks. Second, subjects are aware that they are being observed and evaluated 
during the experiment, which may be a strong behaviour changing factor and a stimulus by 
itself, producing noise in feelings elicitation and distorting research results. Third, to a large 
extent, the non-empirical techniques are reliant on what subjects say, rather than their actual 
behaviour. There is extensive evidence that these two instances can differ. A more natural 
domain of empirical analysis can potentially control for these disturbances.    
 
2.6. The impact of emotions on risk behaviour  
 
An essential conclusion stemming from the papers considered in the previous section is that 
performance most of the times is strongly dependent and mediated by risk preferences and 
risk behaviour in the episodes of judgments under uncertainty involving emotions. 
Therefore, in this section, I examine studies that focus specifically on the interactions 
between feelings and risky choices. In the non-consequentialist framework, emotions are 
predicted to have a direct impact on behaviour under risk and uncertainty. However, as it is 
explained in Kahneman and Tversky conceptualisation (1979, 1992), the risk is a multi-
dimensional construct that is based on three main components – the form of the outcome 
valuation function, the form of the probability weighting function, and loss aversion. In the 
subsequent sections, I describe the risk components one by one.  
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2.6.1. Emotions and the form of the value function 
 
The valuation function has been found in Prospect Theory framework to have an S-shaped 
form, which Kahneman and Tversky explained by “psychophysics of value” principle. In 
accordance with it, the psychological perception of the magnitude of change in value 
decreases as the change happens further away from the status quo. As a result, individuals 
will face a concave valuation function in the domain of gains, and convex function in the 
domain of losses. In other words, they will tend to be risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking 
for losses. Later, Kahneman et al. (1999) and Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) expanded and 
largely modified the psychophysics explanation originating a framework of ‘affective 
valuation’ or ‘valuation by feelings’. This principle or method of valuation has become the 
cornerstone of the dual-process theory that has been referred to in the prior discussion. The 
theory contends that individuals are naturally equipped or utilise two classes of thinking and 
deciding, one based on cognitive apparatus, and another on emotional processing. Both are 
substantially different from the stimulus valuation standpoint. Cognitive analysis recognises 
the continuity of the valuation function, i.e. the value function evolves gradually from the 
reference point, while emotional analysis has a propensity towards binary-like structure, i.e. 
everything/nothing, or gains/losses. Most of the psychological value is derived from the 
mere appearance of stimuli themselves and tend to ignore the pertaining degree of scope, i.e. 
are insensitive to severity15.  
 
Kahneman et al. ((1999), p.212) explain scope insensitivity in the following way: “the 
quantitative attribute has little weight in the valuation, which is determined mainly by the 
affective response to a prototypical instance of the good”. Kahneman and his colleagues also 
argue that at the heart of valuation process is not the revelation of genuine and fundamental 
 
15 As Hsee and Rottenstreich ((2004), p. 24) assert: “feelings yield marked sensitivity to the presence or absence 
of a stimulus (i.e., the change from 0 to some scope) but yield little sensitivity to subsequent increments of 
scope. In contrast, calculations yield relatively constant sensitivity throughout the entire range.”   
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economic preferences but rather the expression of the momentary attitude of liking or 
disliking towards the stimulus (p. 204), which has an authentic affective origin. This view 
very closely overlaps with the models of Affect heuristic (Finucane et al. (2000), Slovic et 
al. (2004)) and ‘Risk as feelings’ hypothesis (Loewenstein et al. (2001)), which claim that 
valuation of risky decisions is mostly a process of approaching choices one likes and 
avoiding choices one dislikes. That is, affective valuation determines the sign – positive or 
negative – and intensity of a stimulus. The more intense it is, the more binary, i.e. tending to 
extremes, the realised attitude (or choice preference) is going to be. Also, the more bipolar 
is the choice, the more insensitive it is to the scope of a stimulus.  
 
Variation in insensitivity to the scope is demonstrated in the series of smart experiments by 
Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004). In the first study, the authors show that subjects initially 
primed to calculations or affect, evince apparent proclivity to more (when primed to 
calculations) or less (when primed to feelings) sensitivity to scope in the subsequent analysis. 
In the second study, subjects prove to be more consistent (sensitive to scope) when deciding 
on the effort spent to earn cash remuneration (a proxy for affect-poor stimulus) than in the 
case of equivalently priced music book (a proxy for affect-rich stimulus). The third 
experiment manipulates the visual representation of the stimulus (saving pandas). As it turns 
out, subjects who see cute pictures of pandas are much less sensitive to the number of 
animals they are saving with their donation in comparison when pandas are depicted 
schematically as mere dots. Based on the experiments’ proceeds, Hsee and Rottenstreich 
((2004, p. 28-29) offer a model equivalent to Cobb-Douglas utility function that would 
reflect shifts in the curvature of the value function caused by emotional implications of 
appraised stimuli: 
 
𝑉 = 𝐴𝛼𝑆1−𝛼    (Formula 2.1) 
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where V stands for the subjective value derived from a stimulus, A denotes the emotional 
intensity of a stimulus, S stimulus’s scope, and α is a coefficient of emotional focus. As 
noted by Hsee and Rottenstreich, A and α are presumed to be correlated, i.e. more affective 
stimuli attract more attention from the decision-maker16.  
 
It is assumed that α is larger for higher A value due to the positive correlation between the 
two. The resulting function is schematically depicted in Figure 2.3. As presumed, affect-rich 
stimuli elicit the most of psychological value already at low rates of inducement. 
Subsequently, the degree of scope sensitivity remains muted. In contrast, affect-poor targets 
produce high sensitivity to increments in scope.  
 
Figure 2.3 Subjective value function for affect-rich vs. affect-poor stimuli. 
 
Note: The affect-poor prospect value function is constructed using a curvature coefficient from the original 
study by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), which is 0.88. For affect-rich prospects, the curvature coefficient is 
arbitrarily lowered to 0.2. Subsequently, the sensitivity to small changes in outcomes becomes 
disproportionally more acute than to larger changes. The psychological evaluation of an outcome approximates 
a more binary-like process of ‘will occur/will not occur’, where the extent is less important.   
 
16 For the sake of focusing on the curvature of the value function, I deliberately ignore the loss aversion factor 
that is commonly used in specifications of similar models (starting from Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). In 
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The model outlined above implies consequences that are qualitatively and quantitatively 
different from what is inferred by consequentialist models. The affect-rich function is 
progressively more concave in the positive domain and convex in the negative domain for 
more feelings-eliciting stimuli. Considering that feelings are not integrated into the decision 
processing under the traditional or Prospect Theory frameworks, both models cannot predict 
or incorporate the fact that the level of affect pertaining to the prospects may change the 
form of the value function. Nevertheless, such a change will have a direct influence on the 
risk behaviour and correlation between risk and return. The shift in the psychological value 
of a similar type of outcomes should lead to different lines of behaviour depending on the 
dominating level of emotional charge.  
 
2.6.2. Emotions and loss aversion 
 
The impact of emotions on the second dimension of risk behaviour – loss aversion is 
explored to a much lesser extent. Most of the research in this area is represented by 
experimental (Dhar and Wertenbroch (2000), Harinck et al. (2007)) and neurophysiological 
(De Martino et al. (2010), Weller et al. (2007)) studies. Camerer summarises the literature 
and expresses his viewpoint on the interaction between loss aversion and feelings in the 
following way (Camerer (2005), p. 9): “My intuition is that loss-aversion is often an 
exaggerated emotional fear reaction, an adapted response to the prospect of genuine 
damaging survival-threatening loss, which overreacts to small losses in our (evolutionarily-
new) long lives that are not truly life-threatening. Many of the losses people fear most are 
not life-threatening, but there is no telling that to an emotional system over-adapted to 
conveying fear signals.  People hate losing jobs, ending relationships, and delaying delivery 
of rewards, though they rarely die from those “losses” or broken hearts”. It should be kept 
in mind that loss aversion is normally elicited when both positive and negative choices are 
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part of the same evaluation prospects (so-called mixed choices). That is why loss aversion 
is qualitatively diverse from risk-averse/risk-seeking analytical framework because the latter 
typically involves prospects with the same sign (all losses or all gains), Effectively, as is 
stipulated in the literature of affective loss aversion, in case of more affect-rich stimuli the -
λ (loss aversion) coefficient applied to losses section of valuation function in Kahneman-
Tversky Prospect Theory framework, is expected to be larger. As a result, affect-richer 
stimuli must generate a higher degree of overall risk aversion. Graphically, it can be 
represented in the following way:  
 
Figure 2.4. Loss aversion effect on subjective value function for affect-rich and affect-poor 
stimuli.  
Note: The affect-poor prospect value function is constructed using curvature and loss aversion coefficients 
from the original study by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), which are 0.88 and 2.25, respectively. For affect-
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2.6.3. Emotions and the form of the probability 
weighting function 
 
The last facet of risk behaviour is the probability weighting function. Fehr-Duda and Epper 
((2012), p. 589 comment: “Probability dependence is the more fundamental of the two [if to 
compare loss aversion and non-linear probability weighting] because it is observed for all 
types of prospects: pure gain prospects as well as pure loss and mixed prospects. In contrast, 
loss aversion is effective for mixed prospects only. It is our impression that probability-
dependent risk preferences have not received as much attention as loss aversion has, 
however”. This view is confirmed by a minimal number of studies investigating the 
emotional nature and affective impact on the weighting function. 
 
There are three components or dimensions of the transformation of probability weighting 
function that must be encompassed to understand the influence of affect on probability 
weights: the curvature of the probability weighting function, elevation of the probability 
weighting function, and asymmetric transformation of the weighting function for gains and 
losses. 
 
I begin with the first dimension – concavity and convexity parameters of the nonlinear 
probability function. As was initially outlined in the Prospect Theory framework (Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979)), for probability weighting function two reference points are naturally 
identified – zero probability (impossibility) of an event to occur, and 100% probability 
(certainty) that an event will take place. It has been discovered that humans tend to 
systematically overweight chances closer to 0% and underestimate objective probabilities 
closer to 100%. It leads to the inverse S-shaped functional form of the decision weights. 
There are several explanations of this phenomenon in the literature. Tversky and Kahneman 
in their Prospect Theory maintain that this is the result of the psychophysical process 
(‘psychophysics of chance’) of larger sensitivity to more salient probabilities near to 
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certainty and impossibility, and then diminishing sensitivity to intermediate probabilities. 
Other researchers (e.g. Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001)) believe that this is in the first place 
the consequence of emotional implications, primarily the feelings of fear and hope, but also 
dread and savouring that shape the weighting function. Moreover, in contrast to the standard 
condition of source independence, probabilities estimation is not separated from the stimulus 
itself, meaning that the perception of equal probabilities for more affect-rich prospect and 
the less affect-rich prospect will differ.     
 
In fact, abundant evidence is found indicating that affect-rich and affect-poor probabilities 
are treated by people in a strikingly different way (see Rick and Loewenstein (2008), Suter 
et al. (2016) for review of relevant literature)17. There are two alternative views on how 
feelings transform probability weighting of a risky choice. First, individuals may neglect 
probabilities (beliefs) whatsoever when placed into an affect-rich set-up. In this scenario, the 
choice is essentially shaped by vivid representation (mental imagery) of possible extreme 
outcomes – worst- and best-case scenarios leading to the engagement of minimax rule (i.e. 
changes in probabilities close to reference points elicit most – close to all – of psychological 
impact). This way of rationing can be found in Pachur et al. (2014). In the alternative 
construct, the affect-rich setting does not block probability function completely but only 
distorts it in comparison to an affect-poor set-up. In this conceptualisation, put forth by, e.g. 
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001), the risky choice is best fitted by the probability weighting 
function described in Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). 
Suter et al. (2016) investigate which of the two models – CPT or minimax rule – can better 
explain the ‘affective gaps’. They conduct their experiments on an individual decision-maker 
level and discover that individual preferences in risky choice are best described by the so-
called dual-system model (DSM) that combines both constructs administered by a linear 
 
17 Practically, it allows rejecting probability-outcome independence, which is one of the core assumptions in 
the consequentialist theories (e.g. Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory).  
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weighting function18. The study comprises an important conclusion that the weight for 
minimax rule (that ignores probabilities) rises two-fold from 20% in affect-poor set-up to 
44% in the affect-rich set-up.  
 
The second dimension of affective influence on the probability function reflected in the 
literature is its elevation. Fehr-Duda and Epper (2012) refer to the elevation factor as the 
affect-charged degree of optimism or pessimism pertaining to the decision-maker. The 
formal treatment of this effect is proposed by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) and Prelec 
(1998)19 and used in the featured studies of Tversky and Fox (1995), Wu and Gonzalez 
(1996), Gonzalez and Wu (1999). According to Goldstein and Einhorn (1987), the 





       (Formula 2.3) 
 
where γ is the parameter of the curvature of probability function, and δ is responsible for 
elevation of the function. A lower value of γ and higher value of δ produce more pronounced 
curvature and higher elevation of the probability function (i.e. higher degree of nonlinearity) 
above the objective probabilities linear function used in the Expected Utility Theory, for 
which w(p) = p.   
 
Several papers investigate the elevation parameter (e.g. Gonzalez and Wu (1999), Fehr-Duda 
et al. (2010)) and find that models incorporating elevation better explain the experimental 
 
18 Suter et al (2016) base their analysis on the formal dual-system model (DSM) developed by Mukherjee 
(2010). The concept is very much alike dual process models that I described in the prior sections of literature 
review (Epstein (1994), Sloman (1996), Kahneman (2003)). Suter et al. (p.444) explicate the DSM: „This 
hybrid modelling framework assumes that risky choices stem from a confluence of two qualitatively different 
systems, whose relative influence can vary continuously: a) a deliberate, expectation-based system that is 
sensitive to both outcome and probability information; and b) an affective system that is influenced by the 
decision maker’s mood and how she feels about a specific prospect and that considers only the value of an 
outcome and whether it is possible or impossible (thus ignoring probability).” 
19 Gonzalez and Wu (1999) demonstrate that both functions were equally appropriate for their experimental 
data.  
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data. In practice, higher elevation may result in consistent overestimation of objective 
probabilities across the whole probability function causing extreme over-optimism in gains 
domain, and over pessimism in the losses domain engendering excessive risk-seeking or risk 
aversion.  
 
Finally, the third dimension of the role of emotions in the evolution of the weighting function 
is asymmetric dynamics of curvature and elevation for gains and losses domains. Here, I 
refer to the experimental studies of Abdellaoui (2000), and Abdellaoui et al. (2005), who 
discover that decisions weights in the loss domain exhibit more elevation than in the gains 
domain. It results in relatively higher risk aversion for losses. Combining all three aspects 
of the decision weighting function, the graphical representation of affect-rich versus affect-
poor stimuli may look in the following way:  
 
Figure 2.5. Probability weighting function for affect-rich and affect-poor stimuli comprising 
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Note: The linear function denotes an objective probability, whereby the subjective (vertical axes) and objective 
evaluation (horizontal axes) of probabilities match. The affect-poor weighting function is constructed using the 
curvature coefficient of 0.69 (Kahneman and Tversky (1992). Affect-rich weighting function for gains is 
constructed using the curvature coefficient of 0.4 and elevation coefficient of 1.5. Finally, affect-rich weighting 
function for losses employs the same curvature coefficient of 0.4, but the elevation coefficient is raised to 2.     
 
2.7. The impact of emotions on the correlation 
between risk and return 
 
In the sections above, I have reviewed the extant research on the role of feelings in 
performance and risky choices of individuals. As a logical continuation of this discussion, it 
might be natural to assume that the interaction between these two variables also should have 
deserved some attention. Correlation between risk and return historically has taken a 
prominent place in financial theory. For example, it plays a central role in most of the asset 
pricing or valuation models. In all these theories, which are grounded on the inviolable 
principle of rationality, any escalation of risk must be compensated by higher return. The 
only question is how this risk factor or factors should be calculated. Further, it must be noted 
that empirical evidence that started to mount from the papers of French et al. (1987) and 
Campbell (1987) exploring international stock markets’ risk and return has up to now 
provided mixed results on the positive or negative nature of risk-return trade-off. 
Nevertheless, stock prices are not readily convertible to the risk-return choices of identifiable 
individuals, therefore, they are out of the scope of the current research.  
 
A bit more relevant studies on the risk-return correlation of individual decision-makers can 
be found in the empirical research on organisation theory. First pioneered by Bowman 
(1980), who has discovered the negative relation between the volatility and average return 
on equity (ROE) of US firms, similar studies have repeatedly unearthed this phenomenon, 
known as ‘Bowman paradox’, across various countries and industries. Later, researchers 
have associated this effect with Prospect Theory (Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), 
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Fiegenbaum (1990), Chou et al. (2009)) demonstrating that outperforming firms exhibit 
positive relation between profitability and its variance while underperforming firms manifest 
the opposite behaviour. Clear evidence of loss aversion bias has also been identified. 
Considering that business decisions directly influencing corporate performance and 
volatility are taken by the managers, i.e. identifiable individuals, this is the best evidence so 
far demonstrating potential traces of irrational behaviour in risk-return correlation research.  
To the best of my knowledge, there were no other attempts to approach this topic in the past, 
especially with application to the role of emotions in the correlation dynamics, which 
indicates a gap in the literature worth investigating. In Section 2.10, I analyse the relation 
between risk and return in the framework of the theoretical model, whereby an individual 
investor is making portfolio selection choice having Prospect Theory-like preferences. I 
compare and make predictions on how the risk-return correlation may change depending on 
the more/less affect-infused environment of decision-making. 
 
2.8. Summary of the reviewed literature and 
identified research gaps 
 
The analysis of the literature covering the decision making under risk and uncertainty 
demonstrates that in the past two decades the non-consequentialist perspective introduced a 
new set of hypotheses striving to explain human judgements through the prism of the more 
enhanced impact of feelings on performance, behaviour and the relation between the two. 
Nevertheless, my examination shows that these hypotheses so far have been insufficiently 
tested: for some of them, the results still are very scarce. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that testing efforts concentrated predominantly in the experimental environment, and the 
evidence from a more realistic empirical setting is almost completely missing. This gap is 
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yet to be filled by new research of the emotional implications in decision-making.  In the 
following several sections, I intend to summarise the research gaps that I identified and that 
require further hypotheses testing and investigation. 
 
2.8.1. Comparison of the expected behaviour under 
Prospect Theory and Expected Utility Theory 
 
Even though both theories are being juxtaposed since the introduction of Prospect Theory, 
the empirical research that would test and confirm the expectations of both frameworks 
remains extremely scarce relative to the importance of the topic. An essential exception is 
an empirical study of the disposition effect over the last 20 years, the discovery of which is 
attributable to the value function under Prospect Theory. The main challenge of comparing 
the theories is the intrinsic disparity in their nature. Expected Utility Theory is based on ex-
ante choice and puts the equality sign between what economic agents think and what they 
do because they must be directed by the rational weighing of outcomes. Prospect Theory 
makes predictions on the ex-post basis and maintains that the decision-maker should be 
carried away by psychological forces that would distort the correct (in rationality terms) 
behaviour.  
 
The analysis of the divergence between theories should be centred on the relation between 
risk and return, especially in the domain of negative outcomes (losses). In this case, unlike 
the traditional perspective, Prospect Theory predicts that because of the attention-narrowing 
and focusing on individual decisions rather than total wealth, an economic agent would turn 
risk-seeking, and the realised relation between risk and return is to become negative. An 
additional aspect to explore is the expected loss aversion bias, which should be manifested 
in the form of a stronger negative relation between return and risk for losses than a positive 
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relation between these two variables for gains. It is something that should not be observed if 
individuals make a rational choice under the Expected Utility Theory’s principles.  
 
2.8.2. Research gaps in the impact of feelings on 
performance and behaviour 
 
More empirical testing should be effectuated to explore if emotions can influence financial 
behaviour or having consequences for financial performance. So far, this topic was 
approached using only experimental and neuro-physiological methodologies. The traditional 
treatment of affect as a factor for the decision-making process is giving it a very modest role 
of the product of choice, not its driving force. More novel theories, such as Risk-as-Feelings 
hypothesis, grant feelings far more prominent place by arguing that a stronger degree of 
affect may push the realised choice far away from what is expected by the consequentialist 
decision-making framework. In fact, the stronger the emotions are, the more disparity should 
be expected between the predictions of the outcomes. The dual-process models forecast that 
in the more affect-rich environment, an economic agent, mediated by the attention-
narrowing mechanism, should turn more concentrated on the decision and its short-term risk 
and consequences.       
Another round of testing should be performed on the hypothesis of whether feelings improve 
or deteriorate performance. The extant research does not give a common answer to this 
problem because the results highly depend on the angle of view that a particular academic 
paper takes. Academics are equally successful in demonstrating that emotions harm 
investment results if they aim to expose the negative role of behavioural biases, or in proving 
that emotions are positive if they strive to highlight the fact that emotions facilitate quick 
and efficient decision processing. 
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2.8.3. Research gaps in the impact of feelings on risk-
taking 
 
The three manifestations of risk behaviour – the form of the value function, the form of the 
probability weighting function and loss aversion – so far are academically explored to a 
different extent. Nonetheless, all these factors of risk lack empirical testing of their possible 
alteration subject to changes in an emotional setting. As in the case of performance, the key 
hypothesis to be tested ensues from the dual-process theories backed by existing 
experimental studies. In the context of the value function, in the presence of stronger 
feelings, the form of the function should become more curved, i.e. a decision-maker should 
turn more risk-averse in the gains domain and more risk-seeking in the losses domain. 
Concerning the form of the probability weighting function, the existing behavioural theory 
implies several possible changes that may happen to the functional form of probabilities – it 
may become more curved, elevated or unequally shifted for gains and losses. Loss aversion 
bias is the least explored risk factor out of all. Loss aversion denotes the behavioural bias 
identified in the Prospect Theory model (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), whereby individual 
decision-makers dislike losses significantly stronger than they like equivalent gains. Loss 
aversion is fundamentally distinct from risk aversion because the latter encapsulates the 
general aversion to the dispersion of possible outcomes that is expressed via the concave 
form of the utility function, while the former is used to describe the specifically 
psychological aversion to losses when compared with gains. There is evidence derived from 
prior experiments that the bias can change in response to the changes in the affective 
environment (Harinck et al. (2007)).  
An additional essential aspect that remains unclear is the interaction between the three forms 
of risk. The existing experimental and neurophysiological literature has intentionally 
approached them separately and independently in order to isolate the necessary effects. To 
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the best of my knowledge, there were no attempts made to decompose behaviour, investment 
behaviour in particular, into various recognised realms of risk. Nevertheless, it is intuitive 
that the investment decision-making process is equally and continuously driven by the 
subjective perception of outcomes, probabilities and psychological dominance of losses over 
gains. Creating an empirically backed framework where the three facets of risk intersect, 
may be a valuable source of information about behaviour and the driver for future research.  
 
2.8.4. Research gaps in the impact of feelings on the 
correlation between risk and return 
 
Unlike the variables in the previously reviewed sections, such as performance and risk, the 
correlation between them has never been analysed in the emotional context. Therefore, this 
area represents one big research gap. Considering that academic evidence that both risk and 
return may be impacted by feelings, it makes sense to assume that their correlation is not 
immune to emotions either. However, the exact way of how feelings impact the correlation 
between risk and return remains unknown. The closest strand of literature that can shed light 
on this topic may be related to the attention and the attention-narrowing phenomenon. Risk 
is not one single factor that explains performance – there are many other variables that can 
contribute to the investment results, for example, experience, knowledge and skill, level of 
wealth, etc. However, it may be hypothesised that in a more affect-rich environment, the 
attention becomes concentrated on the essential factor out of all, which is risk – deviation of 
returns. If this is the case, the correlation between risk and return will be forced to increase. 
This effect should be even more substantial for losses than for gains, considering the long 
streak of evidence that losses are more psychologically pronounced.    
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2.9. Formal description of Prospect Theory 
 
Grounded on the literature review and the short comparison between the traditional 
economic decision-making framework and the behavioural decision-making framework 
under risk and uncertainty outlined in Section 2.2, I devote this section to a more formal 
description of the behavioural theoretical perspective.  
In my empirical chapters, I analyse two important phenomena of decision-making under risk 
and uncertainty. First, it is the nature of the relation between risk and return of individual 
investors when their performance is framed as losses and gains. Second, it is the impact of 
emotions on performance and risk behaviour. Unfortunately, a single behavioural theory that 
could incorporate both elements was not yet introduced by academia (Prietzel (2019)). 
Therefore, in this section, I will provide the formal treatment of Prospect Theory (Tversky 
and Kahneman), which is the most thorough and key driving force of all economic 
behavioural research. Further, in Section 2.10, I will propose a market model intended to 
highlight some of Prospect Theory's predictions of risk-return relation.  
Prospect Theory has been formalised in the two key papers. The original Prospect Theory 
(OPT) was proposed in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). After more than a decade, another 
paper by the same authors outlined the concept of cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). The latest paper was largely the response to the critique of 
the original theory that under certain scenarios might violate the stochastic dominance 
principle. Consequently, the authors have incorporated the amended treatment of the non-
linear probability function, which solved the problem. Nevertheless, Daniel Kahneman has 
remained the supporter of the original version of Prospect Theory. In the 1992 paper, the 
authors contend (Tversky and Kahneman (1992), p. 302): "Although the two models yield 
similar predictions in general, the cumulative version – unlike the original one – satisfies 
stochastic dominance. Thus, it is no longer necessary to assume that transparently dominated 
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prospects are eliminated in the editing phase – an assumption that was criticised by some 
authors. On the other hand, the present version can no longer explain violations of stochastic 
dominance in non-transparent contexts (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1986)". It should be 
added that since 1992, other evidence has been provided to demonstrate stochastic 
dominance violations (e.g. Birnbaum (2005)).   
Still, cumulative Prospect Theory is the version mostly used in the modern economic 
analysis, hence it is the model of choice to be used in this section. The formal description of 
the Prospect Theory follows the approach adopted by Dhamy (2016). 
 
2.9.1. Assumptions of Prospect Theory and the form of 
the value function 
 
Comparing to Expected Utility Theory, Prospect Theory puts forth the following critical 
assumptions: 
- The carriers of value are gains and losses, not the final level of wealth; 
- The value of each outcome is multiplied by the decision weight, not by an additive 
probability. 
Under the Expected Utility Theory, the valuation function U(·) is defined in the following 
way: 
𝑈(𝐿) = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑢(𝑊 + 𝑦𝑖)                             (Formula 2.4) 
where 
 𝑈(𝐿) is the valuation function of the set of prospects, 
𝑝𝑖 is the objective probability of the prospect I, 
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W is the decision maker's current level of total wealth, 
u(·) is the utility function of the decision maker's change in wealth. 
Under the Prospect Theory, the valuation function V(·) to the decision-maker is described 
as follows: 
𝑉(𝐿) = ∑ 𝜋𝑖𝑣
𝑛
𝑖=−𝑚 (𝑦𝑖)    (Formula 2.5) 
where  
𝑉(𝐿) is the valuation function of the set of prospects, 
𝜋𝑖is the decision (probability) weight attributable to each prospect, 
𝑣(𝑦𝑖) is the utility function of prospect 𝑦𝑖. 
 
2.9.2. Incremental form of prospects 
 
Let a lottery L be presented as:  
 𝐿 = (𝑦−𝑚, 𝑝−𝑚;  𝑦−𝑚+1, 𝑝−𝑚+1; … ; 𝑦−1, 𝑝−1;  𝑦0, 𝑝0;  𝑦1, 𝑝1;  𝑦2, 𝑝2; … ; 𝑦𝑛, 𝑝𝑛)  
where 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥0, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, is the increment (positive, negative, or zero) in wealth 
relative to reference wealth, 𝑥0. The reference wealth is fixed at some status-quo level. Each 
increment is referred to as an outcome or prospect; 
𝑚 + 1 +  𝑛  is the total number of prospects, 𝑚 represents the outcomes in the domain of 
losses, 𝑛  represents the outcomes in the domain of gains, and there is one outcome 
representing a reference point; 
the sum of probabilities associated with each prospect is restricted to equal 1: 
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∑ 𝑝𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=−𝑚 , 𝑝𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑖 = −𝑚, −𝑚 + 1, … , 𝑛.   (Formula 2.6) 
 
and the restriction on the prospects is as follows: 
𝑦−𝑚 < 𝑦−𝑚+1 < ⋯ < 𝑦−1 < 𝑦0 < 𝑦1 < 𝑦2 < ⋯ < 𝑦𝑛        (Formula 2.7) 
 
2.9.3. Utility function under Prospect Theory 
 
Let 𝑌 ⊂ 𝑅  be the set of wealth levels relative to a reference point and 𝑦𝑖  represent the 
increment in wealth relative to a reference point. A utility function, 𝜐, is a mapping 𝜐: 𝑌 →
𝑅 that satisfies the following: 
- 𝜐 is continuous; 
- 𝜐 is strictly increasing; 
- 𝜐 (0) = 0 
- 𝜐 is concave for 𝑦 ≥ 0 
- 𝜐 is convex for 𝑦 ≤ 0 
- −𝜐(−𝑦) > 𝜐(𝑦) for 𝑦 > 0 
The utility function has the form: 
𝜐(𝑦) = {
       𝑦𝛾                    𝑖𝑓 𝑦 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑦)𝛾              𝑖𝑓 𝑦 < 0
    (Formula 2.8) 
 
where λ and γ are constants,   λ > 0 and 0 < γ < 1.  
λ is known as the coefficient of loss aversion, while γ denotes the degree of utility function's 
curvature.  
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The plot resulting from the utility function above is demonstrated in Figure 2.3. 
 
2.9.4. Decision Weights under Prospect Theory 
 
Prospect Theory does not use probability weights to evaluate gambles. Instead, it employs 
decision weights. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) define the decision weights, 𝜋𝑖 as follows: 
𝜋𝑛 = 𝑤
+(𝑝𝑛)     (Formula 2.9) 
𝜋𝑛−1 = 𝑤
+(𝑝𝑛−1 + 𝑝𝑛) − 𝑤














𝑗=2    (Formula 2.12) 
𝜋−𝑚 = 𝑤
−(𝑝−𝑚)    (Formula 2.13) 
𝜋−𝑚+1 = 𝑤
−(𝑝−𝑚 + 𝑝−𝑚+1) − 𝑤














𝑖=−𝑚    (Formula 2.16) 
 
As follows from the formulas above, if all outcomes in the lottery are in the domain of gains 
or the domain of losses, their decision weights, 𝜋𝑖, should add up to 1.  
Another important note is that cumulative Prospect Theory can be extended to uncertainty 
and can accommodate any number of prospects.  
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For the estimation of the decision weights, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) employ the 







    (Formula 2.17) 
 
where 𝜏 is the curvature coefficient.  
Importantly, the curvature of the probability function can differ in the domain of losses and 
the domain of gains. 
 
2.9.5. Estimated parameters in Prospect Theory 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) run empirical tests to estimate the parameters for the utility 
function and probability weighting function. They identify the following values for the 
parameters: 
a) The value of probability weighting function's curvature coefficient, 𝜏, equals to 0.61 
in the domain of gains and 0.69 in the domain of losses 
b) The value of the utility function's curvature coefficient, 𝛾, equals to 0.88 in both 
domains. 
c) The value of the utility function's loss aversion coefficient, 𝜆, equals to 2.25.  
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2.10. Prospect Theory-based model with the 
analysis of risk-return relation 
 
2.10.1. Introduction to Prospect Theory-based models 
 
Prospect Theory has been formally used to accommodate a large number of economic and 
financial empirically observed phenomena, for example, mental accounting (Frazzini 
(2006)),  equity premium puzzle (Barberis and Huang (2001), Benartzi and Thaler (1995)), 
momentum (Grinblatt and Han (2005)), narrow framing (Barberis, Huang and Thaler 
(2006)). 
Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, there are no registered attempts to offer a 
Prospect Theory-based economic model that would explicitly incorporate the assumption 
about the relation between volatility and return. A cluster of studies in the organisation and 
accounting theory (see Section 2.7) dealing with the so-called 'Bowman Paradox' 
(Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), Fiegenbaum (1990), Chou et al. (2009)), offered Prospect 
Theory as the explanation of the negative risk-return relation observed in the financial results 
of underperforming firms across countries and industries. However, none of the researchers 
provided a formal model of firms' behaviour. With notable exceptions (e.g. Wang et al. 
(2017)), the phenomenon of the negative relation between risk and return, for example, 
observed in the stock markets, has not been attributed to Prospect Theory.       
One of the well-documented empirical behavioural observations is the disposition effect. It 
denotes the tendency by investors to hold on to losing trades and close too fast their winning 
trades ((Dhar and Zhu (2006), Shefrin and Statman (1985)). I contend that by the nature of 
the phenomena, disposition effect is connected to the risk-return relation. If investors 
systemically overhold the losing positions in an attempt to wait until the price hits back to 
the break-even point, they inevitably accept high dispersion of realised trading results. Most 
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of such overheld trades will be closed with losses, which will generate negative risk-return 
relation in the losses domain. For the gains area, the effect will be the opposite – smaller 
volatility will be associated with overall positive performance. This rationale has been 
referred to in other studies as well as a complementary observation (Grinblatt and Han 
(2005), Wang et al. (2017)). However, it has never been explored in the framework of a 
theoretical model.  
Disposition effect attracted greater attention from the researchers than the risk-return relation 
or other market effects and biases when it comes to the economic modelling of its connection 
to Prospect Theory. The possibility that disposition effect can be explained by Prospect 
Theory has been voiced in a large number of studies starting from Shefrin and Statman 
(1985). Other examples of highly cited papers on disposition effect that followed the 
approach include Weber and Camerer (1998), Odean (1998), Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001), Dhar and Zhu (2006). As a consequence, the causal relation between Prospect 
Theory and disposition effect became something taken for granted by researchers until 
several theoretical models proposed during the last decade by Barberis and Xiong (2009), 
Kaustia (2010) and Vlcek and Hens (2011) concluded that such a relation is far from clear. 
These authors identified certain flaws in the Prospect Theory explanation. It was deduced 
that not all conditions outlined by Kahneman and Tversky (1992) and Shefrin and Statman 
(1985) could lead to the manifestation of the disposition effect. In many occasions, this 
phenomenon should not be observed, or even the reverse effect may take place. Such a sharp 
distinction between the empirical observation of disposition effect and the theoretical models 
has triggered an active and still ongoing debate in academia that is purposed to reconcile the 
paradox.  
For example, Meng (2010) and Ingersoll and Jin (2012) proposed an intriguing resolution 
by suggesting that the reference point of the decision-makers must not remain still at the 
initial wealth as the unrealised gains or losses evolve but change together with them. Barberis 
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and Xiong (2010) developed the idea of realisation utility. In this model, decision-makers 
derive utility only from realised gains or losses but not from unrealised. All these 
explanations found mixed empirical support so far (Jakusch et al. (2019)).  
Another group of studies challenged the approach of using the parameters of the value 
function, loss aversion coefficient and probability function from the original theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky (1992)). The reasoning used in these studies is based on criticism 
of ecological validity of the research design employed by Kahneman and Tversky and their 
followers20. To elicit the parameters of the model, the authors of Prospect Theory informed 
their subjects of exact probabilities and outcomes of gambles used in experiments (or the 
probabilities could be easily inferred). Such a generous amount of information or completely 
emotionless environment of decision-making cannot be met in real-life financial markets. 
Among other research, Vlcek and Hens (2011) and Jakusch et al. (2019) concluded that for 
the disposition effect to be revealed, the fitted parameters must be significantly distinct from 
the original Prospect Theory. I use both papers as the starting point and the foundation for 
my model and subsequent analysis.  
The study of Vlcek and Hens (2011) is stimulating because in their highly cited theoretical 
model, the authors make essential steps from homo economicus that makes judgements 
based on behavioural Prospect Theory (a strange mix), towards more behaviourally (and 
hence, realistically) acting decision-maker. It makes a difference between their work and 
another popular model by Barberis and Xiong (2009), in which an agent is capable of finding 
multi-period optimal investment solutions and exhibits other characteristically rational 
behaviour.  
 
20 Such argument is fully in line with the general critique of experimental research setup. A great summary of 
the challenges faced by experimental research can be found in Al-Ubaydli et al. (2017).   
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The paper of Jakusch et al. (2019) deserves attention because it is further approximating the 
theoretical model of Vlcek and Hens (2011) towards real-life investment decisions by 
applying it and exploring the model's predictions on the empirical dataset of individual 
brokerage clients' trades. These two studies of the possible interaction between Prospect 
Theory and disposition effect represent the closest pieces of academic work relating to my 
own data set and research framework.  
I further extend and modify certain aspects and assumptions of the model for three primary 
purposes. First, I need to adapt the model to the data set and the real-life trading environment 
of the decision-makers in my study. Second, I want to explore the assumptions of the model 
concerning the relation between risk and return, not only disposition effect. Third, I focus 
on the distinction between the parameters and predictions of the model in affect-rich and 
affect-poor environments. To the best of my knowledge, the last two topics have not been 
explicitly discussed in academic research in the same context before.              
 
2.10.2. Model setup – Ex-post versus Ex-ante model 
design 
 
Hens and Vlcek (2011) review two alternative model designs – they refer to one of them as 
ex-post and another as ex-ante. In the ex-post conceptualisation, the initial decision to 
acquire a risky asset is considered to be already taken, and the analysis of this decision 
remains out of the model's scope (i.e. an investor already owns a risky stock). Only 
subsequent choices of a decision-maker, so-called liquidation decision, are taken into 
account and examined. In the case of ex-ante design, the rationale behind the primary 
decision to invest in a risky asset is also made part of the analytical framework. The 
consequence of the model design's selection is essential. Most of the researchers who use 
the ex-ante approach and try to explain the initial decision to invest with the Prospect Theory 
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assumptions and parametrisation, fail to do so. The primary explanation of this effect is the 
loss aversion factor of Prospect Theory (Barberis and Xiong (2009)). It seems that an 
investor who exhibits disposition effect on the second step of the model, i.e. when 
contemplating liquidation of a risky asset, usually will not engage in buying a risky asset on 
the first step in fear of expected losses. However, Hens and Vlcek (2011) and Jakusch et al. 
(2019) argue that the ex-ante approach is inherently rationalistic, which dissonates with the 
Prospect Theory behavioural framework21. They doubt that investors can be expected to 
combine rationalistic multi-period optimisation of choice with the behavioural valuation of 
outcomes and probabilities.  
The ex-post modelling seems more consistent with Prospect Theory analysis and 
behavioural perspective of decision-making in general. The original theory is also 
fundamentally ex-post neglecting the scrutiny of the initial decision to take a risk exposure. 
Besides, behavioural economic research has identified many empirically observed factors 
that can influence and explain the primary decision to buy risky assets, for example, 
sensation seeking (Zuckerman (2007)), overconfidence (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)) 
among others.  
In my subsequent analysis, I will reply on the ex-post conceptualisation and focus 
exclusively on the liquidation decision – the second-period behaviour of an individual 
subject to the change in the value of the risky asset. For the ex-ante perspective's review, the 
one can consult Section 3.2 in Hens and Vlcek (2011).    
 
 
21 As Hens and Vlcek (p. 4-5, (2011)) reason their position: “…requiring dynamic optimisation [as in Barberis 
and Xiong (2009)], i.e. integrating into today’s decision the correctly anticipated optimal future decisions, 
seems to be at odds with assuming reference point based behaviour on the other hand. The investor would then 
be very rational and very behavoural at the same time.”  
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2.10.3. Assumptions of the model 
 
I draft a one-stage multi-period model for investment portfolio allocation in the schematic 
financial market where only two assets are available – a risky instrument and a risk-free 
instrument. Reflecting on my dataset, a risky asset is a EUR/USD currency pair, and a 
riskless asset is a bank non-yielding deposit, i.e. 𝑅𝑓 = 0. An investor who is faced with the 
portfolio choice decision has Prospect Theory-aligned preferences (Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992)).  
Following Hens and Vlcek (2011), the price changes of the risky instrument are described 
by the binomial process; hence after the end of each period, there are two possible price 
outcomes. If the price goes up, it is referred to as an upside state U. The probability of this 
state is 𝑝 > 0 at time 𝑡. The rise in value generates a return 𝑅𝑈 > 1. The reverse price 
development leads to a downside state D with probability 1 − 𝑝 with the associated loss 0 ≤
𝑅𝐷 < 122.  
In the framework of the model, an investor makes valuations of the changes in wealth, not 
terminal wealth. In all the aspects, investor's preferences are described by Prospect Theory. 
An investor is considered to possess an initial endowment, 𝑊0, and earn no other income. 
This initial level of wealth serves as the reference point for the evaluation of losses and gains 
across the return evolution. Due to the peculiarity of the currency pair risky instrument, an 
investor is assumed to take not only the long position in the risky asset but also the short 
one23. As in Hens and Vlcek (2011) and Jakusch et al. (2019), an investor in my model 
exhibits myopic behaviour, i.e. he is not prone to dynamic optimisation of choice but weighs 
 
22 In order for the price of the risky asset to remain positive, the non-arbitrage condition must be met: 0 ≤
𝑅𝐷,𝑡 < 1 ≤ 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 < 𝑅𝑈,𝑡. 
23 In fact, a short position in a currency pair is equivalent to the long position in the reverse form of this currency 
pair. For instance, a short position in EUR/USD is the same as the long position in USD/EUR. Therefore, my 
allowance of shorting does not change the model of Hens and Vlcek (2011) significantly but adds a substantial 
approximation to real-life situation.  
P a g e  | 78 
 
up each iteration of price change as an independent gamble. As Hens and Vlcek (2011) note, 
such assumption better corresponds to the real-life behaviour of small individual investors 
and finds better empirical support.    
The valuation of prospects takes place according to the utility function and probability 
weighting function described in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Section 2.9 above. At 
each iteration, an investor can make only two types of decisions – either keep all of his 
wealth in the risky asset or close the position in the risky instrument in full. No partial sale 
can be made.      
 
2.10.4. The first period of the model 
 
Figure 2.6 exhibits the client's situation at the first iteration (first period). 









𝐶𝑈 = 𝐶0𝑅𝑈 
𝑊𝑈 = 𝑊0𝑅𝑈 
1 − 𝑝 
𝑝 
𝐶𝐷 = 𝐶0𝑅𝐷 
𝑊𝐷 = 𝑊0𝑅𝐷 
𝑡0 𝑡1 
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In the period 𝑡0 an investor makes an allocation into the risky asset (currency pair) that has 
an initial value of 𝐶0 . As the model's assumption specifies, no fractional investment is 
possible, hence investor's wealth, 𝑊0at 𝑡0 equals to 𝐶0. 
In the period 𝑡1the risky asset can be in two alternative states. With probability 𝑝 the value 
of the risky instrument can go up to 𝐶𝑈, which will be the product of the initial value 𝐶0 and 
the increment 𝑅𝑈. Or, with probability 1 − 𝑝 the value of the risky asset can decrease to 𝐶𝐷 
– the product of initial value 𝐶0 and the downward value shift 𝑅𝐷. Investor's wealth will 
increase to 𝑊𝑈 or decrease to  𝑊𝐷conditional upon the price change. In both states in 𝑡1, the 
value of the risk-free asset, 𝑅𝑓 , does not change because 𝑅𝑓 = 0,  according to the 
assumption of the model. As the model specifies, the decision to invest in the risky 
instrument is considered to be already taken. Therefore, the decision to sell24 or keep the 
risky asset is transferred to the period 𝑡1and ongoing iterations (periods) of the model. 
Because all the parameters of the model remain constant over time, the structure of the 
second period and onwards will be the same as for the first period. Therefore, for 
demonstration purposes, I will only review in details the transition from the first to the 
second period.    
 
2.10.5. The second period of the model  
 




24 The decision to sell the risky asset is equivalent to the decision to invest the current wealth, 𝑊𝑡, into the risk-
free asset, i.e. the bank deposit.  
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Immediately after the outcomes are revealed at the end of the first period, the investor is 
facing the risky asset liquidation decision. At the second iteration of risky asset's values, four 
options of price evolution are possible. These options are denoted with UU, UD, DU and 
DD subscripts on Figure X, reflecting the possible developments: UU stands for double 
upward movement of price, UD means an upward move followed by a decrease in price, DU 
is reverse in order and DD denotes the double downward shift in price. The investor's level 
of wealth in the second period equals to the product of his wealth in the first period and the 
return on the risky asset in the second period.  
 
2.10.6. Subsequent periods of the model 
 
Vlcek and Hens (2011) choose a two-step form for their model, whereby the price of an 
underlying risky instrument can only change twice. Such a restrictive assumption is at odds 
with real financial market complexity and needs to be relaxed. Technically, the model can 




𝑊𝑈𝑈 = 𝑊𝑈𝑅𝑈 
 
𝑊𝑈𝐷 = 𝑊𝑈𝑅𝐷 
𝑊𝐷𝑈 = 𝑊𝐷𝑅𝑈 
 




1 − 𝑝 
1 − 𝑝 
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keep my model manageable but ensure its flexibility, I allow the maximum of 100 steps of 
price evolution as this is enough to analyse the assumptions I want to explore. That is, if an 
investor keeps the risky instrument for 100 consecutive periods, the position gets 
automatically closed and the accumulated profit or loss get realised. 
Considering the assumption of the constant amplitude, it is conventional for similar models 
with binomial evolution to combine intermediary nodes for simplification purposes, i.e. 
𝑊𝑈𝐷and 𝑊𝐷𝑈  as in Figure 2.7. Hence, at period 𝑡 there can be 𝑡 + 1 possible outcomes. 
Variable 𝑗 (𝑗=1,2,3,…, t+1) denotes the order of the outcome, so that 𝑗 = 1 is the highest 
possible outcome at each step of the model and 𝑗 = 𝑡 + 1 is the lowest possible outcome. 





                            (Formula 2.18) 
As in the second period, at every subsequent step of the model, 𝑡 ∈ {3, … , 100}, an investor 
evaluates the prospects to make a liquidation decision, which can happen in any of the 
periods. 
 
2.10.7. The liquidation decision 
 
In the proposed model, an investor makes investment decisions based on Prospect Theory 
preferences. It means that the decision to liquidate the position in a risky instrument is taken 
by computing the difference in the utilities of two prospects, which are mutually exclusive. 
The first implies keeping the risky instrument one period forward and facing the gamble 
between the possible upward or downward change in price. The second prospect entails 
selling the risky instrument and realising profit or loss accumulated from prior period(s), 
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which can be also interpreted as the investment into a risk-free asset. The analysis above can 
be written mathematically as  
𝐿 = Δ𝑡(𝑈𝑡
𝑅𝑃, 𝑈𝑡
𝐴 ∥ Θ)    (Formula 2.19) 
where L is the net utility of liquidation decision, 𝑈𝑡
𝑅𝑃  is the utility of holding the risky 
instrument at time t, 𝑈𝑡
𝐴 is the utility of an accumulated sure gain/loss at time t and Θ denotes 
the set of Prospect Theory parameters, which are constant over time: Θ = ⟦𝛾, 𝜆, 𝜏⟧. 𝛾 stands 
for the utility function's curvature coefficient, 𝜆  is the utility function's loss aversion 
coefficient, 𝜏 is probability weighting function's curvature coefficient.  
 
2.10.8. Prospect Theory analysis of intermediate steps of 
the model 
 
As Vlcek and Hens (2011) only use a two-step model, there are no intermediate steps when 
an investor can decide to keep the risky asset onwards to the next period25. Hence, there is a 
maximum of four26 nodes at the second (last) step of the model. When the number of possible 
steps is extended, the model becomes progressively more complex. Following Jakusch et al. 
(2019), to simplify the formulation of the model, I use a single variable that denotes the 
intermediate accumulated wealth (i.e. wealth accumulated at any of the intermediate nodes 
𝑡 ), whether it is gain or loss. The variable I use is 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝑖 ∈ {?̂?; ?̂?} , ?̂?  means 
intermediate accumulated gain, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡= ?̂? if 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 > 1, ?̂? means intermediate accumulated loss, 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡= ?̂?  if 1 > 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0.  
 
25 This is true for the ex-post model design. For the ex-ante specification, there is one intermediary step.  
26 Given a constant amplitude of price changes over time, It is conventional to combine the outcomes that lead 
to the equivalent return, for example 𝑊𝐷𝑈and 𝑊𝑈𝐷as in Figure X. In this case, Vlcek and Hens (2011) model 
would have a maximum of three nodes.  
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The analysis of intermediate nodes is essential because it defines the usage of loss aversion 
coefficient. Jakusch et al. (2019) identify five scenarios for intermediate nodes that I describe 
below. For the first two scenarios, the utility of the risk-free asset (i.e. utility of the certain 
prospect of selling the risky instrument at the step 𝑡) is denoted as 𝑈𝑡
𝐴(𝑊0, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ∥ Θ) and 
equals to (𝑊0𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑓,𝑡 − 𝑊0)
𝛾.            
Case 1. Accumulated gains, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡, are high enough to satisfy 𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑈,𝑡 > 𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ≥ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝐷,𝑡 ≥
1. In this case, an investor evaluates the utility of the risky instrument at time 𝑡 as  
𝑈𝑡
𝑅𝑃 = 𝑤(𝑝𝑡)(𝑊0𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑈,𝑡 − 𝑊0)
𝛾
+ 𝑤(1 − 𝑝𝑡)(𝑊0𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝐷,𝑡 − 𝑊0)
𝛾
  (Formula 2.20) 
where 𝑤()  is the decision weighting function calculated from the Prospect Theory 
probability weighting function in Formula 2.17. Because both prospects 𝑅𝑈,𝑡 and 𝑅𝐷,𝑡 are 
above the initial wealth, the coefficient of loss aversion, 𝜆, is not applied.     
Case 2. Accumulated gains, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡, are moderately high satisfying 𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑈,𝑡 > 𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ≥ 1 >
𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝐷,𝑡 ≥ 0. For this scenario, the utility of the risky instrument at time 𝑡 will include the 
coefficient of loss aversion because the possible downside change in price may cause the 
accumulated wealth to end up below the reference point of initial wealth:  
𝑈𝑡
𝑅𝑃 = 𝑤(𝑝𝑡)(𝑊0𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑈,𝑡 − 𝑊0)
𝛾
− 𝜆𝑤(1 − 𝑝𝑡)(𝑊0 − 𝑊0𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝐷,𝑡)
𝛾
   (Formula 2.21)  
The total utility of keeping the investment into the risky instrument equals to the utility of 
upwards change in wealth following the uptick of the price of the risky instrument multiplied 
by the corresponding decision weight and the utility of the decrease in wealth following the 
downtick of the value of the risky instrument multiplied by the loss aversion coefficient and 
the respective decision weight.   
Case 3. This scenario considers a situation when the accumulated wealth gets to the losses 
domain, 0 ≤ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 < 1.  However, if the accumulated losses are relatively small so that 
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𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑈,𝑡 > 𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ≥ 1 > 𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝐷,𝑡 ≥ 0, the investor still has a chance to win back the loss 
with the next iteration of holding the risky asset. The calculation of utilities of holding the 
risky instrument and liquidating the risky position will remain as in Case 2.  
Case 4. Under this scenario, the losses become more vital so that 𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑈,𝑡 > 1 > 𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑓,𝑡 >
𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝐷,𝑡 ≥ 0. Hence, the positive change of the value of the risky asset is enough to turn 
accumulated losses into gains, yet, the risk-free return is not high enough to do the same27. 
In this scenario, the utility of the liquidation decision will now include the loss aversion 
factor:  
𝑈𝑡
𝐴 = −𝜆(𝑊0𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑓,𝑡 − 𝑊0)
𝛾   (Formula 2.22) 
Case 5. The last scenario implies that the level of losses is so high that even the positive shift 
in the value of the risky instrument cannot cover up the accumulated loss: 1 > 𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑈,𝑡 >
𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑓,𝑡 > 𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝐷,𝑡 ≥ 0 . For this scenario, the utilities of both parts of the gamble – upwards 
change in wealth and downwards shift in wealth will contain the loss aversion term:  
−𝜆𝑤(𝑝𝑡)(𝑊0 − 𝑊0𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑈,𝑡)
𝛾
− 𝜆𝑤(1 − 𝑝𝑡)(𝑊0 − 𝑊0𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝐷,𝑡)
𝛾
  (Formula 2.23) 
The utility of the liquidation decision will also be multiplied by the loss aversion factor as 
in Case 4. 
 
2.10.9. The parameters used in the model 
 
In my model, I use three stylised investors, each of them featuring a specific form of Prospect 
Theory-based preferences. The first investor – Investor A carries the set of parameters that 
 
27 I demonstrate here the scenarios from Jakush et al. (2019) to describe all possible theoretical cases 
considered in their model. In my model, I assume that the risk-free rate equals to zero, hence the Case 3 in 
my particular formulation cannot exist. With zero risk-free return, Case 4 immediately follows Case 2.  
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fully match the original Prospect Theory model. I conjecture that Investor A is relatively 
emotionless, i.e. his portfolio selection choices are not impacted by any affective pressures 
surrounding the decision-making process. This is explained by the nature of the experimental 
design undertaken by the authors of Prospect Theory. The second investor – Investor B is an 
affect-poor decision-maker. His set of parameters reflects investment decisions that have a 
moderate degree of emotional influence. The parameters of Investor B equal to the average 
of the original Prospect Theory parameters and the ones used by Jakusch et al. (2019). 
Finally, Investor C is exactly matching the parameters from the model of Jakusch et al. 
(2019). I call this Investor affect-rich as he exhibits a strong form of influence of emotions 
on his decisions.     
 
2.10.9.1. Attribution of parameters to investor types 
 
In the original Prospect Theory Kahneman and Tversky used the following parameters for 
their model: 
a) The value of probability weighting function's curvature coefficient, 𝜏, equals to 0.61 
in the domain of gains and 0.69 in the domain of losses 
b) The value of the utility function's curvature coefficient, 𝛾, equals to 0.88 in both 
domains. 
The value of the utility function's loss aversion coefficient, 𝜆, equals to 2.25. I attribute these 
parameters to the emotionless Investor A.                        
As discussed above, these parameters may not correspond well to the conditions of the real 
financial market. The Vlcek and Hens (2011) model's fitting tests undertaken by Jakusch et 
al. (2019) on the dataset from the discount broker in Germany on the retail investors revealed 
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the following parameters: 𝛾 = 0.37, 𝜆 = 1.1, 𝜏 = 0.72. I assign these parameters to my 
affect-rich Investor C.  
Utility function’s curvature coefficient of 0.37 from Jakusch et al. (2019) emphasises a 
substantially stronger curvature of the function compared to the original theory. The 
difference can be explained by the origin of the data for the parametrisation. Jakusch et al. 
(2019) use real investors trading on a real financial market. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 
1992) used students as subjects asking them to solve hypothetical cases of future prospects. 
As outlined in the research of Kahneman et al. (1999), Loewenstein et al. (2001), Hsee and 
Rottenstreich (2004), the difference in the elicited parameters between Kahneman and 
Tversky and Jakusch and his colleagues can be explained by the degree of emotional 
intensity and affective environment for the decision-makers at the time they choose the risky 
prospects. Students in the experimental research design of Kahneman and Tversky are placed 
in the naturally affect-poor environment (if not affect-free). They are not constrained by time 
or experience other pressures, for example, they do not face the risk of losing their money. 
Real individual investors in the dataset of Jakusch and his co-authors face typical pressures 
of the financial markets – the need to make quick decisions under the risk of losing their 
invested capital. Such psychological strains are known to engender physiological reactions 
associated with strong emotions in traders (Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2012), Lo et al. (2005)).  
The coefficient of loss aversion turned out to be significantly lower in the model of Jakusch 
et al. (2019) than in the original study. Jakusch et al. (2019) do not provide explicit reasoning 
on why such difference could have taken place. They rely on the version of explanation from 
Hwang and Satchell (2011), who believe that this result can be derived from the selection 
bias because the investors prone to the high level of loss aversion would avoid trading risky 
assets (stocks in the case of Jakusch et al. (2019) but also attributable to my dataset as well, 
which is represented by the even riskier type of marginal trading). As I discuss in the 
literature review’s section on emotions and loss aversion, the research of this phenomenon 
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is still rare, and the results are mixed. To test a possible impact of higher loss aversion 
coefficient on the relation between risk and return, I will introduce a special case of Investor 
D who will have all the parameters of Investor C (based on parameters from Jakusch et al. 
(2019)) with the exception of the arbitrarily chosen loss aversion coefficient of 4. For the 
affect-poor scenario (Investor B), I intend to use the coefficient of loss aversion that is the 
average between the one from the original model and the one from the model of Jakusch et 
al. (2019).  
Jakusch’s et al. (2019) fitted decision weighing function’s coefficient equals to 0.72, which 
is slightly higher than in the original model. In general, it is much harder to test the decision 
weighting function using the binomial models as in Vlcek and Hens (2011). Prospect Theory 
contends that the most considerable swings in the decision weights relative to the objective 
probability weights take place in the ends of the probability curve, i.e. near very low 
probability and very high probability. Theoretical models described by binomial price 
evolution fail to catch the extreme probabilities. Therefore, it may be the case that the real 
coefficient of the function is further away from the one identified by Jakusch et al. (2019). 
In the experimental research parametrisations, this coefficient varied from 0.44 (Gonzalez 
and Wu (1999)) to 0.83 (Abdellaoui et al. (2005)). In my model, I use the original theory’s 
coefficient for the emotionless scenario (Investor A), Jakusch et al. (2019) coefficient for the 
affect-rich scenario (Investor C) and the average between the two for the affect-poor scenario 
(Investor B).  
 
2.10.9.2. The parameters of stochastic process of risky asset 
 
I adopt the approach of Jakusch et al. (2019) concerning the stochastic process of the risky 
instrument, yet, in a substantially modified form. Grounded on the empirical research on the 
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investment behaviour of individuals (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), Dhar and Kumar 
(2002), Kaustia (2010)), the authors establish the trend-following trading strategy for the 
decision-maker. Under this strategy, investors are inclined to overestimate the perspectives 
of risky assets (of an uptick at the next step of the model), whose price has been increasing 
in value in the recent past. Individuals also dislike risky instruments that showed an 
immediate history of negative price development. Consequently, in my model, I compute 
the parameters 𝜇𝑡 and 𝜎𝑡 that define the value of 𝑅𝑡,𝑈 and 𝑅𝑡,𝐷 at each step of the model as 
the average return and standard deviation of the risky instrument over the past 20 periods. 
For the evaluation of the risky asset price development at each step in the model, I apply the 
rolling window approach, whereby at each step 20 previous price change observations are 
used to define the value of 𝑅𝑡,𝑈 and 𝑅𝑡,𝐷.  
Effectively, investors in my model will expect an increase in return and volatility from the 
risky asset that demonstrated the positive performance and higher dispersion track-record in 
the near past. Such an approach reflects the myopic focus of individual investors, whereby 
the decisions are taken independently for each step, there are no dynamic optimisation 
attempts, but traders still make inferences based on a simple backwards-looking strategy. In 
the domain of retail brokerage, such an approach can be associated with the extremely 
popular technical analysis rules.   
Unlike other theoretical models that simulate the price evolution of a risky instrument, I take 
the real-time series for EUR/USD currency pair over the period between November 2011 
and May 2015 (𝑚 ∈ {1, … , 45})– the period that fully matches my empirical dataset. I use 
1-hour price ticks over a selected time frame as the measurement interval of one period. All 
of my stylised investors A, B, C and D open a risky position on November 1, 2011 (𝑚 =
1) and review the holding/liquidation decision hourly following the change in the price of a 
risky instrument. If an investor decides to liquidate the position and realise profit or loss at 
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the step 𝑡, my model implies that he will reopen a new risky position immediately at the next 
step, 𝑡 + 128. The opened position can be long or short depending on the average return, ?̅?20, 
over the last 20 steps as discussed above. For ?̅?20 ≥ 0, a long position is opened, for ?̅?20 <
0, a short position is established. At the end of the month, I summarise all the realised 
(liquidated) trades in the domains of gains and losses and calculate the correlation between 
realised risk and return in both domains (𝜌𝑚
+  and 𝜌𝑚
− , respectively). As follows from the 
described setup, investors A, B, C and D can take a distinct number of liquidation decisions 
(different number of trades) subject to the variation in the parameters of utility function and 
decision weighting function. The beginning of the next month marks the start of a new period 
of observations producing another set of values of risk-return correlations for gains and 
losses. May 2015 is the last month of observations (𝑚 = 45). Thus, I collect 45 correlation 
coefficients for each domain per each investor, which I can compare and make inferences.    
As concerns the specification of the probability of the return evolution in the next node, 𝑝𝑡, 
I calculate the value of the probability of the uptick in the value of the risky asset (i.e. the 







    (Formula 2.24) 
where 𝑛𝑈 is the number of upticks in the previous upticks of the risky instrument, and 𝑛𝐷 is 
the number of downticks. Such a formulation reflects the approach of Jakusch et al. (2019), 
who in turn adopted it from Weber and Camerer (1998) and Barberis and Xiong (2009). In 
the offered specification of 𝑝𝑡, an investor is considered to be using a Bayesian approach to 
update his subjective probability by deriving information from the past upticks and 
downticks.     
 
28 For the sake of simplicity, I assume that the amount of invested capital at every step is the same and is not 
dependent on previously realised gains or losses.   
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2.10.10. Analysis of model’s results and predictions 
 
After running the model, I obtain the set of 45 observations for a number of variables that 
describe the trading performance and behaviour of each of the stylised investors: Investor 
A, Investor B, Investor C and Investor D. The discussion of the results is provided in the 
sections below. I compute the following parameters: 
Return (%) – an average per-trade return from 45 observations for each type of an investor 
(calculated as absolute return/position volume). 
Total standard deviation (%) – standard deviation of all trading positions returns for each 
type of an investor (an average for 45 observations). 
Positive standard deviation (%) – an average of standard deviation of returns from realised 
(closed) gaining positions. 
Negative standard deviation (%) – standard deviation of returns from realised (closed) 
losing positions. 
Duration of holding gains (steps) – median number of steps until a gaining position gets 
realised (closed) by an investor.   
Duration of holding losses (steps) – median number of steps until a losing position gets 
realised (closed) by an investor. 
Risk/Return correlation – correlation coefficient between realised total risk and return for 
an investor. 
Correlation Risk+/Return – correlation coefficient between realised positive standard 
deviation and return for an investor.  
Correlation Risk-/Return – correlation coefficient between realised negative standard 
deviation and return for an investor.  
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Number of trades – observed number of realised round-trip trades (steps) during the 
specified period of 1 month by an investor.   
The results of the model are presented in Table 2.3 below: 
Table 2.3. Results of the theoretical model of portfolio choice for four types of an investor 
























































































Number of trades 
(steps) 
 
609 505 501 529 
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Note: The table displays the results of the model with the set of parameters outlined in Section 2.10.9. Four 
types of investors are considered: Investor A reflects an individual with the preferences from the original model 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1992); Investor B holds the preferences representing the mixture between 
Investor’s A preferences and the model parameters described in Jakusch et al. (2019); Investor C replicates the 
parameters from Jakusch et al. (2019) model. Finally, Investor D has the parameters of Investor C with the 
coefficient of loss aversion equal to 4. The variables are estimated using 45 runs of the model. Each run of the 
model represents a one-month period between November 2011 and May 2015 using 1-hour price ticks of 
EUR/USD currency pair (hence, 45 one-month periods in total). For each of the variables in the table, an 
average of 45 observations is provided.  
 
2.10.10.1. Disposition effect analysis and predictions 
 
The theoretical models that I used as the source and the reference for my model (Barberis 
and Xiong (2009), Vlcek and Hens (2011), Jakusch et al. (2019) and others) were drafted 
with the primary goal of explaining the empirically observed disposition effect. Therefore, 
it is logical to start the analysis by comparing my results on the disposition effect with the 
above-mentioned models. What I find is the complete reflection of the outcome of Vlcek 
and Hens (2011) and Jakusch et al. (2019), which underlines the robustness of my theoretical 
framework. Specifically, the parameters of the original Prospect Theory model (Kahneman 
and Tversky (1992)), describing the behaviour of Investor A, cannot explain the disposition 
effect. In fact, when applying these parameters, the observed effect is reversed as the 
difference between the time duration of holding gains is longer than the duration of holding 
losses by 0.2 steps, which is significant at 5% confidence level.  
Investor C, whose preferences are grounded on affect-rich parameters of the utility function 
(adopted from Jakusch et al. (2019)), exhibits the disposition effect that is statistically and 
economically significant. The duration of holding losses is 2.69 times longer than that of 
holding gains. It should also be noted that Investor C would hold gaining positions a bit less 
than one step longer than Investor A, which is significant at 1% level. Investor B, who is 
taking decisions in the affect-poor environment according to the model, demonstrates the 
disposition effect of 1.66 steps that is substantially smaller than Investor C. The difference 
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exclusively comes from the holding of losing positions because the duration of holding gains 
is statistically indistinguishable for Investors B and C.  
Investor D, who has the same parameters as Investor C with the stronger loss aversion 
coefficient (4 against 1.09), unveils weaker disposition effect compared to Investor C but 
stronger value relative to Investor B. Again, all the difference comes from overholding losing 
trades.  
I make empirical testing of the disposition effect in the third empirical chapter – Chapter 6 
of the Thesis, Research Question 2.1, Section 6.5. According to the prediction of the 
theoretical model, I should expect to observe the disposition effect in both affect-rich and 
affect-poor environments. In the affect-rich environment, the observed effect is expected to 
be more pronounced.  
 
2.10.10.2. Analysis and predictions of performance and risk 
behaviour 
 
After the examination of the disposition effect, I turn to the analysis of risk behaviour that is 
represented in the results as the standard deviation of returns. I explore three risk variables 
– total dispersion of returns, the volatility of returns in the positive domain, and the volatility 
of returns in the negative domain. It is logical to assume that the disposition effect and the 
manifestation of dispersion of returns should be connected. The longer one holds the trading 
positions, the wider should be the distribution of returns. Nevertheless, in the gains domain, 
this rationale does not seem to work, as I observe a drop in standard deviation (significant at 
1% confidence level) when switching from Investor A to Investor B parameters, and the 
subsequent drop from Investor B to Investor C (significant at 5% confidence level). It may 
be explained by the small difference in the disposition effect observed for gains. Positive 
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deviation of returns for Investor D is indistinguishable from Investor C, which is not 
surprising – loss aversion coefficient has no much impact on the gains territory.  
The dispersion of returns is more aligned with the disposition effect in the zone of losses. 
Here, the longer is the holding period of losing positions, the more pronounced is the returns 
deviation. The changes in behaviour from Investor A to Investor B to Investor C are all 
significant at 1% level, marking the fact that my theoretical investors get progressively more 
risk-seeking. Interestingly, Investor D demonstrates more risk-averse decision-making in the 
losses domain as compared to Investor C (significant at 5% level). This finding helps to 
unveil the role of loss aversion coefficient on the risk behaviour. However, given the sharp 
change in the loss aversion coefficient, the impact seems relatively limited (at least, in the 
scope of a theoretical model).  
Total standard deviation demonstrates a flatter pattern across investors. The only meaningful 
difference is between Investor A and the others. It is the result of the counterbalancing 
changes in the variation of returns in the domains of gains and losses. 
I explore the risk behaviour measured by the standard deviation of returns and the changes 
in it pertinent to affect-poor and affect-rich environments in Chapter 6, Section 6.6. 
According to the predictions of my theoretical model, in the empirical setup, I should 
observe substantial changes in risk-taking behaviour in the domain of losses for affect-rich 
investment environment as compared to the affect-poor setting. In contrast, the deviation of 
returns in the domain of gains should stay relatively weak.   
As regards the analysis of performance that I evidence in the results of the model, I find that 
for all types of investors, it is negative and significant at 1% level. However, the differences 
in performance between investors are now statistically meaningful. To learn more about the 
disparity of performance in different affective settings, I examine it in the framework of 
empirical study in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.   
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2.10.10.3. Analysis and predictions of the correlation between 
risk and return 
 
Before setting up the theoretical model, I assumed that the correlation between risk and 
return has to be connected to the disposition effect grounded on the form of the utility 
function. According to the Prospect Theory, in the domain of gains, a decision-maker faces 
a concave form of the function. Therefore, higher return should accompany higher expected 
volatility, hence a positive correlation between both variables. In the losses domain, the 
convex form of the function brings about the opposite effect and the negative expected 
correlation between risk and return. The disposition effect is stemming from the same line 
of rationale. After I examine the results, I can state that it is valid only for the losses domain. 
The situation in gains domain proves to be more complicated. As I hypothesised above, it 
can be explained by the relatively small variation in the holding period of gaining trades 
across the tested stylised investors. In the losses zone, the ties between the disposition effect 
and risk/return correlation are plainly detectible.  
I begin the discussion of findings with the correlation between return and total risk. Investor 
A exhibits a positive correlation coefficient between risk and return equal to 0.16. The 
coefficient is statistically significant at 1% confidence level. Such a correlation reflects the 
overall rational behaviour of Investor A, i.e. higher return is demanded per the unit of risk. 
It is quite different from Investor B, and Investor C. Investor B demonstrates the average 
risk-return correlation of 0.05 over the 45 observations, which is not statistically discernible 
from zero. In contrast, Investor C features the negative correlation coefficient of -0.16 
(significant at 1% level). The resulting correlation coefficients for all the three investors are 
also statistically significantly different at 1% confidence level. Relating the coefficient to the 
form of the utility function, I can establish that Investor A is risk-averse, Investor B is risk-
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neutral, and Investor C is risk-seeking. Investor D’s results are not meaningfully different 
from Investor C in any of the three correlation measures.  
Once I break down the correlation between total risk and return into two semi-deviations – 
positive and negative risk – and return, my theoretical model evinces negative correlation 
coefficient in the area of losses and positive coefficient in the area of gains. This finding and 
prediction reflects my assumption about the nature of risk and return relation under the 
Prospect Theory preferences and parameters. Notably, the relation holds for all types of 
stylised investors that I explore, which indicates the fundamental character of the observed 
phenomena. I devote empirical Chapter 4 to the tests of my model’s predictions concerning 
the risk-return relation in the domains of gains and losses.   
Furthermore, I investigate the dynamics of correlation between the positive/negative risk 
(dispersion of gains/losses) and total return across differently affect-infused environments. I 
notice that the correlation between positive risk and return is well aligned with the 
distribution of returns in the gains domain. Thus, the correlation coefficient is the largest for 
Investor A and the smallest for Investor C. The difference between Investor A and Investor 
B is statistically significant at 1% level, while the distinction between Investor B and 
Investor C is smaller (significant at 5% level).  
The correlation between negative risk and return demonstrates a different pattern. Here, a 
more substantial negative linear relation is witnessed for the most affect-rich setting 
(Investor C). It is lower than for Investor B (the difference is significant at 10% level), who 
is set to make decisions in the affect-poor environment. Finally, the least emotionally-
infused Investor A shows a higher correlation than Investor B (significant at 1% level).        
What is the psychological rationale behind the negative correlation between return and 
negative risk? I believe that once an investor finds himself in the area of losses, he is ready 
to pay the return premium to avoid the disutility caused by the failing decisions (which is 
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economically irrational). It means that an investor is prepared to experience even higher 
losses (up to a certain threshold) as the economic cost for getting back to the break-even. 
Sometimes, it becomes possible to wait until the open position hits back to the reference 
point. However, in more adverse scenarios, the losses from the position will keep 
accumulating until a desperate investor would close them down fearing disastrous 
consequences of irreversible loss of capital29. Consequently, the attempts to attenuate the 
disutility creates high dispersion of returns in the domain of losses resulting in the negative 
correlation between negative risk and performance.  
I make empirical testing of the risk-return relations in different environments in the context 
of emotions in Chapter 5.    
 
3. Data Description  
 
The brokerage house that has provided the data set is a large specialised retail broker that 
offers investors Direct Market Access (DMA) to foreign currency trading (FX market) 
through an in-house developed electronic trading platform that is available on desktop 
computers, smartphones and even smartwatch. Thanks to the specifics of the FX market, 
customers can place orders and make trades 24/5. Another critical discrepancy from stock 
markets is a large amount of financial leverage available to investors 30 . Usually, the 
maximum leverage for opening a position is 100:1, which means that a trader with $1,000 
on her account can increase exposure up to $100,000 and, consequently, gain or lose a 100 
times greater amount than without having such an opportunity. In cases when opened 
 
29 Such high severity/low probability events in the framework of Kahneman and Tversky (1992) model produce 
risk aversion in the losses domain. 
30 In personal communication, the broker has provided the average leverage across traders equal to 33, meaning 
that on average the size of a trading position exceeds investors’ capital 33 times. 
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positions generate losses, the leverage grows, and if it exceeds some maximum level 
predefined by the broker, e. g. 200:1, the exposure is automatically reduced so that the use 
of leverage is brought to approximately 100:1. Such exposure reduction is called a margin 
cut and is achieved by closing existing positions and/or opening new positions in the 
opposite direction. Margin cuts allow brokers to control their clients’ losses and limit them 
by the margin amount - the trader’s own assets. The factor of leverage creates an 
unprecedented environment of risk, incomparable to most of the other financial markets, 
which may consume trader’s all invested capital or double it within a very short time frame. 
It has an inevitable magnifying impact on the emotional state of investors during trading 
activity.  
 
The number of instruments in the FX market is limited (e.g. as compared to the stock 
market). Altogether, traders in the data set had access to only 48 financial instruments that 
included major currency pairs like EUR/USD, and USD/JPY, but also more exotic pairs like 
GBP/NZD or ZAR/JPY. The EUR/USD pair is by far the most popular trading instrument 
in the world, which was also reflected in the data set where this currency pair was on the top 
of the trading list for 60% of traders. For comparison, the next most popular pair, GBP/USD, 
was a hit for only 9% of traders. The limited number of similar instruments with the 
dominance of only a few of them creates a substantial benefit and advantage for an academic 
study of investors’ behaviour because it helps to control for the multitude of extraneous 
characteristics pertaining to instruments themselves leaving any changes in performance or 
other variables exclusively to individual decisions.    
 
A very valuable feature of the retail FX market is the popularity of so-called demo 
(demonstration) accounts, which provide a riskless training ground for beginner investors as 
well as the opportunity to test various strategies for more advanced traders. Typically, such 
a demo environment completely replicates live trading settings. The only difference is that 
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live account implies real money deposits, while demo accounts are credited with virtual 
(paper) money. On top of that, many large brokers organise multiple trading contests run on 
their electronic platform. The brokerage house that provided the data for the current research 
organises not only a trading contest of that sort but also records and stores the resulting 
data31. I describe the trading contest in detail in Section 3.1.2.   
 
I have acquired the complete Live trading orders history of 8,527 individual investors, who 
held accounts at a single Europe-based brokerage house during the period between 
November 2011 and May 2015. 618 investors had Contest accounts in addition to Live. Both 
accounts were matched by the broker using investors’ unique parameters, such as phone 
number or email address. I managed to collect the same amount of data for the Contest 
accounts as I did for Live. In each of the three Empirical Chapters of the Thesis, I apply a 
specific data selection procedure depending on the perspective required by research 
questions.  
 
In the first empirical chapter, I examine the relation between risk and performance of 
investors in the Live-only context. After applying a strict filter of a minimum of 200 
transactions per investor, my working number of subjects shrinks to 3,670 individuals in the 
Live trading domain.    
 
In the second empirical chapter, I carry on keeping my focus on the correlation between risk 
and return. However, I now evaluate two environments – Live and Contest and compare the 
interaction of risk and return in both with the purpose to elicit the role of emotions that I 
expect to observe in the correlation discrepancies. To maintain the connection and 
comparability to the first empirical chapter, I preserve the minimum number of trades 
criteria. Therefore, I isolate 166 individual investors who fit the selection requirements.    
 
31 In general, this is quite unusual for a broker to keep the contest data because it consumes precious space on 
company’s servers. In this case, the data was stored as multiple trading contests of the broker were 
interconnected not only to other contests but also live trading environment.  
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In the third empirical chapter, I abandon the correlation analysis framework and shift to an 
independent examination of performance and risk. Thanks to that, I ease my minimum 
number of trades criteria to only 10 trades, which leaves me with 523 subjects, featured with 
both live and contest trading accounts.  
 
The structure of raw data in my dataset is identical for Live and Contest settings. The dataset 
contains complete records of trade open and close orders. In addition, it includes a variety 
of orders’ descriptive characteristics, such as traded currency pair, price on which the order 
was filled, order volume, order side (buy or sell), order direction (open or close), conditional 
price and conditions if any were applied (conditional open, stop-loss or take-profit close), 
date and time of the order, automated order identifier which points to strategy if the order 
was executed under one’s conditions, order commission amount, and other information. 
Each record also includes several identifiers, which, firstly, allow distinguishing between 
the records of different traders, and, secondly, recognising separate trade orders. Also, the 
data about the traders’ balances in USD is available for every settlement date. The raw data 
were processed and reorganised into the form that describes the trades through several 
characteristics, including its profitability (return on trade), duration in minutes, and volume 
in USD. Additionally, each trade was categorised by whether it was intraday, based on 
automated strategy, fully or partially executed under any predefined conditions. 
 
Finally, aggregating all the data, a number of trading characteristics of a trader for both types 
of trading accounts were obtained: average daily balance, portion of intraday trades, portion 
of conditional orders, portion of automated trades, aggregated turnover, median duration of 
a trade, number of trades, number of instruments traded, standard deviation as well as semi-
deviations of the returns on trades. I do not use the same number of variables in every 
chapter, varying the content depending on the specific needs of research questions.  
 
 I summarise some of the variables for all my subjects in Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics of the complete selection of 8,527 Live investors without 
filters applied. 
 
Variable name AVG MEDIAN MIN MAX 
RETURN -0.045% -0.013% -1.494% 0.614% 
STDEV 0.909% 0.370% 0.024% 15.495% 
STDEV_PLUS 0.498% 0.261% 0.016% 5.695% 
STDEV_MINUS 1.112% 0.401% 0.023% 17.029% 
TRADES 464 178 2 4,933 
INSTRUMENTS 10 8 1 39 
TURNOVER 17.00 3.18 0.01 289.45 
INTRADAY 78.82% 85.71% 10.71% 100% 
DURATION 382 47 0.55 8,848 
CONDITIONAL 26.41% 21.90% 0% 92.42% 
AGE 38 36 21 67 
Note: The table exhibits the descriptive statistics for the selected number of variables pertaining to the 
individual investors in the current research. All the values are displayed after exclusion of outliers using 1% 
winsorisation for each of the variables. All the variables are calculated per an investor (or an account). The 
decoding and meaning of variables: RETURN (%) – average return on an account (calculated as 
return/position_volume); STDEV (%) – standard deviation of the trading positions return (return calculated as 
return/position_volume); STDEV_PLUS (%) – standard deviation of positive positions return; 
STDEV_MINUS (%) – standard deviation of negative positions return; TRADES (N) – total number of 
transactions made on the account; INSTRUMENTS (N) – number of trading instruments used by investors; 
TURNOVER (mln USD) – aggregated turnover on the account; INTRADAY(%) – share of trades completed 
within a trading day; DURATION (min) – median duration of an average trade on the account; 
CONDITIONAL (%) – share of conditional orders as part of all orders placed; AGE – investor’s age. 
 
   
According to the summary statistics, an average investor can be described as a 38 years old 
male (92% of all investors), trading 10 instruments and completing more than 400 
transactions, a quarter of them using conditional orders. Hefty 78% of trades are completed 
within the same day, each trade lasting 6 hours until closure.  
On average, an investor would see his wealth decreasing after each trade by 0.045% of the 
invested capital. The fact that individual trading is a wealth-destructive activity is fully in 
line with other research in this area. For example, Barber and Odean (2000), one of the first 
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studies of lay investors' performance, show that non-professional traders lose money on 
average, which is mainly attributable to trading costs. This observation and conclusions are 
very relevant to my findings. The more individual investors trade, the higher commissions 
they incur, while their gross trading remains comparable to market indexes. Barber et al. 
(2009) continue the same line of research and find that Taiwanese lay traders lose more than 
2% of the annual GDP of Taiwan. Finally, Barber et al. (2014) reveal that out of all individual 
investors (mainly day-traders) trading on Taiwanese stock exchange between 1992-2006, 
only 20% ended up with positive net performance. It is surprisingly close to the figures 
published by retail brokers in Europe who now have to reveal these data thanks to the new 
regulation by ESMA (EU regulator of financial markets).  
More specific data sets with subjects’ selections relevant to the research questions posed in 
each of the Thesis chapters are described and discussed therein.  
 
 
3.1. Affect-rich and affect-poor settings 
 
The literature on emotional research frequently refers to affect-rich and affect-poor stimuli 
(for example, Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004), Suter et al. (2016)). In my study, I align these 
designations with Live and Contest trading environments from my dataset.  
 
3.1.1. Live account as affect-rich setting 
 
Live trading account is a standard type of real money brokerage account representing the 
continuous set of risky gambles with traders’ own funds that they initially must deposit on 
their account with a broker. The nature of marginal trading implies that each trade may only 
partially be covered with an investor’s capital. This part may vary from 0.5% to 100% of the 
gamble’s value, and this is always an investor’s choice reflecting his risk preference. 
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Depending on the size of the selected financial leverage, investor’s capital may change faster 
or slower in reaction to the price change of the underlying instrument. This degree of risk 
sensitivity has an imminent effect on affect-richness of the gamble. However, even 
negligible risk sensitivity (small financial leverage) is still an essential emotional stimulus 
because it leads to possible loss of real personal money. Moreover, my review of the 
literature on neurophysiological and psychological inspection of individual traders revealed 
that real financial markets conditions enable acute emotional reactions, so fierce that 
professional traders describe their investments in the vivid terms of love and hatred. 
Therefore, I attribute all the bets, no matter which financial leverage is used by an investor, 
to the affect-rich domain.  
 
3.1.2. Contest account as affect-poor setting 
 
Contest account deserves a more detailed description, as it is rarely used by stockbrokers but 
is more popular with FX brokerage houses. For the broker that provided the dataset, the 
Trader Contest is part of the traders’ Community, which is accessible from the broker’s web 
site, with a separate section devoted to it. Anyone can become a member of the Community 
by filling in a registration form. A real email address and mobile phone number should be 
provided, as they are verified during the registration procedure. If members are caught on 
giving false information 32  or on manipulating or breaching Community rules, they are 
immediately expelled and lose entitlement for any prizes. The number of Community 
members has risen over approximately 10 years of its existence to 130,00033 people from all 
 
32 Such cases usually occur when a member becomes eligible for a monetary prize in one of the community 
contests. Real prizes are only credited to Live accounts, thus requiring a person to have one. Live account 
opening procedure necessitates a prize receiver to send certified copies of identification documents and proof 
of address. At this stage any lies become evident. The most common cases include false age (should be over 
18 years to open a Live account) or nationality (financial regulation that the broker complies with prohibits to 
open accounts for citizens of USA and a number of other countries).       
33 Certainly, only small portion of the registered members actively takes part in the Community on some regular 
basis. The broker does not collect such statistics, but refers to the figure of 5,000 active participants. 
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over the world, and there are 15+ different contests available, whereas Trader Contest is the 
largest and most famous of them. The contest is run monthly (from the first till the last day 
of a calendar month) and is open for any Community member without any prerequisites. 
There are also no rules regarding the continuity of participation. In this regard, every 
monthly Contest is run independently. On the first day of the month, each participant’s 
Contest account is credited with $100,000. This amount and any trading proceeds are zeroed 
on the last day of the Contest when the final results are computed. In the Contest rules the 
broker declares four goals that a participant must follow in order to be successful in the 
competition: 
1) Generate the maximum trading profit within 1 month with the maximum drawdown 
of the initial amount34; 
2) Showing good trading performance, to prompt other traders to copy participant’s 
trades35; 
3) Demonstrate long-term steady results36; 
4) Actively explain trading decisions by maintaining a trading blog. 
 
The broker outlines certain rules for the participants, e.g. minimum and maximum order size 
(100,000 and 5,000,000 currency units, respectively), or maximum 5 simultaneous 
transactions, but these limitations are primarily aimed at ensuring that participants take the 
competition seriously, do not do random trading, back their decisions with their beliefs and 
research, and strive to maximise their returns.  
 
34 In case of loss of the initial amount, a participant cannot continue to trade and should wait for the next month. 
35 Transactions made by participants in Trading Contest are a source for another contest conducted by the 
broker, which in short can be described as portfolio management competition. In this game participants have 
to sign up for trades (signals) from selected participants in Trading Contest, normally based on their 
performance. After that any transaction made by traders from the underwritten pool translates into portfolio 
profits or losses. Portfolio management game is thus won by a participant who can most aptly create a pool of 
the best traders from Trading Contest. In turn, Trading Contest’s participants are rewarded for having 
subscribers, the more the better.    
36 Long-term performance is rewarded in yet another competition, which is called Trader of the Year. This is 
a rolling monthly contest, in which the participants have to have at least 6 months prior track record within the 
rolling year window. The winner should show the best average monthly performance and become eligible for 
$2,000 prize.   
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The rank of each participant is made up of 4 components, even though 2/3 of the score 
consists of performance (computed as an increase of equity). The other criteria, as was 
explained above, are used to motivate the best effort and punish those participants who try 
to win by random transactions – number of signal subscribers, orders quality, and trader’s 
blog. Virtually, the only chance to win in the trading game is to conduct thoughtful 
transactions as is confirmed by the random inspection of the top three winners’ strategies37. 
A vital motivational aspect is the monetary prize structure. The total prize fund is $28,000 
every month. It is distributed across the best 30 traders. The exact structure is presented in 
the table below:      
 
Table 3.4. The distribution of real money prizes for Contest participants. 
 
These gains are undoubtedly significant and desirable for contest’s participants. For 
comparison, the average value of participants’ Live account balances is $2,834. Therefore, 
a contest participant can win from 7% to 218% of their own live funds.  
 
37 Without the physical opportunity to review all Contest participants and their strategies, I cannot guarantee 
that some of them do not employ the option-like trading strategy, whereby they would open a single position 
in the beginning of the month with the biggest possible risk in order to reap a maximum random profit. 






5th – 6th 1,500$ 
7th – 10th 1,000$ 
11th – 20th 500$ 
20th – 30th 200$ 
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In addition to monetary incentives, there are substantial non-monetary reasons for optimal 
decision making among Contest participants. First, a trader can benchmark personal 
performance and gauge his skill against a large and representative group of peers. It may be 
a valuable tool both for experienced traders and beginners, who may test their preparedness 
to switch to Live trading. The number of Contest participants holds stably around the figure 
of 800 people in a single month. The second benefit from trading responsibly and engaging 
the best effort in the Contest does not have immediate monetary benefit but offers large 
potential later on. Noticeable results that anyone can trace usually attract interest from other 
investors, who start seeking advice or external manager’s service. Hence good and consistent 
performance can translate into the beginning of a successful business story. Thirdly, a high 
ranking means a certain personal status in the community. Top three performers are asked 
to deliver a presentation telling about their strategies leading to success. Also, they are 
praised and acclaimed in traders’ forums and generally become famous building up better 
self-image and emotional state.   
 
The aggregation of all the financial and non-financial incentives discussed above creates a 
powerful mechanism, which stimulates contestants on the conscious level to exhibit their 
best skill in trading. It is also apparent that Contest trading is not affect-free because superior 
performance pays back in real money prizes and higher community status. Nevertheless, 
deficient performance does not have any straightforward monetary consequences. For the 
most part, the worst outcome of Contest trading is suffered self-esteem. Therefore, 
considering and comparing the bulk of trading activity in Live and Contest, I conclude that 




P a g e  | 107 
 
3.1.3. Interface of the investment platform 
 
The investing process is inextricably linked to the trading interface of the user. Before the 
digital revolution in trading, the standard process of placing orders involved very moderate 
technical equipment, like telefax or phone. The development of electronic platforms in the 
2000s has lead to the structural shift in the whole trading industry in multiple ways. First, 
electronic market access has dramatically decreased the costs of trading because huge bits 
of manual processing of orders and transactions have become redundant. Therefore, 
investing turned more democratic and affordable for the masses of laypeople. Second, 
electronic interfaces provide for enormous and smooth flow of trading-related information. 
Furthermore, built-in Artificial Intelligence systems are now available to set up and pick out 
the necessary useful bits from this information waterfall. Third, access to markets has 
become truly universal. Having a mobile phone in the pocket allows immediate order 
placement, analysis of pre-trade and post-trade information, tracking of investment 
performance, etc. All this knowledge is available 24/7.  
The electronic platform provided by the brokerage house is a thoroughly developed system 
that can be equally used by the newbies or trading professionals. Its main interface can be 
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Figure 3.1. Electronic trading interface provided to clients by the brokerage house.  
 
The interface is made up of three clearly visible parts. The biggest part is the central space 
with the price chart of the currently selected trading instrument. This area is used for 
‘drawing’, i.e. application of various methods from technical analysis. A user can set up the 
price chart according to the personal needs, for example, choosing different time frames, 
types of the graph, technical indicators, etc. Also, in this particular platform, a user can place 
orders (market or conditional) by clicking on the chart space at the specific price level. 
The second component of the interface is the vertical area on the left. It is the main block 
used for placing orders as it is featured by large and colourful market orders-related Buy and 
Sell buttons, which is hard to miss. Below market orders area, there is a section for 
conditional orders. Further below, a user can track essential information, like changes in 
prices of the main instruments, current market liquidity levels.  
The third critical element of the interface is the area in the bottom of the screen. It is used to 
reflect the up-to-date trading situation of the user. The user can inspect all the placed orders 
and their impact on total performance. It is the most ‘emotionally charged’ section. The 
profit/loss information is updated with every tick of the price, hence the change from the red 
P a g e  | 109 
 
colour indicating losses to the green colour indicating gains takes place uninterruptedly 
provoking the elicitation of positive and negative feelings familiar for any trader. Any 
conditional order or open position can be cancelled or closed from this area as well.  
It is worth paying attention to the line of text in the very bottom of the interface. It shows 
the total capital owned by an investor, which is stored on the investor’s account at the 
brokerage house. Besides, a trader can see her total leverage used by all currently open 
trading positions. The part of the capital that is still remaining or unused is called ‘free 
margin’. Possibly, the most important figure on the whole interface is the ‘total result’ or 
Total Profit/Loss that sums up from all open positions by an investor.                
When the one looks at the live screen of the platform, not just at the picture of it, the interface 
and the information on the screen appear to be extremely dynamic, with running numbers, 
evolving price charts, changing colours. All these vibrant commotions are capable of 
inducing the affective states in investors by themselves and require a great deal of attention 
and focusing in order to understand the continually changing environment.      
      
3.2. Methodology 
 
Throughout my thesis, I use similar research methods. The first two empirical chapters are 
primarily devoted to correlation analysis, while the last chapter adheres to the comparison 
of risk behaviour among individuals. In two of my empirical chapters, I use multiple 
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3.2.1. General principles 
 
Across my research, I employ the return or profitability variable. I calculate the per-trader 
return, in line with the industry standard, in a three-step method. First, I convert every trade’s 
return and position volume in USD (the exchange rate applicable to each trade is provided 
in the data set). Next, I measure the return per each trade as an absolute return for the trade 
divided by trade volume. Finally, I average the return across all trades of an investor38. The 
resulting figure can be interpreted as the return per 1 US dollar traded. Unfortunately, this 
method does not account for the leverage employed by a trader. However, the exact degree 
of leverage is tough to evaluate during the abrupt and volatile trading process. Nevertheless, 
such an approach, by standardising against position size, still produces a reasonable control 
for the implied investment risk of each transaction. 
 
Furthermore, I frequently use and compute the positive and negative semi-deviations of 
returns. However, these are not precisely ‘semi’ deviations because they are mathematically 
computed against mean return that can be negative or positive, while in the case of my study 
I am more interested in the measurement against a status quo value. In trading, a typical 





∑ 𝐼𝑟<0 ∙ 𝑟




∑ 𝐼𝑟>0 ∙ 𝑟
2     (Formula 3.2) 
 
 
38 The approach is equivalent to summing up all trading profit of an investor and dividing it by the total traded 
volume.  
39 It should be noted that in trading, zero return does not coincide with the purchase price (offer for long 
position), but rather with the selling price (bid for long position). When a trader opens a position she 
momentarily gets into the loss domain valued by the size of the spread (difference between offer and bid prices).  
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where 𝑣𝑎𝑟− and 𝑣𝑎𝑟+ are negative and positive modified semi-deviations with 𝑛−, 𝑛+ and 𝑟 
being number of negative returns, number of positive returns and realised return on a trade, 
respectively. 
 
For the goal of several research questions, I evaluate the Disposition effect (DE). For the 
computation of DE, I adopt a simple methodology of round-trip duration of transactions used 
by Shapira and Venezia (2001). In line with this approach, DE for each trader equals to: 
 
                       𝐷𝐸𝑖 = 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛,𝑖
− − 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛,𝑖
+       (Formula 3.3) 
 
where 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛,𝑖
−  is the median duration of transactions realised as losses, and 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛,𝑖
+  
is the median duration of transactions realised as gains. Disposition effect for the whole 







𝑖=1                                            (Formula 3.4) 
 
3.2.2. Methods used in Chapters 4 and 5 
 
In the first empirical chapter (Chapter 4), I use three measures of the linear relation between 
risk and return variables. One measure is parametric Pearson correlation, while the other two 
are non-parametric Spearman rank-order correlation and Kendall’s correlation. The first and 
the most common statistic for measuring linear relation is Pearson 𝜌 correlation, which is 
defined as the ratio of two variables’ covariance to the product of their standard deviations. 
So, the sample correlation coefficient 𝑟 is: 
 

























As Pearson’s correlation is a parametric test, it has strong assumptions like bivariate normal 
distribution of the data. The coefficient is very sensitive to outliers and assumes a strictly 
linear relationship, so, in the case of non-normal data, it could be misleading. 
 
To reduce the effect of outliers, the observations could be replaced by their ranks, which is 
implied by Spearman’s rank-order correlation: 
 
𝑟𝑆 =
∑ ((𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑥𝑖)−𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑥)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑦𝑖)−𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑦)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ))
𝑛
𝑖=1
√∑ (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑥𝑖)−𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑥)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
2𝑛
𝑖=1 ∑ (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑦𝑖)−𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑦)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
2𝑛
𝑖=1
         (Formula 3.6) 
 
where 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑥𝑖) and 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑦𝑖) are the ranks of the sample’s observations. Such an approach 
allows for relaxing the assumption about linearly related variables and shows high absolute 
correlation values for non-linear but a monotone relationship. 
 
In a similar fashion, Kendall’s correlation is a non-parametric test designed to assess the 









                    (Formula 3.7) 
where 
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𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗) = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗) > 0
0, 𝑖𝑓 (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗) = 0
−1, 𝑖𝑓 (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗) < 0
;  𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗) = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗) > 0
0, 𝑖𝑓 (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗) = 0
−1, 𝑖𝑓 (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗) < 0
 
 
Furthermore, in my study, I interpret the correlation between the return and risk as a measure 
of investors’ rationality and use correlation coefficients as a dependent variable in regression 
analysis. In line with the recommendations in academic literature (e.g. Cox (2008)), I 
transform the correlation coefficient in the way to obtain approximately normally distributed 
non-limited variable which retains the dynamics of the original one. For this purpose, I use 









)                                                          (Formula 3.8) 
 
To check the reliability of the results obtained using classic multiple linear regression, I use 
one of the robust regression methods called MM-estimators (see Verardi and Croux (2009) 
for more information). It combines two essential properties of a good robust estimator – 
high-breakdown point and high efficiency. The estimator compiles two types of robust 
estimators, S-estimator and M-estimator. It is defined as40: 
 





)𝑛𝑖=1                (Formula 3.9) 
 
Here ?̂?𝑆 is the robust estimator of residuals’ dispersion which satisfies 
 
 
40 𝑟𝑖(𝛽)in Formulas 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 is u.d. 







)𝑛𝑖=1 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡                                  (Formula 3.10) 
And ?̂?𝑆 is the S-estimator, which is used as the initial value of ?̂? in the iterative calculation 
of ?̂?𝑀𝑀. It is defined as: 
?̂?𝑆 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 min
𝛽
?̂?𝑆(𝑟1(𝛽), … , 𝑟𝑛(𝛽))                       (Formula 3.11) 
 
In both Formula 3.9 and Formula 3.10, 𝜌(𝑢) is even, non-decreasing for 𝑢 > 0 and less 
increasing than the square function. A good choice is Tukey’s Biweight function: 
 
𝜌(𝑢) = {







𝑖𝑓 |𝑢| ≤ 𝑘
1 𝑖𝑓  |𝑢| ≤ 𝑘
                       (Formula 3.12) 
 
where k is some constant chosen depending on the desired efficiency and breakdown point 
of the estimator.  
 
Finally, to compare the regression models’ coefficients across groups, I use the dummy 
variables and interaction terms. Thus, to examine two groups A and B differences, I add the 
dummy variable for, say, B and p variables which are predictors of initial model multiplied 
by B dummy: 
 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽𝑝+1𝑑𝐵 + 𝛽𝑝+2𝑑𝐵 ∙ 𝑥1𝑖 + ⋯ 
+𝛽2𝑝+1𝑑𝐵 ∙ 𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛                (Formula 3.13)) 
 
Here, 𝛽𝑗 , 𝑗 = 0, … , 𝑝 are coefficients of the model for group A, 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝+1+𝑗, 𝑗 = 0, … , 𝑝 are 
coefficients of the model for group B, and 𝛽𝑝+1+𝑗, 𝑗 = 0, … , 𝑝 are differences between the 
two groups’ regression coefficients. As far as 𝛽𝑝+1+𝑗, 𝑗 = 0, … , 𝑝 are separate coefficients 
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in the model, its significance (difference from zero) can be statistically tested. So, if 𝛽𝑝+1 
statistically differs from zero, the intercept significantly varies across groups, if 𝛽𝑝+1+𝑗, 𝑗 =
1, … , 𝑝  statistically differs from zero – the effect of 𝑋𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑝   significantly varies 
across groups. 
 
3.2.3. Methods used in Chapter 6 
    
In Chapter 6, I aim to explain the difference in the profitability of Contest and Live accounts 
with the help of the cross-section of multiple personal, trading and behavioural variables. 
This goal is best fulfilled with the use of multiple linear regression analysis. The regression 
equation takes the form: 
 
𝑦 =∝ +𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛   (Formula 3.14) 
 
I develop two regression specifications for the study. The first model includes 22 variables, 
while the second model is based on 26 variables. The magnitude of the variables is calculated 





𝑖     (Formula 3.15) 
 
where 𝑟∆
𝑖  is the difference in return for investor i, 𝑟𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒
𝑖  is the return on Live account for 
investor i, and 𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑖  is the return on Contest account for investor i.  
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4. Empirical Chapter: Do individual 
investors make rational decisions? 
Prospect Theory view on the negative 
relation between risk and return. 
 
4.1. Research Question 1. Hypothesis development 
 
Risk aversion is one of the fundamental principles in modern economic theory. The idea that 
economic agents exhibit rational behaviour by requiring a risk premium for the extra units 
of risk from investments and, as a consequence, face concave decision valuation function 
lies behind many prominent financial models, such as Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), Modern Portfolio Theory. Yet, the empirical testing of risk 
aversion in many domains of finance fails to provide unequivocal evidence of the dominating 
rationality. For example, the testimony from international stock markets or organisation 
theory that I discuss in the literature review, suggests that economic agents may instead agree 
to pay risk premium for extra units of risk that is against traditional economic perspective. 
However, all such evidence up to date is indirect – it does not test the decision-makers and 
their decisions directly. Rather, the scholars explore the consequences of these decisions, for 
instance, in the framework of corporate risk and profitability analysis or risk and return 
patterns of financial securities.  
One of the possible explanations behind such indirectly observed irrationality patterns 
offered by researchers (Fiegenbaum (1990), Wang et al. (2017)) is the agents’ behaviour 
aligned with Prospect Theory preferences. These preferences result in S-shaped form of the 
utility function and reverse S-shaped form of decision-weighting function, which altogether 
creates a fourfold pattern of risk attitudes (Kahneman and Tversky (1992)). In Section 2.10, 
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I design an economic model of portfolio choice to test how the decisions of an individual 
investor with Prospect Theory-based risk preferences might impact the relation between 
realised investment performance and risk. My model is built on the papers of Barberis and 
Xiong (2009), Vlcek and Hens (2011) and Jakusch et al. (2019), who apply a similar 
framework to explore the association between Prospect Theory preferences and disposition 
effect. The model makes several curious predictions concerning disposition effect and risk 
behaviour. One of the key predictions is a positive correlation between risk and return in the 
domain of gains and negative correlation in the domain of losses.         
My data allow a direct investigation of individual risk attitudes and the predictions of my 
theoretical model concerning risk and return relation. I intend to utilise the detailed data set 
that contains trading statistics of a large group of individual investors.  
Consequently, my first research question is articulated in the following way: 
Do individual investors change their risk behaviour subject to positive or negative trading 
results?  
According to my adopted methodology, I measure risk behaviour based on the realised 
relation between risk and return. Is the correlation between risk and return a good measure 
of rationality? I contend that this is not only an adequate measure but it also directly follows 
from the decision-making theory. The concave form of the value function implies that an 
individual requires a risk premium for an additional unit of risk suggesting that there should 
be a positive correlation between risk and return. In turn, the convex form of the value 
function shows the opposite: an individual is ready to pay a risk premium to accept additional 
risk. This situation should lead to a negative correlation between risk and return. These 
analytical inferences are substantiated by the predictions of the theoretical model in Section 
2.10.   
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In the discussion of the correlation between risk and return as the approximation of 
rationality, another essential perspective is the interaction between rationality and 
performance. From the traditional theory point of view, it should be expected that the two 
variables are positively related. In other words, rational behaviour should predict better 
investment results. Nevertheless, investment performance is made up not solely of the degree 
of rationality but other elements as well. For example, prior literature has broadly 
investigated the presence of skill and luck in profitability. I can admit and expect that an 
individual with a high level of rationality may still experience losses after a long streak of 
investment decisions. 
In contrast, an investor who systematically agrees to pay risk premium for consuming extra 
risk (i.e. has a negative risk/return correlation) may still end up with overall positive 
performance. Or, there can be two individuals with an equivalent degree of rationality, yet 
disparate investment income. All of that may happen, for example, due to perfect market 
timing skills. If I manage to discover the empirical presence of the phenomenon discussed 
above but still establish a positive link between rationality and performance, it would 
indicate that rationality is a viable but non-perfect predictor of investment success.       
My subsequent analysis is based on a simple idea that the strength of risk-return relation can 
indicate the degree of the subject’s risk attitude. In principle, economic theory agrees that 
individual risk preferences are heterogeneous41, that is the curvature of the decision valuation 
function is unique for each person. Consequently, on the scale of individual risk attitudes 
continuum, greater absolute measure of the relation between risk and return should signal a 
more curved valuation function. At the same time, a weaker gauge of the risk-return link 
 
41  For example, Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) proposed measurement techniques for individual risk 
preferences – absolute and relative risk aversion.  
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would indicate less curved function. In other words, a smaller price (cost) of risk per the unit 
of return.   
Systematic risk aversion is what should be expected if individuals comply with strict rules 
of rationality principles put forth by neoclassic economic models. These models do not 
recognise reference-dependence. Thus all investment decisions should be made in 
accordance with the concave valuation function perspective. If this is the case, the relation 
between risk and return should remain steadily positive for traders independent of positive 
or negative overall performance. I will use this expectation as my null hypothesis: 
H0: Investors should exhibit risk-averse preferences in their decisions irrespective of 
the sign of their investment results. For gains and losses, investors should require a risk 
premium for extra units of risk consumed. The relation between risk and return should 
remain strictly positive.  
Prospect Theory provides another conceptualisation of risk behaviour. According to this 
model, individuals tend to be risk-averse only above a specific reference point. Below such 
point, they are expected to manifest risk-seeking behaviour. From the risk-return relation 
perspective, it means that above some certain threshold risk and return should be positively 
correlated, while below the threshold, the correlation should turn negative as my model in 
Section 2.10 demonstrates. Besides, Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992)) also introduces the concept of loss aversion, which describes 
the tendency of decision-makers to assign a higher psychological weight to losses than to 
gains. Practically, this translates into the expectation that negative correlation between risk 
and return in the valuation area below the reference point should be significantly higher in 
modulus than the positive correlation in the area above the reference point. The outcome of 
the theoretical model also predicts this fact for the investor who takes decisions in the real 
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financial market environment. Following this discussion, I formulate three alternative sub-
hypotheses that together describe the individual risk behaviour under Prospect Theory: 
Ha1: Investors should demonstrate risk-averse behaviour above the reference point. 
In the positive domain, the relation between risk and return should remain positive.  
Ha2: Investors should demonstrate risk-seeking behaviour below the reference point. 
In the losses domain, the relation between risk and return should remain negative.  
Ha3: Losses should loom larger than gains. Investors should demonstrate higher 
sensitivity to losses than to gains of equal value. The relation between risk and return in the 
negative domain should be greater in absolute value than in the positive domain. 
 
 
4.2. Research Question 1. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.2.1. Macro vs Micro-level perspective 
 
To add robustness and enhance the accuracy of my analysis of the research question and 
hypotheses, I plan to conduct my investigation at the two levels. 
Firstly, I will explore if pooling the trading results across all investors in my sample can 
reveal any difference in risk behaviour. I call this perspective macro or pooled-data analysis 
because, for each subject, I only collect a single value of return and a single value of risk 
(measured as the variation of return). At this stage, I will evaluate the relation between gross 
risk and return across the board of my sample. The resulting relation should provide evidence 
of aggregated (gross) risk attitude. Specifically, it will show if all investors in my sample, in 
general, are risk-averse, risk-seeking or risk-neutral, and what is the role of trading success 
in the evinced risk preferences. 
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However, the macro approach fails to recognise heterogeneity in individual risk preferences. 
To evaluate the particularised shape of the judgment valuation function, I will need to scale 
down to individual trades of each investor. Obviously, even the most profitable traders have 
tough times of losing trades, while traders with the worst overall performance may have very 
good trades, meaning that each individual investor has a dispersion of trading activity around 
his personal reference point. At the micro level of analysis, I will step down to examine the 
risk behaviour patterns during good trades versus the bad trades for each individual trader. I 
plan that both levels of analysis will provide complementary information for hypotheses 
testing.  
Figure 4.1. reflects the difference in macro and micro analysis perspectives. 
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Note: The panel on the left displays the macro view on the relation between risk and return. Each observation 
on this panel represents the risk-return coordinates of an individual investor. All observations taken together 
allow making an inference about the risk preferences of the aggregated sample of investors. Each investor finds 
its place on the graph relative to the single global reference point. The panel on the right is a single investor’s 
perspective of the risk-return relation. Here each observation embodies the coordinates of the average risk and 
return of the sequence of 20 transactions of a single trader. The positioning of observations on the right panel 
against the local (investor-specific) reference point, which is zero return, allows making a conclusion about 
individual subject’s risk behaviour.   
 
4.2.2. Macro-level analysis of correlations between risk 
and return – a comprehensive view 
 
As was specified above, at the macro level of analysis, each investor is represented with a 
single measure of profitability (average return) and risk (standard deviation of return) across 
his complete trading history. In this perspective, I aim to evaluate the gross risk behaviour 
patterns of the whole sample of investors. I start my investigation of the relation between 
risk and return by computing one parametric (Pearson correlation) and two nonparametric 
(Spearman rank correlation and Kendall’s rank correlation) measures of correlation for all 
3,670 investors in my selection irrespective of their performance.  
Table 4.1. Correlation between risk and return for all individual traders based on Pearson, 
Spearman and Kendall correlation measures.  
Correlation 
measure 
Total return and 
total risk 
Total return and 
positive semi-deviation 


























Note: The table shows the computed correlation coefficients between risk and return for all 3,670 subjects. 
Three measures of correlation are employed: Pearson, Spearman rank and Kendall rank correlations. For each 
of the coefficients, p-values are provided in the brackets. *** shows significance at 1% level, ** shows 
significance at 5% level, * shows significance at 10% level.   
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All the three measures of correlation uncover an overall negative relation between 
profitability and total risk (first column in Table 4.1). Based on the most conservative 
technique – Kendall rank correlation, the correlation between pooled-data risk and return 
equals to -0.17. Furthermore, when I split the total risk measure into positive and negative 
semi-deviations (according to Formulas 3.4 and 3.5), I discover statistically significant 
positive relation between the total return and risk behaviour for gaining trades (positive semi-
deviation – the second column in Table 4.1), which equals to 0.04 according to Kendall 
correlation measure, and significant negative relation between total return and risk behaviour 
for losing trades (negative semi-deviation – the third column in Table 4.1) - -0.22 as per 
Kendall rank correlation. What is more, for all the measures of correlation that I use, losing 
trades behaviour is more sizably related to the total return.  
My results imply that for the aggregate of investors, a lower return is associated with higher 
volatility. This finding does not support the traditional model of risk-aversion dominance, 
which commands a positive relation between profitability and risk. At the first 
approximation, this picture complies with the Prospect Theory’s predictions because all 
three risk behaviour patterns put forth by this theory can be found in the findings: the last 
column’s result is explained by the convex value function for losses, the second column’s 
positive correlation is the demonstration of concavity of the value function for gains. 
Inherent loss aversion effect clarifies the dominance of negative correlation over positive. In 
the losses domain, profitability becomes much more aligned with the factor of risk (negative 
variance) than other factors attributable to explaining trading performance, such as 
experience, cultural background, financial literacy, etc. In the domain of gains, the array of 
non-risk related variables is seemingly more powerful, making the connection between 
profitability and return less robust.  
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4.2.3. Macro-level analysis of correlation: comparison 
between winning and losing investors    
 
In the previous section, I evaluated the risk-return relation for all my subjects and found the 
traces of overall risk-seeking behaviour. Yet, the primary purpose of my analysis is to 
investigate if risk behaviour characteristics are getting modified by investors subject to 
changes in profitability. For the null hypothesis to hold, I must confirm that investors 
performing above or below the global reference point demonstrate a consistently positive 
correlation between their risk and return variables. However, if investors behave according 
to Prospect Theory, three-pattern behaviour should be reflected: positive correlation 
coefficient for the performance above the reference point, the negative correlation 
coefficient for the results below the reference point, and larger correlation coefficient for 
losing investors than for gaining ones. Typically, in the studies on trading and investment 
performance, the traditional reference point is zero return. I believe that for the purpose of 
this study it is the right choice so I will hold on to it as well. In the next step, I divide the 
investors into two groups: the ones with a total return above 0% are designated as ‘Gainers’, 
while the other part of traders performing below 0% is attributed to ‘Losers’. Out of 3,670 
traders in my selection42, 1,193 individuals (32.5%) got to the ‘Gainers’ group. The rest of 
2,477 individuals (67.5%) showed the result below 0%. I evaluate the correlation between 






42 Considering that the criteria for the selection was the minimum of 200 transactions (only position-opening 
trades were considered), the overall trading result represents a relatively sustainable measure of trading 
success.  
P a g e  | 125 
 
Table 4.2. Correlation between total risk and return for individual traders with performance 





risk and return for 
‘Gainers’ group 
Correlation between 




















Note: The table shows the computed correlation coefficients between risk and return for 1,193 ‘gainers’  and 
2,477 ‘losers’. Three measures of correlation are employed: Pearson, Spearman rank and Kendall rank 
correlations. For each of the coefficients, p-values are provided in the brackets. *** shows significance at 1% 
level, ** shows significance at 5% level, * shows significance at 10% level. 
 
Grounded on the most conservative correlation technique, the gross correlation between total 
risk and return equals to 0.41 for the outperforming group of investors, and -0.53 for 
underperformers. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Examination of the relation between total risk and total return provides the support for the 
alternative hypotheses: all the three behavioural patterns put forth by the Prospect Theory 
are observable. ‘Gainers’ group demonstrates a substantial positive link between the two 
variables pointing to overall risk aversion. ‘Losers’ group, on the contrary, reveals a high 
negative correlation between total risk and total return and, according to my methodology, 
convex value function. Also, for each of the correlation measures the negative correlation of 
‘Losers’ is higher than the positive correlation of ‘Gainers’ (in absolute value) highlighting 
the loss aversion.  
Based on the aggregate-level correlation study above, it can be stated that individual 
investors tend to behave in accordance with the Prospect Theory’s prescriptions and the 
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predictions outlined in the theoretical model in Section 2.10. Successful individuals with the 
return above the reference point demonstrate positive relation between risk and return 
factors, while less successful investors performing below the reference threshold display the 
risk-seeking behavioural pattern. Besides, as predicted by the Prospect Theory, losses 
accentuate the interaction between risk and return, making the connection stronger than in 
case of gains.  
In the next section, I conduct several robustness checks to substantiate the obtained findings.  
 
4.2.4. Robustness analysis of the macro-level correlation 
between risk and return 
 
I use two different methods to test the robustness of correlation analysis: trimming 1st and 
99th percentiles and trimming 5th and 95th  percentiles of total return and total risk.  
The results of robustness tests for the large data set are presented in Table 4.3: 
Table 4.3. Robustness tests of correlation between total risk and total return for all subjects 











































Note: The table displays the computed correlation coefficients between risk and return for the whole data set 
of 3,670 investors after two robustness checks are applied to the data. Three measures of correlation are 
employed: Pearson, Spearman rank and Kendall rank correlations. For each of the coefficients, p-values are 
provided in the brackets. *** shows significance at 1% level, ** shows significance at 5% level, * shows 
significance at 10% level. 
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Compared to non-robust results, the findings for all subjects’ correlation between total risk 
and return changed substantially for Pearson correlation method, which is predictably the 
most sensitive to the information hidden in the top and bottom percentiles of the data set. 
For example, when trimming 5% from the top and bottom of the risk variable, Pearson 
correlation rose from the initial -0.58 to -0.17. The difference between trimming 1% and 5% 
of data was also substantial for Pearson correlation. For non-parametric methods, the change 
has been much less dramatic. In particular, Spearman correlation has risen from -0.23 to -
0.19 for 5% trimmed total risk and remained unchanged for other robustness approaches. In 
turn, Kendall rank correlation has risen from -0.17 to 0.14 for 5% trimmed total risk.   
I can conclude that, generally, the result is unchanged – investors in aggregate demonstrate 
risk-seeking behaviour. As expected, the largest impact of trimming is on Pearson 
correlation measure that is more sensitive to outliers 
Next, I apply the same tests to ‘Gainers’ group and ‘Losers’ group. The proceeds are 
provided in the table below. ‘Gainers’ group is displayed in Section A and ‘Losers’ group in 
Section B. 
Table 4.4. Robustness tests of correlation between total risk and total return for individual 
traders with performance above and below the reference point based on Pearson, Spearman 
and Kendall correlation measures. 
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Note: The table displays the computed correlation coefficients between risk and return for ‘Gainers’ and 
‘Losers’ groups after two robustness checks are applied to the data. Three measures of correlation are 
employed: Pearson, Spearman rank and Kendall rank correlations. For each of the coefficients, p-values are 
provided in the brackets. *** shows significance at 1% level, ** shows significance at 5% level, * shows 
significance at 10% level. 
 
As for the complete data set, the largest shifts as a result of robustness checks could be 
observed for Pearson correlation, which varied from 0.79 (1% trimmed total return) to 0.48 
(5% trimmed total risk) for ‘Gainers’ group, and from -0.83 (1% trimmed total return) to -
0.71 (5% trimmed total risk) for ‘Losers’ group. Two non-parametric methods proved to be 
less sensitive to the selected robustness tests.    
After the robustness tests, all three behavioural patterns observed before have preserved. It 
can still be asserted that the correlation analysis supports the explanation of investors’ 
behaviour grounded on the premises of Prospect Theory.  
 
4.2.4.1. Robustness test of the macro-level correlation using 
EUR/USD currency pair 
 
The Foreign Exchange market, which defines the context and the boundaries of the current 
research, is known to be heavily dominated by one single currency pair – EUR/USD. This 
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is equally true for institutional market and retail trading. In my dataset, as I demonstrate in 
the Data Description section, EUR/USD pair is the most popular for 60% of all the subjects. 
That is why it is essential to test my results against the dominating pair-specific influence.  
To conduct such analysis, I use the same approach as for obtaining the results for Table 4.1. 
However, I only keep the subjects’ EUR/USD round-trip transactions. At the same time, I 
preserve the requirement of minimum 200 trades. I find that out of the total sample of 3,670 
traders, approximately half of them, or 1,734 individuals, fit the criteria for the robustness 
test. The results are shown in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5. Correlation between risk and return for all individual traders’ EUR/USD trades 
based on Pearson, Spearman and Kendall correlation measures.  
Correlation 
measure 
Total return and 
total risk 
Total return and 
positive semi-deviation 


























Note: The table shows the computed correlation coefficients between risk and return for 1,734 subjects based 
on their EUR/USD trades. Three measures of correlation are employed: Pearson, Spearman rank and Kendall 
rank correlations. For each of the coefficients, p-values are provided in the brackets. *** shows significance at 
1% level, ** shows significance at 5% level, * shows significance at 10% level.   
 
The comparison of Table 4.5 and Table 4.1 indicates that there is no significant influence of 
EUR/USD currency pair on total results. For the correlation between total risk and total 
return, the most substantial discrepancy can be spotted for Pearson correlation measure, 
which can be explained by the higher impact of outliers. The other two methodologies – 
Spearman and Kendall – give a more consistent output.  
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A very similar picture is observed for the correlation between return and positive and 
negative risk. All the results are significant at 1% level and have the same signs.   
 
4.2.5. Regression analysis of the macro-level relation 
between risk and return 
 
A useful alternative methodology that can be employed to investigate the relation between 
risk and return is regression analysis, which has the advantage of providing more detailed 
information about the relation between variables. In the current section, I intend to regress 
risk and return variables to examine further evidence of the valuation function’s form. 
For the analysis of the dependencies between risk and return, either risk can be measured as 
the price of the unit of return or return can be evaluated as the premium per the unit of risk. 
I start with the former approach and specify the model: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗 =∝𝑖+ 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 
where  i represents either ‘gainers’ or ‘losers’ group, j = 1,…,Ni represents investor in each 
group, ∝𝑖 is the intercept for the respective group, 𝛽𝑖is the slope coefficient for the respective 
group, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 is the error term. 
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Table 4.6. Regression results for ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ groups 













R-squared 0.66 0.81  
Number of 
observations 
1,193 2,477 3,670 
Note: This table displays the main summary statistics for two regressions, in which Risk is a dependent variable 
and Return is the independent variable. The first column with results describes the risk-return relation for 
‘Gainers’ group that includes investors with positive overall trading performance (above the reference point). 
The second column reports the regression results for ‘Losers’ group that covers investors with overall negative 
performance (below the reference point). p-values for the regression coefficients are provided in parenthesis. 
The third column presents the analysis of the hypothesis of the equality of constant and slope coefficients: 
αGainers = αLosers and βGainers = βLosers using an interaction variable method. *** shows significance at 1% level, 
** shows significance at 5% level, * shows significance at 10% level.  
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Figure 4.1. Risk-return analysis for ‘Gainers’ group and ‘Losers’ group. 
 
Note: The scatter plot displays the relation between risk (vertical axis) and return (horizontal axis) for every 
investor in the data set. The area to the right from the reference point comprises the investors from ‘Gainers’ 
group, whereas the area to the left includes the members of ‘Losers’ group. Firm lines are regression lines for 
each respective group of investors. The chart shows the regression models for each group. ‘Gainers’ group 
regression model is Risk = 0.052 + 14.039*Return. ‘Losers’ group regression model is Risk = -0.057 – 
28.159*Return. Not all observations are displayed. Any positive (negative) outliers above (below) 0.15% (-
0.15%) of return are excluded from the chart, so are the observations with standard deviation above 5%. 
 
The intercept coefficients for ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ groups equal to 0.05 and -0.06, 
respectively. I use the interaction variable approach to examine the significance of the 
difference between the coefficients of the two groups. Intercepts of the two regressions are 
significant at the 95% level. The slope coefficient is negative and significant for the ‘Losers’ 
group (equals to -28.16) and positive and significant for ‘Gainers’ group (equals to 14.04). 
The difference between slope coefficients of the two groups is also highly statistically 
significant. 
y2 = 14.039x + 0.0052
R² = 0.657






















Gainers return_risk Losers return risk
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Regression analysis reinforces to an extent the findings of the correlation study. Again, all 
three behavioural patterns are clearly demonstrated in the results. Beta coefficient for 
outperformers highlights the positive relation between risk and return, while for 
underperformers, it is strongly negative. In addition, the negative slope is two times steeper 
than the positive slope, which is an indication of loss aversion bias. Every 1% of return costs 
28% in terms of standard deviation for underperforming investors and 14% for 
outperformers. These facts propagate the explanation of investors behaviour by Prospect 
Theory rather than neoclassical theory.  
 
4.2.6. Robustness checks of macro-level regression 
analysis  
 
Further, I conduct robustness check of my regression to see how investors with extreme 
values of risk or return distort the results. One of the issues with the OLS regression method 
is a high weight given to large residuals (or outliers) in the process of estimating coefficients 
that would minimise the sum of squared residuals. However, not all outliers are equally 
‘harmful’. Some may not affect the estimated coefficients. Others can distort the intercept 
coefficient. The most problematic are those that are capable of impacting the slope 
coefficient. A good robustness method should attribute less weight to outliers. For this 
purpose, I use the MM-estimator robust regression technique (Salibian-Barrera and Yohai 
(2006), Verardi and Croux (2009)) that I describe in the methodology section in more details. 
I also include the interaction variable to measure the statistical significance of the difference 
between slope coefficients of ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’. The results are reported in the table 
below: 
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Table 4.7. Regression results for ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ groups using a robust regression 
technique.  













R-squared 0.49 0.81  
Number of observations 1,193 2,477 3,670 
Note: The table displays the main summary statistics for two regressions, in which Risk is a dependent variable 
and Return is an independent variable. MM-estimator robust regression technique with 85% efficiency level is 
applied. The first column with results describes the risk-return relation for ‘Gainers’ group that includes 
investors with positive overall trading performance (above the reference point). The second column reports the 
regression results for ‘Losers’ group that covers investors with overall negative performance (below the 
reference point). The third column presents the results of the interaction variable analysis showing the 
significance of the difference between the coefficients of ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’. p-values for the regression 
coefficients are provided in brackets. *** shows significance at 1% level, ** shows significance at 5% level, 
* shows significance at 10% level.  
 
The slope coefficients obtained using the MM-estimator method are approximately three 
times smaller than for the non-robust model - 4.233 for ‘Gainers’ group and -9.411 for 
‘Losers’ group, yet still highly significant. 1% of return hike is worth approximately 4% of 
total volatility for outperforming investors but -9% of total risk for losing investors. The 
difference between the coefficient for ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ groups is also preserved. Using 
the interaction variable method, I show that the difference in the slope coefficient for the two 
groups is statistically significant.  
The results demonstrate that all three behavioural risk patterns remain after application of 
the robustness test. All outperforming investors taken together exhibit positive relation 
between risk and return, whereas underperforming investors with the average return below 
the reference point show the evidence of combining worsening performance with increased 
risk, which is the sign of risk-seeking behaviour. On top of that, the negative slope is twice 
as steep as the positive beta for ‘Gainers’.  
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4.2.7. Micro-level analysis of correlations  
 
The macro perspective that I explore in the prior sections provides information about group 
behaviour of the investors in my sample. It shows how the risk of the group is changing with 
respect to aggregate return. However, it says nothing about the behaviour of an individual 
investor because for every individual I operate with only two values of average return and 
total risk and cannot estimate the individual degree of rationality. Yet, it is evident that even 
if the gross average return of an investor is positive, individual transactions are susceptible 
to volatility around the reference point, which is zero profit. Some of the trades are certainly 
closed with profit, while the other end up in losses. Measuring how the profitability of 
individual transactions relates to their contribution to risk can produce evidence of individual 
risk behaviour of an investor. I call this angle of view the micro perspective of realised risk 
preference. Of course, looking at each transaction is not feasible, therefore I only approach 
it by combining the sequence of returns of 20 transactions, for which I compute the average 
profitability measure and the risk measure (standard deviation of these 20 returns). 
Considering that my initial criteria of sample selection are minimum 200 transactions per 
investor, I obtain the string of minimum of 10 observations of risk and return variables 
depending on the number of executed transactions, for which I calculate a correlation 
coefficient. This approach allows computing the so-called internal correlation coefficient 
between risk and return attributable to each investor. In addition, this methodology overlaps 
with the one I applied in the theoretical model construction in Section 2.10. Hence, the results 
of the micro-analytical perspective can be paralleled with the predictions of the model.  
I now can assess my initial hypotheses about the shifts in risk behaviour of outperforming 
investors versus the underperforming investors from a different standpoint. At the macro 
level, I find that there is a substantial disparity in risk preference of gainers and losers: 
gainers tend to have a positive relation between risk and return, while losers demonstrate the 
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opposite tendency. Now, at the micro-level, I can assign an individual (internal) coefficient 
of risk-return relation to each gross outperformer and underperformer. It should help me to 
further expand my understanding of realised individual behaviour.  
I start the examination with the overview of individual correlation coefficients distribution 
across the two groups of investors specified according to their trading success – ‘Gainers’ 
and ‘Losers’. To concur with the macro analysis results and Prospect Theory framework, I 
expect that the members of ‘Gainers’ group will tend to have a positive correlation between 
risk and return, while investors in the ‘Losers’ group should reveal a negative correlation 
bias. Another essential point of interest is the distribution of correlations itself. As I briefly 
discussed in the Literature Review section, the analysis of investors heterogeneity is scarce. 
Nevertheless, the existing papers demonstrate the broad diversity of individual behaviour. I 
expect that subjects in my study should reveal the same degree of heterogeneity and the 
correlation between risk and return among them would be similarly dispersed as in the case 
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Figure 4.2. Distribution of individual correlations between risk and return for two groups of 
investors – ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ 
Note: The figure displays the distribution of correlations between risk and return variables. Each column 
represents the number of individual investors with the individual correlation coefficient falling into the 
specified correlation range. The columns are split into two sections corresponding to investors’ profitability 
category. ‘Gainers’ group includes investors with an overall positive return. In turn, ‘Losers’ group comprises 
investors with the overall negative profitability.   
 
Figure 4.2. exposes several findings. As expected, following other observed behavioural 
patterns, for example, individual distribution of disposition effect (Dhar and Zhu (2006)), 
the individual risk-return relation measure is considerably dispersed with the centre of the 
total distribution (for all the subjects) being positioned in the negative zone: the average 
correlation coefficient is -0.074, median equals to -0.093 and 59% of all observations have 
negative sign. The average coefficient for all investors confirms the predictions of the 
theoretical model that I construct in Section 2.10. The correlation coefficient that I obtain in 
the model for the Investor C (a stylised individual with Prospect Theory-like preferences and 
the parameters of the utility function matching the ones in the paper of Jakusch et al. (2019) 
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The other results are shown in Table 4.8.  
Table 4.8. Main parameters of correlation coefficient distribution for all investors, ‘Gainers’ 
group and ‘Losers’ group. 







Median -0.093 0.073 -0.166 
Standard deviation 0.377 0.363 0.358 
Percentage below zero 59% 41% 68% 
Number of observations 3,670 1,193 2,477 
Note: The table shows main parameters of correlation distribution for all subjects and the two performance 
groups. P-values are provided in brackets. *** means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, 
* means significant at 10% level. 
 
The average correlation coefficient among the members of ‘Losers’ group is significantly 
below zero and is equal to -0.15 (median - -0.17). The opposite may be told about the average 
coefficient for the ‘Gainers’ group. It is equal to 0.09 (median – 0.07). It is noteworthy that 
2/3 of ‘Losers’ group is featured with a negative relation between risk and profitability. 
‘Gainers’ group is substantially more successful in this respect – almost 60% of its members 
demonstrate a positive correlation. Also, the negative correlation in absolute value is larger 
than the positive correlation.  
Generally, this result is in line with my expectations.  It signals the presence of all three 
behavioural patterns implied by Prospect Theory: a positive correlation between risk and 
return in the gains domain – for investors who are predominantly gainers; a negative 
correlation between risk and return for overall losing investors; and, finally, negative 
correlation exceeding positive one. Nevertheless, I also observe a picture where some of my 
subjects demonstrate risk behaviour that sharply contrasts the patterns of an ‘average’ 
investor. For example, 14% of ‘Gainers’ have individual correlation coefficient between risk 
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and return below -0.3, while for 12% of ‘Losers’ it is above 0.3. This fact signifies that the 
relation between profitability and rationality (measured using risk-return interconnection), 
though present, is far from perfect.     
 
4.2.7.1. Robustness test of micro-level correlations using 
EUR/USD currency pair data 
 
As conferred in section 4.2.4.1., EUR/USD currency pair is the most popular trading 
instrument among the investors. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the impact of this pair 
on the relation between risk and return not only on the macro-level of analysis but also a 
micro level. For this purpose, I make a selection among my subjects of the individual 
investors having a minimum of 200 transactions with EUR/USD instrument and compute 
the correlation between risk and return for this particular subgroup. Altogether, 1,734 traders 
out of 3,670 fall under the necessary criteria. For this group, I calculate individual correlation 
coefficients following the approach from the previous section. The results are exhibited in 
Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9. Main parameters of correlation coefficient distribution for all investors (from 
Table 4.6) compared with the correlation parameters for the subjects’ EUR/USD trades only.  






Median -0.093 -0.100 
Standard deviation 0.377  
Percentage below zero 59%  
Number of observations 3,670 1,734 
 Note: The table compares the main parameters of correlation distribution for all subjects with the selection of 
subjects actively using EUR/USD currency pair as an investment instrument. P-values are provided in brackets. 
*** means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level. 
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The comparison of the correlation for the total sample of investors with the subset of the 
active users of EUR/USD instrument shows a close resemblance of correlation coefficients. 
Following these findings, EUR/USD currency pair alone has no major impact on the relation 
between individual-level risk and return.  
 
4.2.8. Disentangling Total Risk into Positive Risk and 
Negative Risk 
 
My examination of individual behaviour so far concerned total risk as an input variable for 
the correlation analysis. However, total risk represents the combination of two critical 
components: positive risk and negative risk. Effectively, positive risk comprises the 
distribution of returns to the right-hand-side from the reference point that includes all 
winning trades. Negative risk describes the dispersion of losing transactions placed to the 
left from the reference point. Using only the total risk measure to judge the risk-return 
relation hardly can provide the exhaustive picture of individual behaviour. For instance, 
there can be two investors with an equally positive correlation between risk and return, yet 
for one of them, the change in total risk may be caused by the alteration in the gains domain 
(larger positive volatility), while for the other it can ensue from negative risk variation 
(smaller negative volatility). Therefore, the study of positive and negative risk relation to 
profitability serves as the robustness test of my findings in the prior section describing 
individual investors’ manifested rationality.  
To evaluate the individual behaviour from this new perspective, I compute the correlation 
between the series of returns43 and positive (negative) semi-deviations. I expect that the 
 
43 The methodology that I use here is the same as in the case of total risk and total return calculation. For each 
investor in my data set, I take sequential non-overlapping strings of individual transactions’ returns, so that 
each string contains 20 transactions. Next, I calculate the average return and semi-deviation for each string. 
The final step is to compute correlation between the obtained sequence of return and risk variables.    
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subjects will tend to exhibit risk-seeking behaviour to the left side of the reference point 
(negative semi-deviation) and risk-averse behaviour to the right side of the same point 
(positive semi-deviation). In other words, an average individual investor, when experiencing 
losses over some unlucky decision-making streak, would lean to staying relatively more risk-
seeking. The same average investor would tend to close the positions earlier when on a 
gaining streak, thus exposing himself to a relatively stronger risk aversion. The total risk 
measurement would merely reflect the balance between the two flanks of behaviour.    
 Also, I expect that individuals with positive average total return, i.e. more successful 
investors, should manifest more pronounced risk aversion – higher correlation between 
positive and negative risk and total return, which will uncover the evidence of loss aversion.  
The proceeds of my analysis are provided in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10. Analysis of the correlation between return and negative/positive risk of 
individual investors split into ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ groups. 
Section A. Correlation between return and positive semi-deviation 





Median 0.480 0.271 
Standard deviation 0.233 0.259 
Percentage below zero 2.68% 14.82% 
Number of observations 1,193 2,477 
  
Section B. Correlation between return and negative semi-deviation     
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Median -0.358 -0.463 
Standard deviation 0.274 0.236 
Percentage below zero 87.85% 96.41% 
Number of observations 1,193 2,477 
Note: The table displays the main parameters of the distribution of individual correlations between return and 
positive (Section A) / negative (Section B) risk for ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ groups. P-values are provided in 
brackets. *** means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level. 
 
‘Gainers’ group’s members with the coefficients of 0.47 for positive risk and -0.33 for 
negative risk show the evidence of stronger inclination towards rational decision-making 
because for underperforming investors the respective coefficients are 0.27 and -0.45. 
Moreover, 143 investors (12%) in ‘Gainers’ group exhibit a positive correlation between 
total return and both positive and negative risk, thus proving plain risk aversion as implied 
by the assumption of traditional financial theory. Remarkably, there are 84 such individuals 
in ‘Losers’ groups as well. Yet, percentage-wise they make only around 3% of the group’s 
members. In turn, ‘Losers’ group comprises 364 investors (15%) featured with negative 
correlation for the two sides of risk44. This behavioural pattern is beyond the scope of either 
the traditional model or Prospect Theory.   
The results of my investigation fully comply with initial expectations and the predictions of 
the theoretical model in Section 2.10. Even though investors from both groups demonstrate 
a positive (negative) correlation between return and positive (negative) semi-deviation, it is 
more pronounced for one of the groups. Further, I use a parametric test (t-test) and a non-
parametric test (Mann-Whitney test) to verify if the difference between both groups is 
significant for both positive and negative risk. Both tests confirm the statistical significance 
of the difference at the 1% confidence interval. Outperforming investors and 
 
44 There are also 31 (3%) such observations in ‘Gainers’ group. 
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underperforming investors represent statistically different groups in terms of the correlation 
between their risk and return variables.  
My final approach to corroborate the findings of the relation between risk and return in 
general and micro-level correlation analysis is the application of regression methodology to 
the individual investor-level data. 
 
4.2.9. Micro-level regression analysis of risk and return  
 
As discussed before, the macro-level perspective provides the opportunity to examine the 
aggregated interaction between risk and return. However, individual patterns of risk 
behaviour, which can support or counter the macro view, remain unclear. In this section, I 
intend to fit and inspect a regression model for risk and return for each investor in the data 
set. Consequently, I will generate 3,670 regression models, where the return is the 
independent variable and risk serves as the dependent variable. As a result, I will collect an 
equal amount of slope coefficients. The investor-level data allow me making an in-depth 
analysis of individual risk behaviour patterns by splitting the investors subject to the 
demonstrated degree of rationality based on each investor’s slope coefficient that carries 
inside the relation between risk and return.  
The approach that I use to elicit utility function shapes for individual investors in the micro-
analysis can be paralleled with a questionnaire-based method by Fairchild et al. (2016). The 
authors used university students as subjects asking them to fill in a questionnaire to obtain 
information about the participants’ risk preferences. The questionnaire covered all the 
spectrum of prospects – fully in the losses and gains domain as well as mixed ones. Such a 
method allowed the authors to compute individual estimates of utility function parameters - 
coefficients of risk aversion and risk-seeking and loss aversion. This analysis was 
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complemented with the physiological examination during a trading game (measuring GSR, 
eye-tracking and heart rate) and the self-reporting of conscious emotions during the game.   
Considering the variety of functional forms that the decision valuation function can take, I 
identify seven possible scenarios that an investor can reveal and to which I plan to attribute 
the series of beta coefficients: strong risk aversion, weak risk aversion, strong risk-seeking, 
weak risk-seeking, strong S-type behaviour, weak S-type behaviour, risk neutrality. The 
description of each scenario is presented in the table below: 
Table 4.11. Description of possible scenarios of the investor-level risk-return regression 
analysis 
Scenario Description 
Strong risk aversion The relation between positive risk/total return and negative 
risk/total return have a positive slope coefficient. Slope 
coefficients for positive and negative risk are significant at the 
95% level.   
Weak risk aversion The relation between positive risk/total return and negative 
risk/total return have a positive slope coefficient. There is no 
restriction with respect to the significance of the coefficients. 
Strong risk-seeking The relation between positive risk/total return and negative 
risk/total return have negative slope coefficient. Slope 
coefficients for positive and negative risk are significant at the 
95% level.   
Weak risk-seeking  The relation between positive risk/total return and negative 
risk/total return have negative slope coefficient. There is no 
restriction with respect to the significance of the coefficients. 
Strong S-type 
behaviour 
Individuals demonstrate risk aversion in gains domain and risk-
seeking behaviour in losses domain. Slope coefficients for 
positive and negative risk are significant at the 95% level.   
Weak S-type behaviour Individuals demonstrate risk aversion in gains domain and risk-
seeking behaviour in losses domain. There is no restriction with 
respect to the significance of the coefficients. 
Risk neutrality Significance of slope coefficients for positive or negative risk is 
below the 95% level. 
 
The scenarios above in full describe the possible behavioural patterns of all 3,670 investors. 
Some of them are associated with existing financial paradigms. For example, strong and 
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weak risk aversion can be attributed to the explanation of behaviour by traditional theory’s 
assumptions on rationality. In turn, strong and weak forms of S-type behaviour characterise 
Prospect Theory assumptions. Strong and weak risk-seeking does not have a readily 
available explanation by any of the dominating modern financial models, yet technically the 
valuation function can take such form, therefore, I include it into the analysis. Finally, risk 
neutrality describes the investing realm, in which only return is an essential factor while risk 
is ignored.  
I will use the same regression model as in section 4.2.5:  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 
where α and β coefficients denote the intercept and the slope, respectively for the risk type j 
and 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 is the error term.  
 For consistency, I present the results of the regression coefficients for two of my groups, 
‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’, independently. Figure 4.3. demonstrates the distribution of slope (β) 
coefficients for each individual investor. I expect to confirm the findings of my correlation 
analysis implying that investors’ behaviour can be described with Prospect Theory and they 
would exhibit positive slope (beta) coefficients for positive risk, and negative slope 
coefficients for negative risk. Additionally, I assume ‘Gainers’ group’ members will show a 
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Figure 4.3. Distribution of individual slope (β) coefficients of the regressions with risk as 
the dependent variable and return as the independent variable for two groups of investors – 
‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’. 
 
Note: The figure displays the distribution of slope coefficients of the fitted linear regressions where risk is a 
dependent variable and return is an independent variable. Each column represents the number of individual 
investors with the individual slope coefficient falling into the specified range. The columns are split into two 
sections corresponding to investors’ profitability category. Gainers’ group includes investors with an overall 
positive return. In turn, ‘Losers’ group comprises investors with the overall negative profitability. 
 
In the table below, I provide the summary statistics of slope coefficient distribution. In 
addition to total risk, I also compute the statistics for the string of regressions with positive 
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Table 4.12. Descriptive statistics of intercept and slope coefficients across 3,670 regressions 
of risk-return regression for the distribution of investors. 
Section A. ‘Gainers’ group 



















Average 0.004 0.419 0.003 1.548 0.005 -1.300 
Median 0.002 0.288 0.002 1.075 0.003 -0.778 
Standard 
deviation 
0.013 1.737 0.009 1.717 0.016 4.814 
Percentage 
below zero 
1.09% 42.83% 1.68% 7.38% 0.42% 83.99% 
Number of 
observations 
3 1,193 1,193 1,193 1,193 1,193 
Section B. ‘Losers’ group 



















Average 0.003 -1.155 0.003 0.533 0.005 -2.481 
Median 0.002 -0.830 0.002 0.264 0.002 -1.617 
Standard 
deviation 
0.011 1.753 0.007 1.086 0.011 2.519 
Percentage 
below zero 
0.36% 72.47% 0.00% 26.08% 1.29% 95.36% 




2,477 2,477 2,477 2,477 2,477 2,477 
Note: The table displays major distribution parameters for intercept and slope coefficients of 3,670 regressions 
fitted for each individual investor’s risk (dependent variable) and return (regressor) variables. Investors are 
split into two groups, ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ according to their total accumulated profitability over the trading 
period. Three different measures of risk are employed: total risk (Columns 1 and 2), Positive semi-deviation 
(Columns 3 and 4), Negative semi-deviation (Columns 5 and 6).   
 
Figure 4.3. and summary statistics from Table 4.12. jointly ascertain the substantial 
difference in risk-return relations between ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ groups of investors 
measured by the slope coefficient. Again, as in the case with correlation analysis, ‘Gainers’ 
group’s members demonstrate a higher degree of rationality determined by the positive 
relation between risk and return. On average, for well-performing investors, a unit of return 
brings about 0.42 units of total risk. This figure can be further broken down into positive and 
negative risk interaction with return. Here we can find evidence of a positive slope in the 
case of the positive risk (1.55) and a negative slope for the negative risk (-1.30). For ‘Losers’ 
group, the average result is steeper for the negative risk, whereby the beta coefficient is 
highly negative (-2.48). Less successful investors also prove to show weaker risk aversion 
for positive risk (beta equal to 0.53).  
Having computed two beta coefficients for each investor – one for gaining and another for 
losing string of transactions, I am now capable of making a projection of the form of the 
utility function for the investors in my sample. In such projection, the beta coefficient for 
gaining transactions reflects the curvature in the gains domain of the function, while the beta 
coefficient for losing trades describes the form of the function in the losses domain. The 
complete form that includes both domains shall fall into one of the respective behavioural 
categories or scenarios outlined in Table 4.11. Importance or popularity of each scenario 
may provide a more definite answer to my research question and help understand, which of 
the existing theories can better explain the financial decisions made by individuals.   
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Table 4.13. The breakdown of individual investors according to their manifested form of the 
value function expressed in risk-return relation. 
Scenario type All investors Gainers group Losers group 










































Note: The table presents the breakdown of the investors in the data set grouped according to their overall 
accumulated performance: positive (2nd column with results) and negative (3rd column with results). Investors 
are matched against their dominating behaviour reflecting the form of the value function: risk-averse (concave 
form), risk-seeking (convex form), S-type (concave in gains domain, convex in losses domain), risk neutral 
(linear form). The behaviour expression is deemed firm if the slope coefficient in the model 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗 +
𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 is significant at the 95% level. The behaviour scenarios represent the assumptions of key 
modern financial theories: S-type behaviour reflects the assumption of Prospect Theory; risk aversion is 
derived from the neoclassical economic theory (Expected Utility Theory). Global risk seeking scenarios and 
risk neutrality are used as complementary behavioural patterns.  
  
It should be noted that the scenarios in the table above do not sum up to 100% because 
subjects included in the weak form of each behavioural pattern include investors exhibiting 
the solid form of the same pattern.  
The results reveal an explicit confirmation of S-type behaviour dominance. Prospect Theory 
assumption of concavity in the gains domain and convexity in the losses domain help explain 
the decisions of 23% of investors in my data set within the boundaries of my methodological 
framework and strict limits of statistical significance (at 95% level). Relaxing the statistical 
significance constraint, I find that more than 70% of the subjects are disposed to fall into the 
S-type behavioural pattern. In turn, the weight of firm risk aversion followers remains at a 
very small level of 1%. Even loosening the statistical significance burden, the figure 
oscillates at 8%. The third set of behavioural scenarios – risk-seeking – seem to be more 
popular than risk aversion for financial decision making. Almost 5% of investors act along 
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the lines of this pattern at the 95% significance level. Even more essential 20% of investors 
exhibit the weak form of the same behaviour model.  
An interesting and important comparison can be made between ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ 
investor groups. Unsurprisingly, the large share of risk-seeking behaviour demonstration, 
the least rational pattern, can be observed within the ‘Losers’ group – 7% and 26% for the 
firm and weak forms, respectively. In turn, ‘Gainers’ group’s members tend to get into more 
‘rational’ segments: risk aversion and S-type behaviour. The difference between the two 
groups here is substantial, e.g. 12% for weak risk aversion, 10% for firm S-type behaviour 
and 7% for weak S-type behaviour in favour of more successful investors. Risk neutrality 
category does not reveal any distinction between the groups staying at around 11% - 12% 
level.          
 
4.3. Summary and discussion of Research Question 
1 results 
 
Alternative financial models, most importantly Expected Utility Theory and Prospect 
Theory, make disagreeing assumptions about individual behaviour during the decision-
making process, specifically the valuation of prospects. The resulting value functions also 
look different. According to the neoclassical theory, humans are genuinely risk-averse, while 
Prospect Theory puts forth a more complex framework of S-shaped value function with risk 
aversion prevailing only above the individual reference point. Below the point, subjects tend 
to become risk-seeking.  
The primary purpose of my study above was to conduct empirical testing of a group of 
investors’ trading history trying to identify, which of the financial models can better explain 
the observed behaviour. Pursuing this goal, I examined the relation between risk and return 
using two popular methodologies – correlation analysis and regression analysis. To verify 
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the predictions of the impact of Prospect Theory preferences on the relation between risk 
and return, I set up a theoretical model in Section 2.10. These predictions led me to the 
suggestions that the sign of correlation coefficient and the slope of the regression should 
indicate the form of the value function. Positive correlation and positive regression beta 
should point to the concave form of the function, implying a rational behavioural pattern of 
the positive risk premium for extra units of risk consumed. Alternatively, negative 
correlation and negative beta may indicate a less rational risk-seeking line of behaviour. For 
a more in-depth and thorough study, I split the investors in my data set into two groups – 
‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ according to their total average performance during the observation 
period. I also established a constraint of a minimum of 200 trades per investor to achieve a 
more robust elicitation of behaviour. 
Further, I conducted my testing at the two levels of data aggregation. Primarily, I analysed 
the results at the macro level, at which the reference point is zero total average performance 
attained by investors. For each investor, I collected only two aggregated observations of 
return and risk (standard deviation). Secondly, I explored the data at the micro level, at which 
the reference point is closer to the zero return of a single trade. This approach allowed me 
collecting a string of risk and return variables for each subject and computing within-subject 
(individual) correlation and regression coefficients. 
The results of the macro analysis revealed the dominance of Prospect Theory-driven 
explanation of investors’ behaviour, featuring all three essential patterns: positive relation 
between risk and return in the domain of gains, negative relation in the losses domain, and 
evidence of loss aversion, whereby negative relation turned out to be larger than positive 
relation. To be more specific, Spearman rank correlation between total risk and return for 
‘Gainers’ group equalled to 0.58, whereas for ‘Losers’ group it was -0.70. These findings 
were substantiated by regression analysis. In the model with risk as the dependent variable 
and return as a regressor, slope coefficient for ‘Gainers’ group was 14.04 and the beta for 
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‘Losers’ group was equal to -28.16. At the aggregate investor-level, risk is twice more 
sensitive to profitability for less successful investors.  
The micro-level analysis allowed constructing a distribution of correlation and slope 
coefficients for the subjects. This method brought to light sizeable heterogeneity of 
individual risk-return relations. Continuing the examination of two groups of investors 
according to their total average profitability, I discovered that correlation distributions for 
both groups are statistically significantly different. The mean correlation coefficient of 
‘Gainers’ equalled to 0.09 and for ‘Losers’ this figure was -0.15. Finally, I applied regression 
analysis to the micro-level data to match investors’ trading behaviour to seven behavioural 
patterns or scenarios that included risk-averse, risk-seeking, risk-neutral and S-type (or S-
shape) behaviour. I found that the assumptions of Prospect Theory provide the best 
explanation for around a quarter of investors under the constraint of 95% statistical 
significance level. Relaxing the constraint, Prospect Theory managed to explain the financial 
decisions of almost ¾ of all investors. The other patterns were much less successful, yet they 
helped outline the difference between ‘Gainers’ group and ‘Losers’ group.           
My research showed that there is a considerable connection between the trading success of 
individuals and the degree of their rationality. More profitable investors demonstrate an 
apparent proclivity towards more rational financial judgements as inferred from their 
revealed relation between realised risk and return. Moreover, this relation can serve as a 
useful and reliable tool to differentiate between successful and unsuccessful investors. As 
my analysis demonstrated, winning individuals can make better decisions in both instances 
of occurring scenarios – in case of gains or losses. However, even the most profitable 
investors could not avoid negative correlation or negative beta in the risk-return framework. 
Comprehensive rationality turned out to be a very rare trait, around 3 times more uncommon 
than its antipode – comprehensive risk-seeking behaviour.  
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Considering the identified association between investors’ performance and risk-return 
correlation, it becomes practical and appealing to evaluate the factors that impact the degree 
of the linear relation between risk and return variables. Basically, if such factors exist, they 
can be interpreted as influencing the extent of individual rationality. In the second research 
question, I intend to use multiple linear regression methodology to examine the link between 
an array of personal, risk and trading variables pertinent to the subjects in my data set, and 
individual correlation coefficients.    
 
4.4. Research Question 2. Hypotheses development 
 
My second research question ensues from the results of the study that I conducted in 
Research Question 1. The question is formulated in the following way: what is the role of 
diverse personal and trading factors in the degree of individual rationality? As in the first 
research question, I proxy rationality with the individual-level correlation between risk and 
return. In the next sections, I plan to investigate the effect of a group of variables that I 
collected from the data set on individual correlation coefficients of my subjects. This 
analysis implies the use of multiple regression techniques, wherein correlation coefficients 
serve as a dependent variable, and a collection of trading and personal factors are used as 
regressors. To make a more detailed analysis, I follow the approach in the first research 
question and break up the investors into two groups – ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ – depending 
on their total average return. Investors with the total average return above zero are included 
into ‘Gainers’ group. The rest investors will fall into ‘Losers’ group. 
Further, I list the groups of variables along with my expectations of their impact on the 
dependent variable.  
Risk variables: 
P a g e  | 154 
 
- Total risk (variable name: stdev_total - standard deviation) – I compute total risk 
as a statistical measure of standard deviation of individual transactions’ returns. 
According to my methodology, one observation of risk is calculated for a string of 
20 consecutive transactions. Considering that the minimum trades requirement is 
200, I possess at least 10 standard deviation observations for every investor.   
- Positive risk (variable name: stdev_positive - positive standard semi-deviation) 
– calculated according to Formula 3.2. Just as total risk variable, I collect at least 10 
observations of positive risk per each investor.  
- Negative risk (variable name: stdev_negative - negative standard semi-
deviation) - calculated according to Formula 3.1. Just as total risk variable, I collect 
at least 10 observations of negative risk per each investor.  
Expected sign:  The findings in the first research question point to the negative correlation 
between total risk and return, and negative risk and return. At the same time, the correlation 
between positive risk and return appeared to be positive. Yet, the main question with risk 
variables here is the dependence of the correlation coefficient on the level of risk. The value 
function in Prospect Theory or Expected Utility Theory reflects the diminishing sensitivity 
of psychological perception to change in wealth, hence I hypothesise that the link between 
risk and return at a higher level of volatility should wane. It is equally valid for positive and 
negative risk variables. Therefore, my prediction is the negative relation between risk 
variables and risk-return correlation.  
Personal variables:  
- First deposit (variable name: First_deposit) – the monetary size of the first deposit 
made by an investor to the account (in USD currency). 
- Availability of second deposit (variable name: If_second_deposit) – binary 
variable reflecting the fact that an investor has made a second deposit to the account. 
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- Second deposit (variable name: Second_deposit) – the monetary size of the second 
deposit made by an investor to the account (in USD currency). 
- Time between first and second deposit (variable name: Days_between_deposits) 
– number of days that pass between the first deposit and the second deposit. 
- Deposit-to-income ratio (variable name: Deposit_to_income) – is calculated as 
the monetary size of the first deposit divided by the self-reported annual income of 
an investor. Annual income is an investor’s self-reported value 
- Deposit-to-fortune ratio (variable name: Deposit_to_fortune) – is calculated as 
the monetary size of the first deposit divided by the self-reported fortune of an 
investor. Fortune is an investor’s self-reported value 
- Male (variable name: Male) – sets the investor’s gender to 1 if it is male, and 0 if 
female. 
- Age (variable name: Age) – an investor’s age. 
- Developed country nationality (variable name: Developed_country) – the 
country of an investor belonging to the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) country club. 0 = non-OECD country, 1 = OECD 
country. 
- Contest (variable name: Contest) – funds on the Live account are received from 
participation in one of the trading contests. 0 = non-contest participant, 1 = contest 
participant. 
Expected sign: In the study, I use correlation as a proxy for rational behaviour, therefore in 
my expectations, I try to assess the interaction between the highlighted independent variables 
and the degree of rationality of decisions. As some models of the role of emotions in decision 
making imply (e.g.  Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004) or Mukherjee (2010)), the 
individual risky choice varies between two qualitatively different systems of judgement: 
rational and emotional, or cognitive and affective. The proximity to one of the extremes 
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depends on the peculiarities and strength of relating stimuli. More important stimuli drive 
the choice towards higher affectivity. Logically, the invested money and its significance for 
an investor should be one of such weighty factors. Four of the variables – the size of the first 
deposit, deposit-to-fortune ratio, deposit-to-income ratio and Contest money45 may represent 
and outline the level of importance for an investor. Accordingly, I hypothesise negative beta 
for these factors. Furthermore, the variables related to the second deposit are associated with 
less successful investors because usually, the second deposit is only necessary if the first 
deposit is depleted due to losses. Based on the findings in the first research question, trading 
success is negatively connected to rationality. Therefore, I expect the presence of the second 
deposit and its size to be negatively related to correlation, while days between deposits 
should have positive beta because a fewer number of days indicates quicker loss of the 
initially invested funds.    
Finally, Age and Developed_Country variables are frequently used as proxies for the 
experience and financial knowledge (see e.g. Chen et al. (2007)). I expect to observe the 
positive impact of both on the degree of rationality (correlation).  
Trading variables: 
- Intraday trades (variable name: %_of_intraday)– the share of intraday trades 
among all investor’s transactions. Intraday means a transaction is opened and closed 
within a single trading day. 
- Number of trades (variable name: N_trades) – number of transactions completed 
on an investor’s account during the observation period.  
- Number of instruments (variable name: N_instruments) – number of trading 
instruments used by a trader during the observation period. 
 
45 In my view, Contest as a source of investable funds brings about the bias of ‘house money effect’ (Thaler 
and Johnson (1990)), which causes higher risk taking for ‘cheap’ money, hence less rational decisions.   
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- Conditional orders – a portion of conditional orders. I used ten sub-variables that 
described five various types of conditional orders: 1) Market open (variable name: 
Market_open) – portion of trades opened with a market order; 2) Market close 
(variable name: Market_close) – portion of trades closed with a market order; 3) 
Conditional open (variable name: Conditional_open) – portion of traders opened 
with a conditional order; 4) Stop-loss close (variable name: Stop_loss_close) – 
portion of trades closed with a stop-loss order; 5) Take-profit close (variable name: 
Take_profit_close) – portion of trades closed with a take-profit order. 
- Turnover (variable name: Turnover) – aggregated trading turnover on investor’s 
account. 
- Duration (variable name: Duration) – median duration of trades on investor’s 
accounts.  
Expected sign: Continuing the line of thoughts about the positioning of risky choice 
between rationality and emotions, I suggest that excessive trading should prompt the choice 
away from the rational pole. Hence, I expect these factors to have a negative beta. Prior 
research (e.g. Barber et al. (2017)) claimed that day trading is negatively related to rationality 
and profitability. In this regard, I predict that the share of intraday trades, number of trades, 
turnover and number of instruments also should have a negative beta. Based on the same 
logic, duration should have a positive beta, because shorter time frames between the opening 
and closing of investments indicate excessive trading. Concerning the use of conditional 
orders, though this area of research is scarce, there is evidence from Linnainmaa (2010) who 
compared market orders to conditional orders in terms of profitability and inferred 
psychological awareness of financial decisions. He discovered that in terms of intraday 
returns an average investor is better off using conditional orders. Also, intuitively, market 
orders are placed ‘in the heat of the moment’ with virtually immediate effect, leaving very 
limited time for cognitive processing of huge amount of information that generally 
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accompanies a trade. Conditional orders provide for a better opportunity of pre-placement 
and post-placement information processing and correction. In this context, conditional 
orders are expected to comprise a higher degree of rationality than market orders. Therefore, 
I predict that conditional orders should have a positive beta in the regression, while market 
orders should be featured with negative beta.  
 
4.5. Research Question 2. Empirical Analysis  
 
I commence the empirical section with the set of descriptive statistics of my variables 
presented in Table 4.14. 
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Table 4.14. Descriptive statistics of investors’ data set. 
Variable name All subjects ‘Gainers’ group ‘Losers’ group 
 Average Median Min Max Average Median Min Max Average Median Min Max 
Section A. Risk variables 
Stdev_total  
(%) 
0.87% 0.39% 0.00% 24.92% 0.80% 0.41% 0.02% 22.29% 0.91% 0.38% 0.00% 24.92% 
Stdev_positive  
(%) 
0.53% 0.27% 0.00% 28.96% 0.85% 0.36% 0.02% 28.96% 0.37% 0.25% 0.00% 14.94% 
Stdev_negative 
(%) 
1.14% 0.44% 0.00% 40.19% 0.72% 0.44% 0.02% 19.51% 1.34% 0.43% 0.00% 40.19% 
Section B. Personal variables  
First_deposit 
(USD) 
1100 392 0 12747 1303 401 0 19565 1022 392 0 10259 
If_second_deposit 
(binary) 
75.29%    73.18%    76.30%    
Second_deposit 
(USD) 
619 130 0 9957 654 133 0 9091 598 130 0 9958 
Days_between_ 
Deposits (days) 
91 21 0 985 87 17 0 1037 93 23 0 940 
Deposit_to_income 
(%) 
3.26% 1.19% 0.00% 35.65% 3.70% 1.18% 0.00% 48.36% 3.10% 1.21% 0.00% 33.20% 
Deposit_to_fortune 
(%) 
1.30% 0.47% 0.00% 15.65% 1.48% 0.48% 0.00% 19.00% 1.22% 0.46% 0.00% 13.44% 
Male  
(binary) 
91.80%    91.28%    92.05%    
Age  
(years) 
39 38 22 68 39 38 22 66 39 38 22 69 
Developed_country 55.67%    53.31%    56.80%    





6.62%    6.87%    6.50%    
Section C. Trading variables 
%_of_intraday 
(%) 
82.40% 87.08% 26.77% 100.00% 79.30% 83.52% 27.91% 100.00% 83.87% 88.79% 24.00% 100.00% 
N_trades 
(number) 
935 529 203 7066 1038 551 204 8481 888 521 202 6355 
N_instruments 
(number) 
14 12 1 44 13 11 1 43 15 13 1 45 
Market_open  
(%) 
83.99% 96.07% 1.20% 100.00% 82.93% 95.20% 2.02% 100.00% 84.50% 96.52% 1.00% 100.00% 
Market_close 
(%) 
64.28% 67.11% 6.29% 100.00% 67.07% 71.43% 7.81% 100.00% 62.94% 64.93% 5.54% 100.00% 
Conditional_open 
(%) 
16.00% 3.93% 0.00% 98.80% 17.07% 4.80% 0.00% 97.98% 15.50% 3.48% 0.00% 99.07% 
Take_profit_close 
(%) 
15.38% 11.22% 0.00% 73.00% 17.34% 12.48% 0.00% 81.45% 14.45% 10.72% 0.00% 66.66% 
Stop-loss_close 
(%) 
20.19% 16.21% 0.00% 65.82% 15.46% 10.12% 0.00% 60.16% 22.46% 19.29% 0.00% 66.75% 
Turnover 
(mln USD) 
34.20 11.11 0.54 440.14 38.34 12.45 0.54 518.47 32.47 10.54 0.57 427.63 
Duration 
(minutes) 
162 38 2 2841 196 46 2 2798 145 35 2 2848 
 
Note: In all sections, I winsorised 1% of extreme observations. The dataset includes descriptive statistics for 3,670 individual investors. First deposit variable can equal to zero because some 
of the subjects are winners of trading contests organised by the brokerage house. According to the rule of the contest, the prize must be transferred onto the Live account. Such prizes do not 
count as deposits. Variables meanings are provided in section 4.4.   
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Table 4.15.  Correlation matrix for independent variables included in the dataset.  
 
Section 1. Risk variables   
Stdev_positive Stdev_negative 



















































































































































































































































































































































Section 3. Trading variables 































































































































































































































































Note: The table displays the correlation matrix between all independent variables, for which the data was collected. The variables are split into three groups: Section 1 includes correlations 
between Risk variables and all other variables, Section 2 accentuates Personal variables, Section 3 comprises Trading variables. Variables meanings are provided in the section 4.4. P-values 
are reported in the parantheses. *** means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level. 
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I use the correlation between risk and return as my dependent variable. To correct for the skewed 
distribution of the correlation coefficient, I apply Fisher’s z transformation of correlation, which 
approximates the distribution to normal46 as described in the methodology section.  
Overall, the relations between variables seem reasonable. For example, Turnover is positively 
connected to the amount of deposits placed for trading, the number of trades, as well as to 
portion of intraday trading, which is logical – more active trading generates higher volume. All 
other revealed linear relations also seem consistent. 
To test my hypotheses from various perspectives, I specify a regression model that I apply to 
three selections of investors: for all my subjects together, for ‘Gainers’ group and for ‘Losers’ 
group independently:  
𝜌𝑖,𝑗
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛,𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1,𝑗 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽2,𝑗 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽3,𝑗 ∗ 𝑁𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽4,𝑗
∗ 𝑁𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽5,𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽6,𝑗 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽7,𝑗
∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽8,𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽9,𝑗 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝛽10,𝑗 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽11,𝑗 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽12,𝑗
∗ 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽13,𝑗 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽14,𝑗
∗ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽15,𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽16,𝑗 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽17,𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 
where α is the intercept, ε is the error term, i = 1,…,N (number of investors),   j = 1,2,3 denotes 
the type of dependent variable: for ‘Gainers’ group (Model 1), ‘Losers’ group (Model 2) and all 
investors (Model 3).  
 
46 I run all regressions based on non-transformed correlation coefficients as well to find that there is only minor 
difference in regression coefficients.   
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The proceeds of the regression analysis are presented below.   
Table 4.16. Regression analysis of the relation between risk and return for investors from 
‘Gainers’ group (Model 1), investors from ‘Losers’ group (Model 2) and all investors in the data 
set (Model 3). 
Variable name ‘Gainers’ group 
(1) 
‘Losers’ group (2) All investors (3) Interaction (1) & 
(2) 








































































































































































R-squared 0.20 0.29 0.22  
Number of 
observations 
1,193 2,477 3,670  
Note: The table displays regression coefficients for three regressions: with all investors correlation between risk 
and return as dependent variable (Model 3), with ‘Gainers’ group investors correlation between risk and return as 
dependent variable (Model 1) and with ‘Losers’ group investors correlation between risk and return as dependent 
variable (Model 2). The last column demonstrates the difference between the variables in Model 1 (‘Gainers’) and 
Model 2 (‘Losers’) using the interaction variable technique. Because of multicollinearity effect, I omitted several 
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variables from the regression that had correlation above 0.80 or below -0.8 with at least one other variable: 
Market_open (correlated with Conditional_open), Market_close (correlated with Take_profit_close-
Stop_loss_close), Deposit_to_fortune (correlated with Deposit_to_income), %_of_intraday (correlation with 
Duration), If_second_deposit (correlated with Second_deposit). Huber-White consistent p-values are provided in 
the parentheses. *** means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% 
level. 
         
In the next sections, I review the results of regression analysis and the impact of the three groups 
of variables on the correlation between risk and return. After that, I advance my investigation 
by comparing outperforming investors (‘Gainers’) against underperforming (‘Losers’) to 
understand, which variables can explain the difference in profitability and/or traces of rational 
behaviour. For this purpose, I intend to use the interaction variable technique, a parametric test 
(t-test) and non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney U test).  
 
4.5.1. The influence of Risk variables  
 
My initial expectation was that the risk variables should be negatively related to the dependent 
variable. It turned out to be valid only for the negative semi-deviation variable, yet beta 
coefficients were statistically significant only for Models 2 (‘Losers’ group) and 3 (All 
investors). For positive risk, I observe positive betas, whereas positive risk is a statistically 
significant factor for all three models.  
According to my results, for the average of outperforming investors, an increase in positive risk 
by 1% translates into 0.024 rise in risk-return correlation. Even the hike in negative risk proves 
to have a positive effect on the degree of rationality for investors from ‘Gainers’ group, which 
is an indication that successful traders may act in line with the prerequisites of the traditional 
economic model. Yet, as mentioned before, the negative risk variable’s coefficient fails the 
acceptable significance threshold.  
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For underperforming investors, a change in positive risk is far more significant for the dependent 
variable than an equal shift in negative risk, possibly reflecting the fact that for such investors 
choices in the gains domain present more challenging environment. One percentage point 
increase in positive risk for the average trader in this group would raise the correlation 
coefficient by 0.087. The equivalent growth in negative risk would result in the reduction of 
correlation by 0.013. 
In the last model that combines all investors, underperformers dominate, therefore variables’ 
coefficients are more consistent with Model 2. 1% increase in positive risk would augment the 
correlation of an average investor by 0.054. At the same time, a corresponding rise in negative 
risk would lessen the correlation by 0.025.  
Interestingly, judging from the median values, an average investor from both groups copes 
pretty evenly with the negative risk (median values respectively equal to 0.44% and 0.43%), 
however, when it comes to positive risk, the results become noticeably disparate (0.36% for 
outperformers and 0.25% for underperformers). The inability to properly align positive risk 
behaviour with the negative one and psychological factors behind this phenomenon may be one 
of the reasons for bad performance coupled with weaker rationality of decisions as my findings 
demonstrate. I develop this discussion further in Section 4.5.3.       
 
4.5.2. The influence of Trading variables  
 
Next, based on the principle of excessive trading, I predicted that higher values of trading 
variables should have a negative impact on the degree of rationality. ‘Number of trades’ variable 
appears not to conform to overtrading assumption, or at least has stronger alternative 
explanations behind it, for example, gain in experience as the most probable replacement. The 
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factor is highly statistically significant in Model 2 (‘Losers’ group) and 3 (All subjects). As far 
as all investors are concerned, a 10% increase in the number of trades results in correlation rise 
by approximately 0.0147. Additional evidence in favour of experience hypothesis is the fact that 
for more successful investors from ‘Gainers’ group the average number of trades is higher than 
for ‘Losers’ group (1,069 against 916), and this difference is statistically significant at 1% 
level48. It may be an indirect confirmation of the link between elevated experience and superior 
trading. Therefore, investors from ‘Losers’ group might achieve a better level of risk aversion 
with more trades.    
Another variable, ‘Number of instruments’ only partially fits my initial expectation. It is 
negative and significant only in the model with all investors and remains insignificant in the 
other two models. Increasing the number of instruments used by an investor by 10% translates 
into the loss in correlation by approximately 0.002.  
The other variable with the primary hypothesis related to excessive trading and the expectation 
of negative beta is ‘Turnover’. I discovered that the expectation was correct and statistically 
significant for two models out of three – all investors and ‘Losers’. For instance, a 10% surge 
in this factor for ‘Losers’ model leads to the loss of correlation coefficient by the factor of 0.003.   
‘Duration’ variable can be described as the opposite side of a coin in the context of trading 
activity. Longer duration of a round-trip trade is the indicator of less active trading, which is 
substantiated by slightly negative correlation with ‘Number of trades’, ‘Turnover’ and 
moderately negative correlation with the share of intraday trades. I expected that ‘Duration’ 
should be positively associated with rationality. This assumption was supported in all three 
 
47 In the model with non-transformed independent variables, every 1,000 trades increase the correlation coefficient 
between risk and return by 0.03. 
48 Using t-test stats and at 5% level using Mann-Whitney U test. See Table 4.14.  
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models. 10% upsurge in the duration of trade means approximately 0.002 improvement in 
correlation for ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’, and 0.003 increase in correlation coefficient if all 
investors are included in the model.  
The three variables belonging to conditional orders cluster: ‘Conditional open’, ‘Take profit 
close’ and ‘Stop-loss close’, produce some interesting findings. My primary assumption was 
that market orders should be inferior to conditional orders in terms of impact on rationality. As 
market orders variables (‘Market open’ and ‘Market close’) are highly correlated with 
conditional orders variables49, I excluded them from the regression specification. However, to 
evaluate the betas, I run another set of regressions replacing conditional orders variables with 
the market orders ones. The resulting beta coefficients are demonstrated in Table 4.17. 


























Note: The regression specification is the same as in section 4.5. with conditional orders variables replaced by 
market orders variables. P-values on Huber-White consistent t-statistics are provided in the parentheses. *** means 
significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level. 
 
As is observable in tables 4.16 and 4.17 the initial assumption is true and statistically significant 
for all variables except ‘Take profit close’. The use of this type of order reduces the degree of 
rationality exposed by the correlation between risk and return. Notably, a 10% increase in the 
use of this order type causes 0.03 loss of correlation for ‘Gainers’ group and 0.05 – for ‘Losers’ 
 
49 It is so, because the use of market orders equals to 100% minus the use of conditional orders. 
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group. In contrast, active use of stop-loss orders provides an essential backing for the degree of 
rationality, also when comparing it to its antipode order type – ‘Market close’. Unexpectedly, 
investors in ‘Losing’ group employ stop-loss orders substantially more frequently: the median 
use of this order type for ‘Gainers’ group is 10% while for ‘Losers’ group it is 20%. It seems 
that this factor might be important for rationality but less essential for profitability. As I stated 
before, they are far from being perfectly correlated.  
 
4.5.3. The influence of Personal variables  
 
In this cluster of variables, only a few have a statistically significant impact on the degree of 
rationality. One of such variables is ‘Age’, which is negatively influencing the level of risk 
aversion. For all three models, 10% growth in the age variable decreases the correlation between 
risk and return by approximately 0.01. This finding is against my initial expectation, which was 
guided by the growth in experience logic. Obviously, it does not work for this data set. Younger 
subjects demonstrate a stronger tendency to risk aversion.  
One possible explanation can be derived from the paper of Mata et al. (2011), who conduct a 
meta-analysis of the research in the area of age and risk-taking association. The authors find an 
interesting pattern in the experimental literature. According to them, the age-related variation in 
risk-taking practices depends on the amount of learning involved in the administration of the 
task. Learning capabilities generally fade with age. Consequently, older adults display stronger 
risk-seeking behaviour compared to younger counterparts when the required experience from 
learning results in risk-averse behaviour, and vice versa, older adults are more risk averse when 
the experience gained from learning results in risk-seeking behaviour. Considering the learning 
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effect and direction of the risky investment activity, it can be the case that older adults are not 
quick enough to learn how to become more risk-averse.      
Another probable explanation for the observed phenomenon can be the selection bias. Marginal 
trading, just as predominantly intraday stock trading represents a deliberate risky activity. It can 
be the case that a sub-group of older investors in my dataset are more consciously engaged in 
this type of risk-taking practice, hence, they represent only a narrowly specified category of 
more risk-loving individuals. As a consequence, any generalisations for large groups of the 
population should be made with great care (which I also mention in the limitations of my 
research). Younger investors in my dataset can represent a less experienced (in terms of risk-
taking) category of investors, but the one that is willing to try their success in the new form of 
capital investment.  
It should also be kept in mind that most of the research identifying a positive link between age 
with risk aversion is predominantly experimental (see Albert and Duffy (2012) for review). 
There are also noteworthy studies finding the opposite effect (e.g. Denburg et al. (2001)). The 
nature of experiments that test the relation between age and risk aversion can depend on the 
nature of the experimental design, as is shown by Mata et al. (2011). In the natural environment 
of real-life investments, the situation can be significantly distinct. I suggest that more empirical 
research can shed more light on this phenomenon.   
The other two noteworthy variables are the size of the first deposit and Contest participation. I 
hypothesised that these variables should have a negative sign because of higher implied affect-
richness. Yet, I discovered that First deposit factor is positive and significant for all three groups. 
Contest participation turned out to be positive and significant for ‘Gainers’ and all investors’ 
models. It can be explained with the strong alternative factors, for example, correlation analysis 
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of independent variables demonstrates that the size of the first deposit is positively correlated 
with the origination of an investor from a developed country. It can be a sign of better financial 
literacy as confirmed by the studies on the subject.    
The other variables: gender-related, country of domicile-related, size of the second deposit, days 
between deposits and ‘deposit-to-income’ ratio were statistically insignificant.  
 
4.5.4. The difference between ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ 
groups  
 
In the sections above, I analysed the impact of the set of trading, personal and risk variables on 
the degree of investors’ rationality. Yet, there is another essential aspect that may provide useful 
complementary information about the interplay between the difference in regression coefficients 
for successful and unsuccessful investors, profitability and inclination towards rational 
behaviour. I am set to examine the variation of all my independent variables relating to ‘Gainers’ 
and ‘Losers’. In case a particular variable appears to diverge for the two groups, and 
simultaneously be an influential factor for rational behaviour, then such variable deserves close 
attention and further research as a potential indicator of deep-seated, systematic trading success, 
possibly attributable to better inborn skills or capacity, grounded on the fundamental trait of 
superior rationality. In other words, some individuals may be inherently better than others, for 
instance, when making investment decisions, because they tend to exhibit closer alignment 
between risk and return. To elicit and evaluate the discussed relations, I use an interaction 
variable technique covered in the Methodology section.  
From the last column of Table 4.16., I find that one of the key elements that make the difference 
between good and bad investors is the way how they treat gaining positions, more specifically, 
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the dispersion of gains that investors from both groups afford. The volatility of gains is a 
significantly more sensitive issue for underperforming investors with respect to the level of 
rationality they demonstrate. Yet, the sign for the two groups of investors remains the same – 
positive risk volatility is also a positive factor for risk/return correlation.   
In a similar vein, negative risk dispersion also appears to diverge for ‘Losers’ and ‘Gainers’. In 
contrast to positive risk, the sign of the variable coefficient varies from positive for 
underperformers to negative for outperformers. However, it is only statistically significant for 
the latter. Another variable that displays significant disparity for both groups similarly relates 
to behaviour when experiencing gains. It regards the processing of Take-Profit conditional 
orders. The sign of coefficients is negative for both groups meaning that the variable has a 
negative impact on rationality, however, the effect is more pronounced for ‘Losers’.  
Finally, Number of Trades variable exhibits meaningful discrepancy for underperforming and 
outperforming investors. If the investment experience hypothesis discussed earlier is correct, 
‘Losers’ reveal higher sensitivity to the experience gained through more active trading, while 
successful investors seem not to unveil any link between the number of completed trades and 
the degree of rationality proxied by correlation.  
Further to the analysis above, I take a bit different stance on the independent variables. It can be 
the case that a variable can be structurally disparate for performance groups yet remain 
insignificant for rationality. To identify such cases, I test for the difference in distributions of 
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Table 4.18. Analysis of the statistical significance of differences between ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ 
groups of investors applied to trading, personal and risk variables.  
Variable name t-test 
H0: Gainers-Losers =0 
Ha: Gainers-Losers ≠0 
Mann-Whitney U test 
H0: Gainers = Losers 
Ha: Gainers ≠Losers 
Stdev_positive (%) 0.0132***  
(0.000) 
12.97*** 













Turnover (USD) 5.8695** 
(0.016) 
2.216** 
Duration (minutes) 51.8381*** 
(0.000) 
5.316*** 
Conditional_open (%) 0.0157* 
(0.058) 
2.680*** 
Take_profit_close (%) 0.0285*** 
(0.000) 
3.903*** 
Stop_loss_close (%) -0.0697*** 
(0.000) 
-12.035*** 
First_deposit (USD) 280.3821*** 
(0.000) 
0.819 








Deposit_to_income (%) 0.0060* 
(0.085) 
0.564 
Age (years) -0.3457 
(0.385) 
-0.116 
Note: The table presents the results of two statistical tests: t-test and Mann-Whitney U test that are used to explore 
the null hypothesis that investors from ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ samples represent the same population: H0: Gainers 
= Losers. The alternative hypothesis states that the two samples of investors do not belong to the same population: 
Ha: Gainers ≠ Losers. The analysis is applied to all selected variables of the data set. t-scores (for t-test in the 
parentheses) and z-scores (for Mann-Whitney U test) are provided for each variable. For t-test mean comparison 
calculation, the extreme data values are winsorised at 1%. In addition, for t-test I also report differences in means 
between two groups of investors. *** means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means 
significant at 10% level. 
  
Table 4.18. demonstrates that a more successful investor (a member of ‘Gainers’ group) is 
featured with a higher variation of positive returns, number of trades, turnover, share of 
conditional open and take profit close orders and lower number of instruments used and the use 
of conditional stop-loss orders. The results for other variables are insignificant or mixed – either 
means or distributions are equal according to t-test and Mann-Whitney U test.  
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I also use Pearson χ2 test to compare distributions of binary variables: availability of second 
deposit, gender, developed country of domicile and origination of funds from Contest. The 
proceeds are reported in Table 4.19.  
Table 4.19. Analysis of the statistical significance of differences between ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ 
groups of investors applied to the selection of binary variables.  
Variable name Pearson’s χ2 test 
H0: Gainers=Losers 




Note: The table presents the statistic of Pearson’s χ2 test for categorical variables to explore the null hypothesis 
that investors from ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ samples represent the same population: H0: Gainers = Losers. The 
alternative hypothesis states that the two samples of investors do not belong to the same population: Ha: Gainers ≠ 
Losers. *** means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level. 
 
None of the binary variables in my data set evidenced statistically significant difference for 
‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ groups.  
Combining the results from Table 4.16 that describes regression coefficients pertaining to the 
set of my independent variables that help explain the degree of rationality, and Table 4.18 (and 
4.19) that illustrates the group difference of the same variables yet in profitability context, I can 
identify several ways in which a particular variable co-influences performance and rationality.  
Altogether, I single out four possible scenarios that I summarise below. 
The first scenario includes the group of variables that can help differentiate between ‘Gainers’ 
and ‘Losers’ from the perspective of rationality as well as profitability. For example, ‘Number 
of trades’ variable allows statistical separation of good and bad investors: unsuccessful investors 
make fewer transactions. At the same time, from the rationality perspective, more trades for 
‘Losers’ group is a positive factor, while it is insignificant for ‘Gainers’ group. The other two 
essential variables that also fit the same criteria are associated with the behaviour in the gains 
domain. Semi-deviation of winning transactions turns out to be an important factor delineating 
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good and bad investors from both performance and rationality positions. The same applies to 
the use of take-profit conditional orders. Outperforming investors use this type of orders by 
2.9% more, however, from rationality stance, this behaviour hurts risk/return correlation, 
statistically more significantly for underperforming investors.  
The second scenario comprises variables that help explain the between-group variation in 
profitability but not in the degree of rationality (i.e. interaction variable between the groups is 
statistically insignificant). For instance, my findings demonstrate that underperforming 
investors use a larger number of investment instruments. The difference for an average investor 
in both groups is approximately 1.5 instruments in favour of ‘Losers’50. However, this variable 
proves to have an insignificant discrepancy between the groups from rationality perspective. 
Further, ‘Gainers’ turnover is on average USD 5.87 million higher, yet regression analysis 
indicates that growing turnover has a negative impact on risk/return correlation, especially for 
underperforming investors. The next variable in this category is Duration of a trade. Even 
though the variable does not explain the difference in regression coefficients of ‘Gainers’ and 
‘Losers’, both coefficients are statistically significant and have a positive sign, meaning that 
longer duration is positive for the rationality of decisions. At the same time, outperforming 
investors demonstrate 52 minutes longer holding period of an average trade. Other two factors 
from the category have to do with the conditional orders. Successful investors on average use 
conditional orders by 1.5% more frequently but stop-loss orders by 7% rarer. Both variables fail 
to distinguish between investors from rationality perspective but for different reasons. The use 
of Conditional orders factor turns out to be unimportant for correlation between risk and return, 
 
50 Number of used instruments is conceptually different from diversification. The peculiarity of marginal trading 
predisposes traders to hold only 2-3 open positions simultaneously, which can be in different instruments. The 
respective number of instruments reflected in Table 4.15 Section C is the result of accumulation over the whole 
period of investment activity. Thus, the variable shows whether a trader remains focused on few instruments or on 
many instruments, rather than the degree of diversification pertinent to a subject.  
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while the use of stop-loss orders appear to be equally important with an even positive effect for 
‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’.  
The third category includes variables that have an influence of rationality but cannot explain the 
between-group variation from the profitability perspective. Three variables can be attributed to 
this class: The size of first deposit, investor’s age and participation in Contest51. ‘Age’ variable 
demonstrates essential negative influence on the correlation between risk and return for 
‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’. Contest participation has an impact, which is positive, only on 
outperforming investors, while the size of the first deposit is similarly positive for both 
performance groups.  
Finally, the fourth category of variables proved not to have statistically significant implications 
neither for rationality nor for the disparity in profitability. It includes all the remaining variables: 
the value of the second deposit, days between the first and the second deposit, deposit-to-income 
ratio, gender, and geographic origin of an investor.        
After the variables that I review in this section, it is fair to ask the question about why some 
investors perform better than others. My examination of various groups of factors indicates that 
the reason is not hidden in demographic or other variables of this type. Neither age nor the origin 
from a developed country (or gender) of an investor does not explain the difference between 
gainers and losers. At least, this is the case with the use of my dataset.  
At the same time, the factors associated with trading behaviour and investments decisions 
demonstrate a much better coherence with the difference between good and bad investors. 
However, investment decisions that translate into investment behaviour (for example, where 
 
51 I include here the variables that failed the statistical significance test of performance group difference (Table 
4.15 and 4.16) using any of the testing methods – parametric t-test, non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test and 
Pearson’s χ2 test for binary variables.  
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and how often to place stop-loss orders, etc.) are only the markers of other powerful forces that 
govern the decision-making process in humans. In the next two empirical chapters, I analyse the 
role of emotions in rationality, decision making and performance. I also believe that emotions 
and, more specifically, emotion regulation, can be responsible for the difference in the results 
of individual investors.  
Emotion regulation capacity is a puissant source of behaviour and performance. In economic 
science, the study of the influence of emotion regulation on performance is still in the inchoate 
state (with some noteworthy exceptions, e.g. (Fenton-O'Creevy et al. (2011), Fenton-O'Creevy 
et al. (2012)). However, in sports science, the intersection of emotion regulation and 
performance is an essential part of the scientific framework (see Lane et al. (2016) for review). 
It is firmly established that sportsmen extensively use emotion regulation in their goal 
achievement and it has a significant impact on performance (Hanin (2010), Lane et al. (2011), 
Stanley et al. (2012)). It is especially true for endurance sports, for example, long-distance 
running or cycling. I believe there is a direct parallel between behaviour in sports and 
investments as the emotions palette in both cases is extremely comparable (for example, elation, 
anxiety, anger, despair) but also extremely intense. As a subject of future research of the topic, 
the study of emotion regulation strategies when taking financial decisions and new approaches 
to measuring emotions among investors, e.g. neurophysiological or emotional intelligence 
study, should provide a better understanding of the empirically observed difference in 
performance between the groups of investors.  
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4.6. Summary and discussion of Research Question 2 
results 
 
In this research question, I strived to examine the factors that can explain the relation between 
risk and return. In the first research question, I found that there was a significant difference 
between successful and unsuccessful investors in terms of their manifested degree of rationality. 
Essentially, I defined the degree of rationality as the level of correlation between risk and return. 
From a theoretical point of view, more rational individuals should demonstrate a higher level of 
such correlation: the concept of risk premium required for an additional unit of risk lies at the 
heart of modern finance. In turn, it is reasonable to suggest that rational behavioural pattern 
should be featured with more prominent success in investing. Effectively, I provided such 
evidence in the first research question. ‘Gainers’ group that included successful traders with 
positive overall profitability proved to have a higher correlation between risk and return 
variables than ‘Losers’ group. Further, I considered that it is essential to understand which 
factors influence the studied correlation coefficient and, in my interpretation, the level of 
rationality. It might provide additional information about the connection between rationality and 
profitability.  
I collected 24 variables from my data set that were attributed to the investors. These variables 
were arbitrarily placed into three broad categories: risk variables, personal variables and trading 
variables. Based on these variables and Fisher’s z transformation technique, I created three 
regression specifications with different dependent variables: all subjects’ correlation between 
risk and return, ‘Gainers’ group (successful investors) correlation between risk and return, and 
‘Losers’ group (unsuccessful investors) correlation between risk and return. This approach 
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allowed me evaluating the difference in the impact of each variable on the level of return 
represented by the specific group.  
I found that particular variables had a statistically significant impact on the dependent variables 
characterising the degree of rationality, while for certain variables beta coefficients diverged for 
‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ groups. For example, the number of completed trades, the number of 
financial instruments used during trading and the number of days between the first and the 
second deposit had significant positive betas only for ‘Losers’ group, meaning that the 
correlation between risk and return for this group of investors tended to be higher for a higher 
level of the mentioned variables. Next, the share of intraday trades and the presence of the 
second deposit were featured with the significant negative influence on the degree of rationality 
of ‘Losers’ group but no influence on ‘Gainers’. In contrast, the average duration of a transaction 
had a positive impact only on ‘Gainers group’.  
The other significant variables had a concurrent effect on both groups of investors. The share of 
transactions closed with Stop-loss conditional order had positive betas, while disposition effect, 
the proportion of take profit conditional orders in all closing orders and investors’ age had a 
simultaneous negative impact on the dependent variables.  
Subsequently, I analysed the factors that could help differentiate between ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ 
from the perspective of rationality as well as profitability. Altogether, I managed to detect three 
such variables: number of trades used, the use of take-profit conditional orders and positive 
semi-deviation of returns (positive risk). I concluded that these variables require further research 
as they potentially play a more fundamental role in the quality of financial decisions, on the one 
hand, rooted in the intrinsic degree of rationality of individuals, and on the other hand, being 
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pertinent to some investors more than to the others. These factors may help understand why 
certain investors can be successful while others underperform.    
 
5. Empirical Chapter 2. The role of affect in 
the degree of rational behaviour 
 
5.1. Research Question and hypotheses development 
 
In the previous chapter, I explored the risk behaviour and risk attitude of individual investors in 
the context of a real market environment. My research question and hypotheses were focused 
on the analysis of rationality that I proxied via the correlation between risk and return. Two 
notorious financial theories – Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory – provide competing 
expectations of risk/return relation as part of the decision-making process. The results that I 
obtained in the first empirical chapter turned out to be better explained by Prospect Theory.  
Rationality principle is one of the cornerstones of the Expected Utility Theory. Axiomatically, 
individuals must require a higher return for extra units of consumed risk. By design, the 
Expected Utility Theory implies that humans always keep in mind the long-term wealth 
perspective. Short-term losses are regarded simply as changes to the total wealth, which do not 
undermine the stability of risk-averse behaviour. These facts lead to the expectation of a robust 
positive correlation between return and risk under the traditional theory. In turn, Prospect 
Theory manifests the short-term ‘myopic’ perspective of the judgemental process. In this 
framework, individuals’ rationality can be challenged by immediate negative performance, 
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which will encourage risk-seeking behaviour. That is, readiness to take a higher risk without 
any compensating level of return.  
Using an extensive data set containing live investment transactions of individual traders, I 
evaluated the correlation between risk and return across the board of all my subjects. My special 
interest was to assess if the correlation remains positive at any level of return as predicted by 
the Expected Utility Theory, or it turns negative if an investor experiences loss as expected by 
the Prospect Theory. I discovered that the gross correlation coefficient between total risk and 
return was negative and equalled to -0.1752. This figure was made up of the positive correlation 
of 0.04 between the return and positive risk (positive semi-deviation of return), and negative 
correlation of -0.22 between the return and negative risk (negative semi-deviation of return). 
Furthermore, I scaled down my examination to the level of an individual investor. For that, I 
dissected the historical trading performance of each of my subjects into the series of 20 trades 
and computed risk and return measures for each section53. Next, I calculated the correlation 
coefficient between risk and return for each of the investors in my sample, obtaining 3,670 
individual correlations. Evaluating the sign and magnitude of the coefficients, I found that 
among all investors, the average correlation equalled to -0.07. However, when splitting the 
subjects into ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’, according to their overall positive or negative 
performance54, I observed that correlation for good performers was on average as high as 0.09, 
while for bad performers it on average hit -0.15. These results support the predictions of the 
Prospect Theory having all three major components of Prospect Theory’s value function get 
 
52 These figures are calculated using nonparametric Kendall rank correlation methodology. The other two methods 
used were parametric (Pearson) and another nonparametric (Spearman rank). The results for these two methods 
proved to be even more substantial: Pearson (Spearman rank) correlation between return and gross risk equaled to 
-0.58 (-0.23), Pearson (Spearman rank) correlation between return and positive semi-deviation equaled to 0.34 
(0.07), Pearson (Spearman rank) correlation between return and negative semi-deviation equaled to -0.63 (-0.30). 
53 Considering the minimum criteria to the data set of 200 trades, I ended up with minimum 10 observations of risk 
and return per each investor.  
54 Characteristically, ‘Gainers’ group included only 33% of investors, while the other 67% fell into ‘Losers’ group. 
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reflected in my findings: positive risk-return relation in the gains domain, negative risk-return 
relation in the losses domain, and the presence of loss aversion featured by the prevalence of 
losses impact over gains.    
Such a meaningful difference in correlations for outperforming and underperforming investors 
reveals the link between rationality and investment performance. Therefore, it becomes essential 
to investigate the forces behind the discovered correlation behaviour more profoundly. Also, 
particular attention should be paid to the negativity of correlation in the losses domain that 
contradicts some of the traditional theory’s main prerequisites and causes underperformance 
among investors. In the previous chapter, I used the regression technique to explore the impact 
on risk/return correlation of multiple trading, personal and risk factors. Indeed, some of the 
independent variables proved to be statistically significant. For the most part, those were trading 
variables like the intensity of trading (share of intraday trading, number of trades), order 
management (use of market, take-profit and stop-loss orders) and few others. However, trading 
variables are themselves an outcome of some systemic decision-making practices or approaches 
by individual investors. I intend to explore if emotions felt at the moment of investment decision 
can be advocated as such a robust force that can intervene and deteriorate investors’ rationality.  
The analysis of the extant literature that I conducted in the literature review section indicated 
that affect or emotions experienced at the moment of choice (for example, investment choice) 
can be a powerful mediator for the cognitive evaluation of outcomes and probabilities and can, 
at extreme cases, radically impact the rationality of behaviour. A growing body of evidence 
from academia, predominantly using experimental setting, demonstrates how affect influences 
return and risk parameters of investment choices. To the best of my knowledge, the correlation 
between these two variables has not yet been examined in this context, the more so empirically. 
P a g e  | 185 
 
However, it is sensible to suggest that if return and risk individually can be mediated by feelings, 
so might be the correlation between the two. It brings me to the following research question:        
What is the effect of emotions on risk and return relation?   
Traditional financial theory gives a simple answer to this question. There should be no impact. 
The optimal, rational behaviour is to maximise return on each unit of risk consumed, whether it 
is expressed, e.g. by Sharpe ratio or in another way. The only element that traditional theory 
recognises is that at higher levels of wealth, its growth does not bring as much utility, i.e. 
individuals become less sensitive to risk. Yet, it does not lead them even to risk neutrality, not 
to say about risk-seeking behaviour. In any case, the change in sensitivity should not be 
explained by feelings. In the discussed framework, feelings are the product of decisions, not its 
predecessor.  
Behavioural financial perspective undergoes a gradual change in its attitude towards the role of 
emotions. If Prospect Theory, a cornerstone of behavioural agenda, is ignorant of the affect 
factor, more recent research that I cover in the literature review, for instance, the seminal work 
on Risk-as-Feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al. (2001)), is increasingly focusing on 
emotions as the driving force behind decision-making machinery. Nevertheless, at the current 
stage, it is very far from reaching the unity of opinions regarding the scope, magnitude or 
positivity/negativity of the emotions impact. As one of the commonly shared principles, 
researchers point out vividness as a factor that influences the emotional intensity and 
consequently, the degree of judgemental suboptimality. Vividness can be defined as an effect 
elicited by various dimensions of proximity – temporal, physical, and sensory – that can have a 
powerful impact on behaviour. It is operated by ‘showing’ mental images or representations of 
future outcomes under concern. The more vivid, either positive or negative, are such images, 
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the stronger is an immediate emotional reaction to the future outcome, and the larger can be a 
possible deviation from the optimal choice (Loewenstein (1996), p. 280). Another version of 
the same effect was dubbed ‘affect gap’ (Pachur et al. (2014)). The authors contended that even 
evaluation of a very similar set of prospects, yet with different emotional implications, can yield 
surprisingly diverse choices made by the same individuals. In their and similar analysis (e.g. 
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001)), two types of outcomes were identified: affect-rich and affect-
poor. Affect-poor outcomes leave the decision-maker much higher chances to stay within the 
boundaries of rationality when making a choice. In turn, affect-rich outcomes transform the 
whole evaluation process (hidden both in the value function and probability-weighting function) 
and may cause substantial damage to the rationality of judgements.    
I now turn to the theoretical model of portfolio choice by an individual investor that I have 
constructed and described in Section 2.10 to test certain assumptions with respect to the relation 
between risk and performance and the possible role that emotions play therein.  
In the analysis, I portray three investors, or stylised investor types, having Prospect Theory-
based preferences with a distinct set of parameters of the utility function. The parameters reflect 
higher or lower curvature of the function and different apprehension of losses versus gains 
directed by loss aversion coefficient. Further, I relate each set of parameters with the various 
degree of affect pertinent to decision-making environment. Thus, Investor A represents the 
emotionless environment and has the parameters from the original Prospect Theory model. 
Investor B acts in the affect-poor environment, while Investor C mirrors the parameters of the 
function approximated for the real financial market, and hence can be presumed to act in the 
affect-rich environment.  
P a g e  | 187 
 
Following my theoretical study, I conclude and predict that investors A, B and C will behave 
differently in terms of realised volatility of returns and correlation between risk and 
performance. In particular, in the domain of gains, Investor A will exhibit higher volatility of 
returns than Investor B, who, in turn, will demonstrate higher volatility as compared to Investor 
C. In the domain of losses, the picture will be reversed. As for the correlation coefficient, it is 
decreasing from Investor A to Investor C in the zone of gains and in the zone of losses.  
Considering the above said, I intend to test empirically whether individual investors will 
demonstrate a distinct line of behaviour, measured by the correlation between risk and return, 
when taking the set of standard investment decisions under the two environments with varying 
emotional charge: affect-rich and affect-poor. In order to approximate affect-rich and affect-
poor settings, I will use the data set of a large international brokerage house that I describe in 
the data and methodology section. One part of the data set represents the live trading activity of 
a group of individual investors taking risk on their own invested capital. The other part of the 
data set contains detailed trading statistics of a trading contest organised by the same brokerage 
company and maintained over a long period. Contest participants, though trading in a real online 
platform with real trading conditions, are required by rules to maximise dedicated virtual capital 
provided by the broker. Both sets of data only partially overlap. It means that only a fraction of 
live investors participated in the contest, and vice versa, only part of the contest participants had 
live accounts. The combination of the two types of accounts, in my view, provides an ideal 
empirical setting to test behaviour in affect-rich versus affect-poor realm. Live setting is clearly 
rich in terms of emitted emotions because investors risk their own funds in a complex 
environment of sequential investment decisions with virtually immediate effect55 and the need 
 
55 The trading platform is designed in such a way that investors observe their P/L immediately after the investment 
decision. Any investment automatically starts at a loss, visible to an investor, because of the bid-ask spread.   
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for fast real-time processing. Also, academic studies (e.g. Tuckett and Taffler (2012), Coates 
and Herbert (2008)) and multiple professional investment online forums confirm that live 
investing is a highly emotionally charged activity, which is self-reported by investors 
themselves, or measured objectively using neurophysiological methods (e.g. Lo and Repin 
(2002), Lo et al. (2005)). 
Comparing to live investments routine, participation in the Contest is undoubtedly an affect-
poor activity. Maximum real harm that it can produce is the unpleasant feeling of being worse 
than others. Nevertheless, it should be noted that affect-poor does not mean that Contest trading 
is affect-free. First, virtual money investment games are a common practice in the field of 
experimental economics and finance testing emotional behaviour (see, for example, Patterson 
and Daigler (2014), Kuhnen and Knutson (2011)). Second, doing one’s best in the Contest is 
the utmost benefit to the participant. Excellent Contest performance is remunerated with high 
real money prizes and reputational gains in the online community, not to say about the rise in 
personal self-esteem (the details about the Contest are provided in the section 2.7.1.2). 
Therefore, it is hard for participants to stay emotionally uninvolved when it comes to investment 
choices.  
To summarise the discussion above – I will use the data from two trading environments, where 
individuals make investment decisions in a natural way56. One of the environments – real money 
Live trading – is aimed to represent affect-rich realm, while the other – virtual money Contest 
trading – shall represent affect-poor setting. With this at hand, I plan to test the following 
hypotheses: 
 
56 By the term ‘natural way’, I mean the setting, in which individuals are fully motivated to maximise the return of 
each investment. In addition, they take investment decisions in regular, day-to-day surroundings, not being 
pressured by some external observers, such as experimenters.     
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I. Correlation between risk and return in the domain of gains should differ in affect-poor 
and affect-rich settings. In the affect-rich environment, the correlation between risk and 
return should be lower as follows from the proceeds of the theoretical model developed 
in Section 2.10.   
II. Correlation between risk and return in the domain of losses should differ in the affect-
poor and affect-rich settings. In the affect-rich setting, correlation coefficients should be 
more pronounced, i.e. be more negative in the losses domain, as follows from the results 
of the theoretical model in Section 2.10.  
III. Correlation between total risk and return should differ in the affect-poor and affect-rich 
settings. In the affect-rich setting, correlation coefficients should be more pronounced, 
i.e. be more negative in the losses domain, as follows from the results of the theoretical 
model in Section 2.10.     
 
5.2. Empirical analysis 
 
The current study is built on the findings and the proceeds of the correlation analysis in the 
previous chapter. Therefore, to preserve the continuity and comparability, I intend to follow the 
last chapter’s methodology, structure and sequencing.  
 
5.2.1. Macro vs Micro analysis perspective 
 
As in the previous study, I plan to conduct my research on the two levels to get a more 
comprehensive picture of investors’ behaviour. Primarily, I will select all subjects in my data 
set having an account and trading history in both instances: Live and Contest. For each 
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individual in this selection, I will compute average return and standard deviation, which I will 
further split into positive semi-deviation and negative semi-deviation. Hence, I will have the 
building blocks for correlations. The next step is the computation of the correlation between risk 
and return independently in Live and in Contest. I call this approach macro perspective or 
pooled-data analysis because in the end, I will obtain a single figure of risk/return correlation 
per each setting that will illustrate the aggregated relation between the two variables – risk and 
return – for all the investors combined. For example, strong positive correlation coefficient, e.g. 
0.5, will mean that the profitability of investors, in general, is positively related to the deviation 
of returns, which is in line with the traditional view on how the risk and return should be aligned. 
This approach will say nothing about the behaviour of an individual investor, though. One 
person’s performance can have zero correlation with the risk-taking behaviour, while another 
trader can have it close to 1, which will average to the coefficient of 0.5. To have a better 
understanding of the distribution of correlations across investors and get the insight into 
individual behaviour, another method should be applied. I call this method a micro perspective 
or individual-level analysis. To implement it, I break down individual trading history into an 
equal series of 20 trades in each of the bits. For each section of sequential trades, I compute 
return and standard deviation and find the correlation between the two. As a result, I get a 
correlation coefficient for each investor in my selection. Having such individual correlations 
allows executing further comparative examination of behaviour. 
 
5.2.2. Macro level analysis of correlations 
 
As mentioned in Section 3 on Data Description, after filtering my data set for investors 
simultaneously having Live and Contest accounts, I obtained 618 records. Further, I applied the 
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criteria of a minimum of 10 trades to have a more consistent calculation of return and risk 
variables. The robustness tests demonstrate that this criterion is optimal to elicit the integral 
information about the behaviour. This procedure left me with 523 investors. For each of these 
investors, I calculated a single measure of average return and standard deviation in each of the 
instances: Live and Contest.  
 
5.2.2.1. Discussion before the analysis of macro level 
correlations 
  
Having risk and return variables for each subject, I intend to calculate correlation coefficients 
independently for Live and Contest settings. If the behaviour of investors is in line with 
traditional theory, the coefficients should be positive and significant. The coefficients close to 
zero shall mean that investors in the sample are on average risk-neutral. Negative coefficients 
would indicate investors’ exhibited inclination towards risk-seeking behaviour. If this is the 
case, such a pattern might point to the explanations best fitted into the behavioural theory of 
decision-making. I also plan to compare correlation coefficients across the instances, i.e. Live 
versus Contest. My goal is to verify if there is any statistically significant difference between 
the two. Presence of such difference might flag that otherwise identical environments provide 
the ground for qualitatively distinct investment decisions, which can be attributed to the factor 
of inherent variation in emotional charge.  
To test the assumptions outlined above, I proceed by computing two measures of correlation – 
parametric (Pearson) and non-parametric (Spearman). I expect that Spearman correlation 
analysis will provide a more conservative measurement because it can better deal with outliers. 
In addition to finding the linear relation between risk and return, I also calculate a couple of 
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other correlation coefficients: between risk values in Live and Contest, between return values 
in Live and Contest, and mixed relations between risk and return from different settings. I expect 
that this examination will yield additional useful input. For example, a positive correlation 
between risk variables in the two instances would suggest common behavioural patterns – a sign 
of consistency in risk-taking practices. The same may be told about the other three parameters.   
 
5.2.2.2. Results of the analysis of macro level correlations 
 
The proceeds of the analysis are shown in the Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. 









STDEV_LIVE 1    
STDEV_CONTEST 0.18***  
(0.000) 













Note: The table displays the results of correlation analysis of risk and return in the two settings: Live and Contest. 
Correlations are computed using parametric Pearson technique. In each setting, the data is collected and studied 
for 523 individual investors. STDEV_LIVE means standard deviation variable in the Live environment. 
STDEV_CONTEST means standard deviation variable in the Contest environment. RETURNS_LIVE and 
RETURNS_CONTEST variables represent profitability variables in Live and Contest settings, respectively. P-
values are provided in brackets. *** Shows significance at 1% level, ** shows significance at 5% level, * shows 
significance at 10% level 
 
Table 5.2. Spearman Correlation analysis between risk and return on Contest and Live accounts. 
 STDEV_LIVE STDEV_CONTEST RETURNS_L RETURNS_C 
STDEV_LIVE 1    
STDEV_CONTEST 0.25***  
(0.000) 















Note: The table displays the results of correlation analysis of risk and return in the two settings: Live and Contest. 
Correlations are computed using non-parametric Spearman technique. In each setting, the data is collected and 
studied for 523 individual investors. STDEV_LIVE means standard deviation variable in the Live environment. 
STDEV_CONTEST means standard deviation variable in the Contest environment. RETURNS_LIVE and 
RETURNS_CONTEST variables represent profitability variables in Live and Contest settings, respectively. P-
values are provided in brackets. *** Shows significance at 1% level, ** shows significance at 5% level, * shows 
significance at 10% level 
 
The main finding of the analysis using the parametric method reveals that correlation between 
return and risk in both settings is negative and significant at the 1% confidence interval. The 
coefficient of -0.42 for the relation between Live risk and Live return suggests a considerably 
strong tendency for linear counter-movement of both variables. The corresponding figure of -
0.17 for the Contest environment also is indicating the negative relation and is significant at 1% 
interval. The robustness check using Spearman approach confirms the negative coefficient for 
the Live domain, though the figure increases to -0.23. For the Contest setting the situation 
changes, and the coefficient here becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero. These results 
fully correspond to the proceeds of my theoretical model, whereby the correlation between total 
risk and return turns out to be negative and significant in the affect-rich setting (Investor A) and 
insignificant for the affect-poor setting. The other noteworthy result includes the correlation 
between risk in Live and Contest equal to 0.18 using Pearson method and even a stronger value 
of 0.25 applying the non-parametric technique. The other coefficients turn out to be insignificant 
at 10% confidence interval.  
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5.2.2.3. Discussion of the results of macro level correlations 
analysis 
 
It is hard to explain the obtained outcome of the negative correlation between risk and return 
using the expectations of traditional financial theory. Underperforming individuals should not 
accept higher risk profiles of their investments compared to outperforming investors. At the 
same time, negative correlation can be explained by Prospect Theory, which predicts that when 
someone loses the money he will tend to take (unpaid) extra risk. Considering that 
approximately ¾ of my subjects were losing their capital on average after all the transactions 
they made with a broker57, it is unsurprising that risk-seeking behaviour stimulating negative 
risk/return relation has outplayed the risk-averse behaviour in the gains domain that is associated 
with a positive correlation between the same variables. Besides, Prospect Theory highlights 
another essential factor – loss aversion – which also might have impacted my findings. 
According to the model, the effect of loss aversion is strongest around the zero return mark, 
where most of all trades in my data set reside. Loss aversion by its nature should produce 
asymmetry in correlations between gains and losses domains ‘favouring’ losses approximately 
twice as solidly as gains58. In my view, these two factors may be responsible for the negative 
correlations that I discover.      
 
 
57 This figure is almost the same for both of examined settings, Live and Contest. Interestingly, thanks to the latest 
changes in regulation, since recently brokers working in the US, EU and many other regions are obliged to publish 
the average ratios of losers to winners in their investment accounts. Normally, losers dominate with most brokerage 
companies showing ratios between 60% and 80%. In this regard, my data set can be considered as perfectly aligned 
with the industry.  
58 The coefficient of around 2x has first appeared in the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) featuring the birth 
of Prospect Theory. Later it was confirmed by many other studies.  
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5.2.2.4. Comparison of macro level correlations in Live and 
Contest 
 
At the cross-setting comparison level, as expected, I establish the presence of the difference 
between Live and Contest risk/return correlation coefficients, which is sustained under both 
computation methods. To verify that the identified discrepancy is significant, I run statistical 
tests for the equality of two correlation coefficients from separate samples. The results of the 
test are reported below: 
Table 5.3. The results of testing for the equality of two correlation coefficients. 





Live -0.42 0.25***  
(0.000) Contest -0.17 
Spearman 
Live -0.23 0.20*** 
(0.001) Contest -0.03 
Note: The table presents the comparison of risk/return correlation coefficients between Live and Contest instances. 
To conduct the analysis, correlations are first transformed using Fisher r-to-z transformation technique, then I 
compute the proper z-score to evaluate the statistical significance of the difference between two correlation 
coefficients from the independent samples. The analysis is performed for the coefficients found using parametric 
(Pearson) and non-parametric (Spearman) techniques. P-values are provided in brackets. *** Shows significance 
at 1% level, ** shows significance at 5% level, * shows significance at 10% level 
       
The tests confirm that the observable difference in coefficients between Live and Contest 
environments are statistically significant at 1% level (Hypothesis III). The obtained results show 
that on average investors are more risk-seeking in Live environment than in Contest 
environment. This finding corresponds to the behavioural framework and its predictions 
outlined in the theoretical model in Section 2.10. Such outcome poses challenges not only for 
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the standard economic model of decision-making but also for the original Prospect Theory. The 
latter does not have readily available arguments or instruments to explain this sizable divergence 
in behaviour when dealing with the set of kindred investment decisions. Yet, this behavioural 
variation can well fit the theories featuring the role of emotions in the risky choice, for example, 
Risk-as-Feelings hypothesis that I cover in the literature review. These models imply that more 
affect-rich environment should impact and alter the standard building blocks of the judgemental 
processing, such as valuation function and probability function, by amplifying their intrinsic 
characteristics. As applied to my findings, if I admit that the negative correlation coefficients 
are explained by the valuation elements put forth by Prospect Theory, then it should follow that 
in the more affect-rich setting, which is Live, these elements will reveal themselves more 
intensively, and the correlations should be more negative than in Contest instance. In particular, 
I refer to the convex form of the valuation function in the loss domain and to the loss aversion 
bias. It is exactly what I observe. At this point, I can state that the proceeds of my study so far 
support my hypothesis about the role of emotions on investors’ behaviour, and, more 
specifically, on the correlation between risk and return. However, in the further sections, I plan 
to undertake a more detailed investigation of risky choices by my subjects and its influence on 
the risk/return co-movement.  
Before I proceed, I would like to emphasise two other findings that I cover in the computed 
figures above.  
 
5.2.2.5. Analysis of additional findings at the macro level 
 
The first finding addresses the returns in the two settings and demonstrates that the returns are 
linearly unrelated, having a correlation coefficient indistinguishable from 0. The same regards 
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correlation between standard deviation in one environment and realised return in another. They 
are very close to zero, showing just how isolated is risk-return relation between the two domains. 
The second finding is that risk-taking behaviour in the two settings is linked tighter: the 
correlation coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. Effectively, a trader 
who is more susceptible to a higher dispersion of returns would convey this preference from one 
trading environment to another59. Yet, the fragility of this connection forces to believe that there 
are powerful external factors that make traders behave so disconnectedly in two very similar 
settings.  
As a final remark for this section, I find it noteworthy to compare the correlation coefficients 
for risk and return with the results in the Empirical Chapter 1 (Section 4), which included larger 
data set, yet exclusively for Live accounts, and more stringent selection criteria. Imposing a 
requirement of minimum 200 transactions (compared to minimum 10 transactions in the current 
study), the prior research covered 3,670 subjects. There, I found that the correlation between 
risk and return using Pearson approach equalled to -0.58 and applying Spearman method it was 
-0.23. Obviously, the results of the two studies appear to be almost identical, which may serve 







59 On top of risk behaviour, it is noteworthy to examine correlations between other trading patterns in Live and 
Contest setting. The picture that we see is akin to the risk-taking patterns, i.e. all variable pairs have weak positive 
correlation, significantly different from zero at 1% level: a) Portion of intraday trades ≫ 𝜌 = 0.39 (t-stat = 9.79; 
p-value = 0.000); b) Number of trades ≫ 𝜌 = 0.2 (t-stat = 4.60; p-value = 0.000); c) Portion of conditional orders 
≫ 𝜌 = 0.3 (t-stat = 7.20; p-value = 0.000); d) Duration of trades ≫ 𝜌 = 0.2 (t-stat = 4.64; p-value = 0.000). 
Correlations were computed using Pearson method.  
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5.2.3. Macro level analysis with risk bifurcation 
 
5.2.3.1. Definition of the problem with macro level correlations 
analysis 
 
The investigation that I conduct in the previous sections has a serious shortcoming. From the 
Prospect Theory framework, we know that individuals are subject to diverse risk behaviour 
depending on their positioning relative to the reference point. Combining the two risk-taking 
domains into a single risk variable degrades the overall understanding of the risk choices made 
by investors. For example, I calculate the correlation coefficient between risk and return for the 
Contest setting using Spearman method to be equal to -0.03, which is not statistically significant. 
Yet, does it mean that the subjects are relatively risk-neutral across the change-in-wealth scale, 
or they simply level off their risk-averse decisions in the gains domain with risk-seeking 
decisions in the losses domain? To have a clearer answer to this question, I need to evaluate the 
factor of risk as two separate values: the one representing positive risk part and the one for 
negative risk part, in other words, positive semi-deviation, and negative semi-deviation 
variables. Importantly, this step should also help me better test my hypothesis, because I will 
get a chance to examine the affect-rich and affect-poor instances independently for the two sides 
of valuation function – gains and losses, which are implied to diverge in terms of behaviour.      
I must note here that my split of total risk will not fall into exactly ‘semi’ deviations because 
true semi-deviations would be mathematically computed against the mean return of each 
investor that can, of course, be negative or positive, while in my case I am more interested in 
the measurement against a status quo value. In trading, a common status quo is the zero return60. 
 
60 Normally, in trading zero return does not coincide with the purchase price (offer for long position), but rather 
with the selling price (bid for long position). When a trader opens a position she momentarily gets into the loss 
domain valued by the size of the spread (difference between offer and bid prices).  
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Hence, I modify the formula of semi-deviations to come to a more natural psychological sense 




∑ 𝐼𝑟<0 ∙ 𝑟




∑ 𝐼𝑟>0 ∙ 𝑟
2     (Formula 5.2) 
where 𝑣𝑎𝑟− and 𝑣𝑎𝑟+  are negative and positive modified semi-deviations with 𝑛− , 𝑛+  and 𝑟 
being number of negative returns, number of positive returns and realised return on a trade, 
respectively. The reference point is the zero return. 
Consequently, for each of my subjects, I calculate two additional variables – positive and 
negative semi-deviations. As a next step, I intend to expand my prior correlation analysis by 
computing the correlation coefficients for all my old and new variables.   
 
5.2.3.2. Discussion before the analysis of correlations with risk 
bifurcation 
 
I divide my expectations from the forthcoming analysis into two sub-sets. The first sub-set 
concerns the prospects of splitting the total risk into positive and negative parts and assessing 
their linear associations with return independently in Live and Contest environments. Here, I 
will rely on the core premises of Prospect Theory and the theoretical model implications in 
Section 2.10. Accordingly, I anticipate that the relation between positive risk and return should 
be positive reflecting the concave part of the valuation function, the relation between negative 
risk and return should be negative echoing the convex section of the value function, and finally, 
correlation between negative risk and return should be stronger than the correlation between 
positive risk and return signalling the impact of loss aversion bias.  
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The second sub-set of expectations is related to comparing correlations between Live and 
Contest settings. In this case, as in the previous section, I expect that the results for the Contest 
setting will be subtler than for Live in the domain of losses but reversed for the domain of gains. 
That is, the correlation between positive risk and return for Live should be weaker, while the 
correlation between negative risk and return for Contest should be stronger (i.e. less negative). 
Moreover, the discrepancy in coefficients for the negative risk should be more salient. These 
hypotheses are based on the literature that explores the role of emotions in decision-making, 
which I revise in detail in the literature review section. For example, the evidence on the salience 
of more emotional outcomes was provided by Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) and Hsee and 
Rottenstreich (2004), who demonstrated in the series of experiments that affect impacts 
decisions by altering the form (curvature) of valuation function and probability weighting 
function. The authors labelled the affect-rich outcomes processing as ‘valuation by feelings’ and 
affect-poor outcomes administration as ‘valuation by calculation’. At extremely affect-rich 
outcomes, the change in the curvature of the value function may even lead to the binary form of 
derived value, i.e. all-or-nothing. Just as a card player who experienced a harsh loss is ready to 
make an all-in bet for his remaining capital. The mechanism of such decisions was described by 
Loewenstein (1996)61.  
Further, the hypothesis on the salience of the negative risk in a more emotional environment is 
associated with the influence of affect on loss aversion. Loss aversion bias and its interaction 
with feelings is currently the least studied component of the three-element structure of risk under 
 
61 According to Loewenstein (1996, p.274-276), the value function is influenced by the three forms of attention-
narrowing mechanism under strong affective states: extreme focus on the emotion at the expense of other forms of 
consumption, which get incrementally ignored; collapsing of one’s time-perspective towards the current necessity 
to mitigate the visceral factor (short-sighted trade-offs of immediate over longer-term benefit prevail); and decaying 
inclination for altruism and boosted selfishness.  
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Prospect Theory. Nevertheless, some of the experimental papers (e.g. Dhar and Wertenbroch 
(2000) or Hsee and Kunreuther (2000)) find proof of higher loss aversion under more emotion-
rich environment. This is how Camerer ((2005), p.9) reasons on the matter: “My intuition is that 
loss-aversion is often an exaggerated emotional fear reaction, an adapted response to the 
prospect of genuine damaging survival-threatening loss, which overreacts to small losses in our 
long lives that are not truly life-threatening”.    
 
5.2.3.3. Results of the correlation analysis with risk bifurcation 
 
Again, I compute correlations using Pearson and Spearman techniques. The results are reported 
in Tables 5.4 and 5.5.    
Table 5.4. Pearson correlation analysis between risk and return on Contest and Live accounts 































































Note: The table reports the results of correlation analysis of risk and return in the two settings: Live and Contest. 
Correlations are computed using parametric Pearson method. In each setting, the data is collected and studied for 
523 individual investors. STDEV_PLUS_L means positive risk (or positive semi-deviation) variable in the Live 
environment, STDEV_MINUS_L means negative risk (or negative semi-deviation) variable in the Live 
environment. STDEV_PLUS_C means positive risk (or positive semi-deviation) variable in the Contest 
environment, STDEV_MINUS_C means negative risk (or negative semi-deviation) variable in the Contest 
environment. RETURNS_LIVE and RETURNS_CONTEST variables represent profitability variables in Live and 
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Contest settings, respectively. P-values are provided in brackets.*** Means significant at 1% level, ** means 
significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level 
 
Table 5.5. Spearman correlation analysis between risk and return on Contest and Live accounts 































































Note: The table reports the results of correlation analysis of risk and return in the two settings: Live and Contest. 
Correlations are computed using non-parametric Spearman technique. In each setting, the data is collected and 
studied for 523 individual investors. STDEV_PLUS_L means positive risk (or positive semi-deviation) variable in 
the Live environment, STDEV_MINUS_L means negative risk (or negative semi-deviation) variable in the Live 
environment. STDEV_PLUS_C means positive risk (or positive semi-deviation) variable in the Contest 
environment, STDEV_MINUS_C means negative risk (or negative semi-deviation) variable in the Contest 
environment. RETURNS_LIVE and RETURNS_CONTEST variables represent profitability variables in Live and 
Contest settings, respectively. P-values are provided in brackets. *** Means significant at 1% level, ** means 
significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level 
 
Based on Pearson method, the correlation between positive risk and return in Live environment 
equals to 0.21, while for negative risk and return it is -0.60. Both figures are statistically 
significant at 1% level. The non-parametric method produces considerably different result for 
the same coefficients: -0.10 for positive risk and return, significant at 5% level and -0.20 for 
negative risk and return, significant at 1% level. The correlations values for Contest setting make 
0.15 for positive risk and return and -0.34 for negative risk and return under Pearson approach. 
Again, both figures are significant at 1% level. The values obtained using Spearman method 
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equate to 0.12 for positive risk and return and -0.17 for negative risk and return. Another 
essential variables are correlations between various risk measures. For example, the linear 
relation between positive and negative risk in Live turns out to be 0.25 based on Pearson and 
0.54 using Spearman method. For the Contest setting, the corresponding figures equal to 0.47 
and 0.53 under Pearson and Spearman, respectively. The final coefficients to be noted describes 
the link between same side risk in different instances, that is, for example, positive risk in Live 
with positive risk in Contest. They also are positive at 0.29 (0.32) for positive risk and 0.14 
(0.28) for negative risk using Pearson (Spearman) approaches. All the relations are statistically 
significant at 1%.    
 
5.2.3.4. Discussion of the results of correlation analysis with risk 
bifurcation  
 
My first set of predictions of the results considered that bifurcated risk variables would behave 
according to Prospect Theory. Pearson correlation coefficients, indeed, reflect such behaviour. 
In Live environment, positive risk was positively associated with return, negative risk and return 
had negative relation, and the presence of loss aversion was also clearly observable, which is 
implied by the difference in losses domain (-0.60) and gains domain (0.21) correlation between 
risk and return. Spearman method provides a more intricate picture. Specifically, the result for 
positive risk seems falling out of the Prospect Theory’s framework.  
Nevertheless, it is essential to compare these results with my investigation in the previous 
chapter (Chapter 4). Chapter 4 is based on a much larger and, therefore, more reliable data set. 
In that chapter, I explored the data set of 3,670 Live-only investors derived from the same 
population as used for the current study. A much stricter selection rule was applied requiring 
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200 minimum trades to be executed by subjects opposite to only 10 trades in the present paper. 
Even though in Chapter 4 I did not analyse Contest statistics, for the case of Live environment, 
the results acquired from a more trustworthy dataset can help to better gauge individual 
behaviour.  
Contrasting the correlations in both studies, I must conclude that Pearson approach generated 
higher homogeneity of results. At the same time, Spearman technique provided much less 
consistent figures. I compare both papers in the table below: 




Correlation coefficients in 
Chapter 5  
Correlation coefficients in 
Chapter 4 
Pearson/Positive risk 0.21 0.34 
Pearson/Negative risk -0.60 -0.63 
Spearman/Positive risk -0.10 0.07 
Spearman/Negative risk -0.20 -0.30 
Note: The table exhibits correlation coefficients from two studies (outlined in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of the 
Thesis) that use the same population of investors. In the previous research the selection was made under the criteria 
of minimum 200 trades per investor and comprised 3,670 individuals. Current paper (Chapter 5) imposed the 
selection rule of minimum 10 trades (and the existence of active Contest account) and comprised 523 persons. All 
correlation coefficients were significant at 1% level for both papers at the exception of correlation between positive 
risk and return under Spearman method that was significant at 5%.      
 
The results for negative risk are surprisingly close for Pearson approach, and somewhat close 
under Spearman. Yet, correlations for positive risk are considerably more dispersed. The overall 
picture of Live risk/return relations derived from both studies provides for several essential 
conclusions that are consistent with Prospect Theory perspective: correlation between negative 
risk and return is deeply negative, and this effect is strong both statistically and economically; 
for positive risk, the link with return is weak being very close to zero, yet with a substantial 
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evidence of remaining positive and statistically significant; loss aversion bias is observed under 
both techniques and in both studies, which proves the pervasiveness of this phenomenon and 
serves as additional robustness test.  
As per the Contest setting, unfortunately, I do not possess the correlation figures from larger 
samples as was the case for Live. It restrains the capacity for complementary robustness checks. 
However, the results that I obtained for the Contest setting are not contradictory for different 
calculation techniques. Both Spearman and Pearson measures demonstrated compliance with 
Prospect Theory framework – positive coefficient for positive risk and return and negative value 
for negative risk and return. The traces of loss aversion also reveal themselves in the findings – 
more markedly for Pearson method and less for Spearman approach. Overall, I can state that my 
first set of expectations was confirmed by the proceeds of correlations analysis.  
 
5.2.3.5. Comparison of correlations in Live and Contest in the 
context of risk bifurcation 
 
The second sub-set of predictions was based on the comparative examination of correlations in 
Live and Contest realms. I conjectured that because of the influence of emotions, the results for 
the Live setting should be more prominent than for Contest in the domain of losses but weaker 
in the domain of gains. I examine the differences between Live/Contest correlation coefficients 
in the table below:   
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Table 5.7. Analysis of differences in correlation coefficients between Live and Contest 
environments. 





STDEV_PLUS_L/RETURN_L 0.21 0.06  
(0.159) STDEV_PLUS_C/RETURN_C 0.15 
STDEV_MINUS_L/RETURN_L -0.60 0.26*** 
(0.000) STDEV_MINUS_C/RETURN_C -0.34 
    
Spearman 
STDEV_PLUS_L/RETURN_L -0.10 0.22*** 
(0.000) STDEV_PLUS_C/RETURN_C 0.12 
STDEV_MINUS_L/RETURN_L -0.20 0.03 
(0.390) STDEV_MINUS_C/RETURN_C -0.17 
Note: The table displays the paired comparison of correlation coefficients between Live and Contest instances. The 
differences in coefficients are reported in the last column. STDEV_PLUS_L means positive risk (or positive semi-
deviation) variable in the Live environment, STDEV_MINUS_L means negative risk (or negative semi-deviation) 
variable in the Live environment. STDEV_PLUS_C means positive risk (or positive semi-deviation) variable in 
the Contest environment, STDEV_MINUS_C means negative risk (or negative semi-deviation) variable in the 
Contest environment. RETURNS_LIVE and RETURNS_CONTEST variables represent profitability variables in 
Live and Contest settings, respectively. P-values are provided in brackets.*** Means significant at 1% level, ** 
means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level 
 
Based on the findings above, the only statistically significant differences were identified for 
negative risk in Live and Contest applying Pearson technique, and for positive risk under 
Spearman method. As I already mentioned, Spearman method in the current study has 
demonstrated a meaningful discrepancy in results with my prior research where I analysed a 
much larger sample of investors. If I substitute Live correlations in the Table 5.7 with the 
coefficients from the last column of Table 5.6 that displays the results from the previous study 
of 3,670 traders, the picture will change considerably. For example, the difference for positive 
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risk under Pearson approach will be equal to 0.19, which is significant at 1% level. As for 
Spearman method, the updated difference for positive risk will turn insignificant, yet for 
negative risk it will become statistically significant at 1%. I can conclude that when using the 
Live parameters from the larger sample, my predictions from the second sub-set will be mostly 
confirmed for the convex part of the value function. The results in the domain of gains fail to 
confirm my initial hypothesis. In what concerns loss aversion, under Pearson technique, the in 
modulo discrepancy of correlations for negative and positive risk in Live (0.39) was indeed 
more pronounced than in Contest (0.19) as anticipated. Spearman correlation coefficients 
grounded on 523 investors demonstrated quite the opposite result – loss aversion in Contest was 
more substantial. However, when I applied Spearman correlations from the last column of Table 
5.6, the situation was back to expected: modulo difference for Live was 0.23 and for Contest 
only 0.05.          
 
5.2.3.6. Additional findings revealed by risk bifurcation 
 
In addition to the main hypotheses, there were several other noteworthy outcomes concerning 
risk-taking featured by correlation study. First, I spotted consistency in traders’ risk behaviour 
in Live and Contest modes with respect to losses and gains domains. Negative and positive 
semi-deviations were positively correlated at 1% level, demonstrating that individual investors 
exhibit coherent risk preferences no matter if they lose or succeed. This finding substantiated 
the long-revealed role of personality peculiarities in risk-taking routines (e.g. see Zuckerman 
(1994), Zuckerman (2007) studies on sensation seeking). More risk-loving individuals would 
prefer more risk to less risk under any market circumstances.  
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Second, the same conclusion can be made when looking at the relation between equidirectional 
risk-taking in Contest and Live. The correlation between positive semi-deviations in both 
trading modes was around 0.3, which is significant at 1% level. For negative semi-deviation, 
the figure was a bit smaller but statistically significant as well. Third, I observed that risk 
behaviour was more correlated within the single setting than equidirectionally within different 
settings. This may be a sign of the fact that there was a larger ‘emotional gap’ between Live and 
Contest trading than between gain and loss domains. However, all these conclusions require 
further study on larger and more elaborated data sets.  
 
5.2.4. Micro level analysis of correlations 
 
So far, I was exploring the correlations between risk and return for the aggregate of my sample. 
As discussed before, this approach gives a general understanding of risk/return relation in the 
group of subjects. However, it is instrumental to understand how risk and return interact on the 
individual trader level. I already applied this line of analysis in Chapter 4 for Live-only subjects.  
 
5.2.4.1. Discussion before the analysis of correlations at micro 
level 
 
In the current research, I intend not only to retake a similar approach to investors in the Live 
setting, but also do the same for these subjects in the Contest setting and compare between the 
two. The main goal of this examination is to evaluate if individual behaviour in Live and Contest 
differs in terms of the risk/return relations as it did at the aggregated sample level. I start with 
the sample selection by applying two rules that must be met by the subjects: a co-ownership of 
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accounts in Live and Contest, and minimum criteria of 200 trades made in each of the two 
instances. Because of strictness of these requirements, my selection includes only 166 
individuals. Nevertheless, I deem this number satisfactory for the purpose of supplementary 
robustness test. I believe that with minimum 200 trades, I can obtain stable markers of behaviour 
for my limited selection of investors. Besides, most experimental studies ground their analysis 
and conclusions on equal or even smaller data sets.   
Further, I plan to split the traders in Live and Contest into two groups – ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ 
according to the respective performance above or below my reference point, which I choose to 
be zero return in line with my prior research and the general practice. Table 5.8 reports the 
number of traders in each of the obtained groups. 
Table 5.8. Composition of ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ sub-groups in Live and Contest environments. 
 Live Contest 
Gainers 45 (27%) 39 (24%) 
Losers 121 (73%) 127 (76%) 
Total 166 (100%) 166 (100%) 
Note: The table displays the sub-groups of investors from the selected sample of 166 individuals having Live and 
Contest accounts. The division into sub-groups is grounded on the accumulated performance of each subject. If the 
return is above zero, which is the reference point, an investor will get to the ‘Gainers’ sub-group. Alternatively, 
she will be included in ‘Losers’ sub-group. The figures in the parentheses shows the share of a sub-group in the 
selection.  
 
The figures in the table above demonstrate that about ¼ of my sample got to the ‘Gainers’ sub-
group. The result for Live and Contest turned out to be alike. Yet, this is a bit less than what I 
discovered in my prior analysis of a large Live-only data set of 3,670 investors, where the share 
of ‘Gainers’ was around 33%. Still, the difference is not sizeable, which is an extra argument in 
favour of the appropriateness of the present sample. 
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After splitting the sample, I intend to compute average correlation coefficients for ‘Gainers’ and 
‘Losers’ members. My expectation is to observe the evidence of risk behaviour in line with 
Prospect Theory: positive correlation between risk and return for outperforming traders, 
negative correlation for underperforming traders, and the sign of loss aversion revealed by 
smaller positive correlation. Furthermore, I assume that in line with the theoretical model 
outcomes in Section 2.10, positive correlation should be higher for Contest in the domain of 
gains and in the domain of losses.  
 
5.2.4.2. Results of the correlation analysis at micro level 
 
Table 5.9. summarises the findings of correlation coefficients in both environments and for the 
two groups of investors. 
Table 5.9. Average correlation coefficients for investors in Live and Contest split into ‘Gainers’ 



































Note: The table displays average correlation coefficients for the respective groups of investors: outperforming 
investors in Live (Live ‘Gainers’ group), outperforming investors in Contest (Contest ‘Gainers’ group), 
underperforming investors in Live (Live ‘Losers’ group), underperforming investors in Contest (Contest ‘Losers’ 
group). Live Positive and Contest Positive mean correlation coefficients between return and positive risk (positive 
semi-deviation of return). Live Negative and Contest Negative mean correlation coefficients between return and 
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negative risk (negative semi-deviation of return). P-values are provided in brackets.*** Means significant at 1% 
level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level.   
 
In line with my prior findings, I observed that at the level of individual investors Prospect 
Theory fitted well to explain the correlation coefficients and the difference between ‘Gainers’ 
and ‘Losers’ groups. In Live the average correlation between return and positive risk reached 
0.34, whereas when separated for groups got to 0.48 and 0.28 for ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’, 
respectively. The outcomes for Live negative risk correlations also corresponded to my 
expectations, making -0.39 for all investors, -0.34 for ‘Gainers’ and -0.41 for ‘Losers’. The 
consistency of these numbers is corroborated by the comparison with the results in Chapter 4 
for 3,670 Live investors. Table 5.10 presents the correlation values from both papers. 
Table 5.10. Comparison of Live correlations between risk and return for two studies with the 
sample of 166 investors and 3,670 investors. 
Investors’ group/ 
Risk perspective 













Note: The table shows correlation coefficients from two studies. In the current study, the selection includes 166 
Live investors that also had Contest accounts, while my prior paper was focusing exclusively on a large array of 
Live traders. Correlations in the table represent average values from the distribution of coefficients for the selection 
of individuals that fall into specific groups: ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’, according to their performance, and two 
categories of computed correlations – between return and positive risk (positive semi-deviation) and return and 
negative risk (negative semi-deviations). Both papers used the same methodology to compute correlation.  
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As follows from the comparison above, despite a limited selection of investors in the current 
study, the figures of coefficients are very similar.  
Unfortunately, I do not possess the proceeds of correlations for any larger group of trading 
Contest participants. Therefore, the existing findings should be taken with additional care. 
Nevertheless, I should note that the figures for Contest remain consistent with Live and with my 
expectations: ‘Gainers’ group in Contest outperformed the respective ‘Losers’ group, 
correlations were positive and significant above the reference point, and negative below the 
reference point. There was also an evidence of loss aversion, as negative correlations loomed 
larger than positive ones.   
 
5.2.4.3. Comparison of Live and Contest correlations at micro 
level 
 
Now I can contrast the results for Live and Contest. My expectation was that Contest 
correlations between risk and return should be higher on both sides from zero – positive and 
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Difference in correlation 






















Note: The table shows the differences in correlation coefficients reflecting various perspectives of Live and Contest 
settings. ‘Gainers’ group includes investors performing above zero return during the reviewable trading history. 
‘Losers’ group comprises the underperforming investors. Live Positive and Contest Positive mean correlation 
coefficients between return and positive risk (positive semi-deviation of return). Live Negative and Contest 
Negative mean correlation coefficients between return and negative risk (negative semi-deviation of return). The 
statistical significance of differences in correlations is evaluated using t-test. P-values are provided in brackets.*** 
Means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level.   
 
The results demonstrated in the table generally confirm my expectation of more pronounced 
correlation values for Live than for Contest in the losses domain. However, for gains domain, 
the results are mixed. For ‘Gainers’ group the difference is not statistically significant and 
weakly significant for ‘Losers’ group, yet the sign goes against my expectations. Hence, I can 
confirm the Hypothesis II but cannot confirm the Hypothesis I with my empirical findings. One 
of the possible reasons for that is a low number of subjects in the study. 
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5.2.4.4. Discussion of correlation analysis at micro level 
 
At the individual investor’s (micro) level of analysis, I found supplementary evidence in favour 
of my hypothesis II and III, which implied that emotions may play their role in investors’ 
behaviour by impacting risk decisions that practically translates into differences in correlation 
between risk and return. When making risk choices in Live environment, which is dominated 
by more explicit affective reactions, most notably, stronger feeling of fear and anxiety, investors 
tend to demonstrate behaviour that is more aligned with the main features of Prospect Theory. 
Unsurprisingly, these strong feelings are mostly manifested in the losses spectrum of returns. In 
the domain of losses investors become more risk-seeking in Live environment and more exposed 
to loss aversion bias. My analysis also established that investors’ behaviour and decisions in 
Contest setting are not affect-free. Rather, my subjects exhibited reactions that appeared to 
remind closely the behaviour in Live. However, I discovered statistically significant difference 
in the correlations in two instances, which clearly pointed to the possibility that emotions do 
impact profitability or/and risk variables. This is exactly the perspective taken by the researchers 
who proposed so called dual-process models of decision making (e.g. Loewenstein et al (2001), 
Slovic et al. (2002), Kahneman (2003) among others). I should also add that this viewpoint 
contradicts the traditional decision-making framework. To elaborate our understanding of the 
role of feelings any further, it is important to decompose return and risk variables and compare 
them in more details in the settings with different degree of affect involved.    
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5.3. Summary and discussion of Research Question 
results 
 
In Chapter 4, I have undertaken an empirical study of correlation between risk and return across 
a large set of retail investors. My results provided evidence in favour of Prospect Theory 
assumptions about behaviour of an individual decision maker: it appeared that on average 
outperforming investors demonstrated risk-aversion, while individuals with performance below 
zero evinced risk-seeking behaviour. Moreover, losses proved to have higher value than gains 
as is predicted by the theory.  
The purpose of the current chapter was exploring possible reasons behind the observed 
behaviour. I conjectured that emotions or affective (visceral) states can be an influential factor 
that guides the decision-makers to obviously irrational, myopic choices. My assumption was 
primarily based on the growing body of literature exposing the role of feelings in economic 
decisions and the consequences that emotional implications can have on rationality. Hence, I 
focused my research question on understanding the role of feelings in choices of individuals 
extractable from the relation between risk and return. The main hypothesis that I bore in mind 
was based on the expectation that it should be possible to elicit the so-called affective gap, i.e. 
the impact of affect on behaviour, if I contrast two types of decision environments – affect-rich 
that is featured with high level of feelings, such as fear, savouring, anxiety, with affect-poor 
setting, which is also filled with the same feelings, however, to a substantially smaller extent.  
To practically replicate such environments, I used the empirical dataset from a large brokerage 
house containing trading data for a group of investors having two types of accounts: a real 
money account that stood for affect-rich setting, and trading contest account that represented 
affect-poor setting. Altogether, I managed to identify 523 individuals with the required 
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specification. As mentioned above, I focused my study on examining risk/return correlation for 
the aggregate of the investors and at the individual investor level expecting that in the affect-
rich environment all three elements of risk behaviour under Prospect Theory will be statistically 
more dominant compared with affect-poor background. The expectations were grounded on the 
predictions of the theoretical model of portfolio choice developed in Section 2.10. 
At the aggregate investor level, or macro level, I discovered that using Pearson correlation 
technique in the affect-rich environment the correlation between risk and return equalled to -
0.42, while in the affect-poor environment it was only -0.17. Repeating the analysis using a 
more conservative Spearman method, I found the coefficients to be -0.23 for Live accounts, and 
-0.03 for Contest accounts. The difference in correlation coefficients was statistically significant 
at 1% level for both calculation methods. Further, I broke down total risk into positive and 
negative semi-deviations and recalculated correlations between return and both types of risk. 
When applying the figures from the previous chapter that contained a larger data set, my 
hypothesis of stronger correlation coefficients for the affect-rich setting was largely confirmed 
for all three elements of risk behaviour. 
Next, I have undertaken to explore risk and return relations at the level of an individual investor. 
For each of my subjects, I computed the personal correlation coefficient grounded on the 
individual series of returns and positive/negative semi-deviation of returns. Each of the series 
comprised 20 sequential trades. This approach allowed me separating investors and their 
attributable correlation coefficients into ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ categories while grouping total 
risk into positive and negative semi-deviations. I hypothesised that correlations in Live 
environment should be more prominent than in Contest environment. Effectively, on average in 
Live investors should demonstrate more risk-averse behaviour in gains domain and be more 
risk-seeking in losses domain. I found statistically significant confirmation of my expectations 
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for three out of four analysed manifestations of behaviour. The members of ‘Gainers’ group in 
Live had 0.07 higher correlation coefficient for positive risk than in Contest (more risk-averse 
as expected), yet it was not enough to pass the significance threshold. In case of negative risk 
for the same group, the difference in average correlation coefficient between Live and Contest 
was found to be -0.13 (more risk-seeking in Live as expected), significant at 5% level. The 
members of ‘Losers’ group also evinced higher correlation coefficient for positive risk in Live 
(on average 0.05 higher than in Contest, significant at 5% level), and lower coefficient in Live 
for negative risk (on average -0.04 compared to Contest, significant at 10% level). Thus, I 
managed to confirm two out of three initial hypotheses.  
My research provides the contribution to the literature on human economic behaviour 
reinforcing the evidence that most individuals do not take decisions according to traditional 
Expected Utility Theory’s prescriptions. Rather their choices are better described with Prospect 
Theory premises, which imply short-term approach to choosing between prospects that leads to 
flawed risk-seeking behaviour and myopic loss aversion. I also discover that the degree of 
rationality is related to profitability, i.e. irrationality has its clear economic cost. Yet, the reasons 
behind the biases in judgments put forth by Prospect Theory are far from clear. In the current 
study, I endeavour to test one of the theories that seek to explain the psychological roots behind 
the irrationality phenomenon.  A group of academics (for example, see Loewenstein et al (2001), 
Loewenstein and Lerner (2003)) believe that the key driver of biased behaviour is hidden in the 
domain of uncontrollable (anticipatory) human emotional reactions, which are very hard to test 
because they are not readily available to be observed in the laboratory or in the field. It is 
utmostly complicated to set an individual to make decisions in the affect-poor environment, and 
after that, modulate a person into stronger emotions to survey and compare how similar 
decisions are taken. People do not like that much to be monitored when they are feeling angry, 
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desperate or fearful. Fortunately, the unique combination of differently modulated environments 
has been created by online retail brokers who created a marketing instrument of contest trading, 
which represents an investment game with paper money but real monetary prizes. Some of the 
contestants also trade with their own funds, and the two environments – Live and Contest – 
possess all the needed features to test for the difference in affective reactions as affect-rich and 
affect-poor domains. I describe them in more details in Section 3.1. After evaluating investors’ 
behaviour in both settings, I find that there is a statistically significant disparity in the way how 
the subjects manifest their degree of rationality that I measure as the strength of the correlation 
between individual risk and return variables. It seems that in a more emotionally-rich 
environment, the judgement value function becomes more S-shaped, meaning that risk-aversion 
becomes stronger in the gain’s domain, and risk-seeking gets more powerful in the loss’s 
domain. Also, loss aversion bias shows the evidence of higher intensity. This finding makes the 
feelings factor an essential contributor to rationality and profitability puzzle. At the same time, 
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6. Empirical Chapter 3. The role of risk and 
emotional engagement in trading behaviour 
and manifestation of behavioural biases by 
investors 
 
6.1. Research Question 1. Hypothesis development 
 
As was demonstrated in the literature review, there are two competing viewpoints on the 
influence of emotions on performance in general, and on financial performance, in particular. 
The first approach put forth by traditional financial theory manifests the ‘no impact relation’. It 
is believed that feelings are the post-product of a cognitive evaluation during decision-making. 
Hence, emotional intensity variation cannot have any practical consequences for realised 
behaviour and outcomes. Alternatively, the dual process models that emerged in the last few 
decades argue that emotions are integral to judgement. More specifically, emotions can mediate 
the cognitive processing of judgments, and have a direct impact on behaviour and outcomes. If 
this is so, modifying feelings intensity for comparable decisions should lead to the deviation in 
outcomes and, consequently, in performance.  
 
Following the competing stances on this important matter, I formulate Research Question 1: 
Does variation in emotional intensity pertaining to the investment decision have an influence on 
financial performance? 
 
In order to elicit the change in emotional intensity, I employ the two types of trading accounts 
from my data set – Live and Contest. Importantly, trading on the two accounts is identical in all 
the parameters except for affective infusion. The genuine and natural contrast between these 
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two instances in terms of the emotional accompaniment of financial trading can be easily 
verified by checking out countless Internet trading forums. A great deal of attention on such 
virtual forums is devoted to discussing how to preserve composure, protect oneself against 
emotional traps, and hold on to initial trading strategy when switching from virtual (Demo) 
account to real (Live) account   
 
The null hypothesis directly ensues from the traditional financial perspective. Accordingly, there 
should be no difference between the performance on Live and Contest accounts because 
investors have the same amount of cognitive abilities and trading skills when operating in Live 
or Contest environment. As explained in Section 3.1.2., they are also motivated to maximise 
their abilities and skills in Contest setting.    
 
H0: PL = PC, 
where PL is Live account performance, and PC is Contest account performance. 
 
The alternative hypothesis represents the position of dual process theories. If the change in 
emotional intensity can impact outcomes by modifying behaviour, it can be envisaged that 
investment performance on Live and Contest will deviate.  
 
Ha: PL ≠ PC, 
where PL is Live account performance, and PC is Contest account performance. 
 
It is hard to make reliable projections about outperformance or underperformance of Live or 
Contest, because prior empirical research did not provide unambiguous guidance. As was 
discussed in the literature review, under diverse research designs, emotions proved themselves 
as having both positive and negative consequences for performance. However, I believe that the 
studies of Coates and colleagues ((Coates et al. (2009), Coates and Herbert (2008)), which 
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showed that emotions are beneficial for performance, could be more applicable to my research, 
as they were conducted in a more natural environment and under the conditions of more 
trustworthy return analysis. Therefore, my expectation is to find evidence of Live 
outperformance.  
 
6.2. Research Question 1. Empirical Analysis 
 
I break my analysis into several sections. First, I evaluate the difference in key trading variables 
in the two modes. Then I examine the difference in profitability in Live and Contest and assess 
the performance distribution parameters. After that, I discuss the possible reasons behind the 
results that I discovered. Next, I switch from the aggregate (macro) analysis level to trader 
(micro) level to find the support for my conclusions. Finally, I conduct and discuss several 
robustness checks.  
 
6.2.1. Difference in behaviour in Live and Contest 
 
I commence the empirical analysis with the overview of a set of key trading variables 
summarised in the table below: 
 
Table 6.1. Between-traders statistics of average values for the group of trading variables in Live 
and Contest. 








Portion of non-intraday trades 21.5% 34.6% -13.1%*** (p-value = 
0.000) 
Number of trades 877 448 429*** (p-value = 0.000) 
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Portion of conditional orders 22.5% 43.1% -20.6%*** (p-value = 
0.000) 
Duration of trade (in hours) 4.11 7.82 -3.69*** (p-value = 0.000) 
Note: The table above displays a group of major trading variables. For each of the variables an average per trader 
result is provided. There are two values for each variable – one for Live account and one for Contest account. The 
last column shows the difference between Live and Contest settings for each variable with pertaining significance 
level and p-value. *** Means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% 
level.      
 
Table 6.1. displays between-trader’s statistics of average values for the given variables. For 
example, the figure for the portion of non-intraday trades on Live accounts means that on 
average Live traders open and close 21.6% of transactions within one day. The statistics presents 
a picture in which an average Live trader tends to complete transactions within one day more 
often, makes two times more trades, and places conditional orders two times more regularly. 
Also, the holding period, though utmost short for both account types, is substantially shorter for 
an average Live transaction. In order to further substantiate the findings, I also look at within-
subject variations for the same parameters. I compute each observation as Li,j − Ci,j, where Li,jis 
a value of jth variable for ith trader in Live account and Ci,j is a value of jth variable for ith trader 










P a g e  | 223 
 
Figure 6.1. Difference in main trading variables in Live and Contest environments 
Section A. Delta in the portion of non-intraday trades 
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Section C. Delta in the portion of conditional orders in Live and Contest environments 
 
Section D. Delta in the duration of trades in Live and Contest environments 
 
Note: The portion of non-intraday trades (Section A) and the portion of conditional orders (Section C) are measured 
in percentage, the number of trades (Section B) is measured as absolute quantity, the duration of a trade (Section 
D) is measure in hours. For each investor I compute the respective parameter’s difference between Live and Contest 
account activity. The analysis presents the distributions for all investors in the data set. I measure the key statistical 
parameters of the distribution, and test for significance of the difference using parametric and non-parametric tests. 
The mean difference in the share of non-intraday trades across traders is 13.1% in favour of Contest account, the 
mean difference in the number of trades across traders is 429, whereby Live account is featured with more trades, 
the average difference in the share of conditional orders is 20.6%, again in favour of Contest account. Finally, an 
average trade on Contest account lasts 3.69 hours longer than on Live account. Also, Live and Contest account 
distributions for all four parameters are significantly different under Wilcoxon and Welch’s t-tests.    
 
As it can be observed, the disparity of within-subject behaviour for the given variables bolsters 
the results in Table 6.1. Even though the degree of individual variation is large (that is in line 
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with other studies emphasising sharp dissimilarity in individual investors behaviour (e.g. Dhar 
and Zhu (2006), see Barber and Odean (2013) for review), within-trader’s variations are skewed 
towards more and shorter trades, less non-intraday trading and conditional orders. These 
findings suggest that an average trader spends substantially more time, energy, and attention on 
Live trading, which fits the assumption of more intense emotional impact in Live mode. 
Naturally, such reaction should be expected to a more emotion-evoking stimulus because as the 
literature maintains, strong visceral factors like fear (of financial loss) have overarching 
attention and motivation-grabbing capacity (Frijda (2007)). Attention-grabbing makes investors 
sit in front of the monitor to follow price movements reflected in the profit/loss account, while 
the motivational precedence of feelings produces extra trading with the short duration within 
short session frames. Such active participation obviously requires fewer conditional orders. 
Additionally, there is recent evidence in the literature (see Kocher et al. (2017)) that higher 
vividness provokes more frequent trading activity62.   
 
6.2.2. Difference in performance in Live and Contest 
 
From the ‘difference-in-behaviour’ section above, which emphasises significant deviation in 
key trading variables implied by the conceivable role of emotional intensity, I move on to the 
more direct analysis of profitability. I start by computing median returns for Live and Contest 
settings and for every trader in the data set. The return is calculated on per trade basis and per 
unit of traded volume.  
 
 
62  In Kocher et al (2017) experimental study, the authors achieved higher vividness effect by substantially 
increasing the size of the stake. 
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Table 6.2. Descriptive statistics of traders’ profitability based on median per-trader returns 
 Live account Contest account Livei - Contesti 
Mean 0.005%63 -0.017% 0.022%*** 
 (p-value = 0.000) 
Wilcoxon stat = 
84512 (p-value = 
0.000) 
Median 0.012% -0.019% 
Kurtosis  23.2 3.16 
Skewness -2.96 -0.89 
Standard Deviation 0.059% 0.095% 
    
Note: The table introduces the results for the examination of returns on Live and Contest accounts. The first column 
includes the four distribution moments for Live account, and the second column for Contest account. The last 
column presents the difference between the average returns on Live and Contest accounts across all traders in the 
data set. I use both parametric and non-parametric tests to check for significance. *** Means significant at 1% 
level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level.      
 
The table above reveals at minimum two noteworthy and interesting findings 64 .The mean 
disparity in Live and Contest performance across traders is statistically significant. In line with 
my expectation and findings of Coates and his colleagues (Coates et al (2009), Coates and 
Herbert (2008), but against part of the literature, and the mainstream beliefs in the industry and 
among lay traders, emotionally intense Live performance is actually better than the results on 
apparently less emotionally charged Contest accounts. The exact difference of median returns 
for an average trader in my data set equals to 0.022% in favour of Live account per every 
conducted round-trip trade. Although at first glance such deviation may seem economically 
negligible, one should remember that investors transact on marginal accounts, and the ratio of 
own funds to the position size at the transaction opening may be as high as 1:100. According to 
 
63 I need to remind that these figures are gross-of-fees. Traders pay commission of approximately 0.003% for each 
leg of a trade (depending on the generated volume). Hence round-trip commission is 0.006%. The same commission 
is applied against Live and Contest trades. 
64 I repeated the same calculations using average returns instead of median returns on an individual trader level. 
The resulting descriptive statistics of paired differences (Live – Contest) is similar to my median analysis. On 
average, Live accounts performance per every transaction is 0.011% higher than on Contest accounts. The 
difference is statistically significant at 95% confidence interval (Ha: Live ret > Contest ret) under t-test (t-stat = 
1.77; p-value = 0.039), Wilcoxon test (stat = 82395; p-value = 0.000). 
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the broker’s data, the mean leverage is approximately 33x65. In other words, to appraise the 
impact of 0.022% per transaction on a person’s equity (amount of own funds), this figure must 
be multiplied by 33 to obtain 0.73%. It should also be recalled that an average trader during the 
life of the account makes 877 trades in Live and 448 in Contest.  
 
6.2.3. Possible explanations of the difference in behaviour 
and performance in Live and Contest 
 
I observe substantial deviation in the second, third and fourth moments of Live and Contest 
performance distributions. It can be inferred that traders in the data set modify their appetite for 
risk when switching from paper money to real money. They become more cautious with 
personal risk policy as there exists an almost twofold drop in standard deviation around average 
trader return. Additionally, the concentration of results around the mean rises dramatically as 
evidenced by an eightfold upsurge in kurtosis. In effect, it can be conjectured that traders align 
their behaviour when the emotional charge of financial decisions escalates, which results in 
increased homogeneity of performance. For a better understanding of the structure of this 
phenomenon, I employ kernel density function to graphically display the dynamics of Live and 













65 Practically, this signifies that an average trading position is maintained with only small fraction of own funds 
(3%). 
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Figure 6.2. Distributions of Live and Contest trading performance of all traders in the data set 
using Kernel Density Function. 
 
Note: The graphs are created using R kdensity function. MEDIAN_RET_L denotes median return for Live. 
MEDIAN_RET_C means median return for Contest.  
 
Figure 6.2. provides a clear visual description of distributional statistics. A significantly smaller 
number of traders allow either too high or too low returns when trading on Live, as the cross-
group median profitability shrinks to a more consistent figure around zero for Live. One can 
also visually detect negative skewness on both account types, while it is more pronounced with 
Live trading.  
 
6.2.4. Individual trader (Micro) level analysis 
 
As outlined in the prior research on behavioural patterns, findings on the macro level can only 
roughly reflect the state of affairs on the micro level – the level of individual investors. For 
example, although the general tendency towards overstaying losing positions and closing 
winning position too early is a very well documented bias, Dhar and Zhu (2006) discovered that 
around 20% of traders are not exposed to disposition effect or even exhibit opposite bias. 
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Considering that, I undertake to explore the difference in Live/Contest trading performance on 
the per-person level with a purpose to extract more information from the data set. To accomplish 
this goal, I compute within-subject paired difference in mean per-trade returns for each trader. 
Next, I run two one-sided statistical tests with different alternative hypotheses formulated in 
Table 6.3: 
 
Table 6.3. Statistical tests formulation on the within-subject difference between Live and 
Contest average returns.  












I place each trader in one of the three groups depending on tests results. Group 1 includes traders 
for whom Test 1 H0 can be rejected with p-value = 0.05%. Likewise, individuals are added to 
Group 3 when we can reject Test 2 H0 with p-value = 0.05%. All other traders are comprised in 
Group 2. I use both parametric (Welch’s t-test) and non-parametric (Randomisation and 
Wilcoxon) tests to obtain more robust results. The findings are presented below: 
 
Table 6.4. Proportion of traders with statistically significant within-trader difference between 
Live and Contest per-trade performance. 
 
Test name Group 1 (Live < 
Contest) Test 1 Ha 
Group 2 (Live = 
Contest) Test 1&2 H0 
Group 3 (Live > 
Contest) Test 2 Ha 
T-test 10% 56% 34% 
Randomisation 12% 49% 39% 
Wilcoxon 18% 49% 33% 
    
Note: The table groups all the traders from the data set in one of three columns subject to the difference between 
their Live and Contest accounts performance. Column 1 combines all the traders who manage to significantly 
outperform on Contest account. Column 3 includes all the traders who outperformed on Live account. Column 2 
comprises all other traders who did not get into either Column 1 or Column 3.  
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It can be noticed that there is no homogeneity in the figures above. Just as other behavioural 
traits and biases reviewed, emotional impact does not affect traders in the same way or by a 
similar magnitude. Approximately half of all subjects have not exhibited statistically meaningful 
distinction in performance. Nevertheless, one can also detect the roots of positive bias for Live 
accounts observed in aggregate data analysis. The bias hides behind the fact that 1/3 of traders 
do better in the more emotional Live setting. Simultaneously, around 10% of investors find it 
more comfortable and productive to deal with paper risk on the Contest account.  
 
Grounded on the analysis above, I conclude that Live and Contest modes reflect disparate 
behavioural trading patterns and results. This disparity is statistically and economically 
significant, which allows rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that traders do not take 
similar financial decisions in the two investigated settings.  
 
6.2.5. Robustness analysis 
 
To validate the findings, I perform several robustness tests.  
 
The data set is subject to certain industry-specific factors and limitations that possibly may 
influence and obscure current findings. Primarily, the data set is severely exposed to only one 
currency pair – EUR/USD. This is a completely normal situation for an online brokerage, but it 
may be the case that the results are too sensitive to only single currency pair. Secondly, the 
subjects vary a lot in terms of their trading activity. For the general analysis, I used a cut-off 
point of minimum 10 trades on each account type. Thirdly, it may be argued that the difference 
between Live and Contest environments may stem from the learning effect. That is, traders first 
open Contest accounts and train in the riskless venue, and only then switch to Live accounts 
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where they can obtain better outcome thanks to the improved skill. To test how all these factors 
influence the findings, I run a series of non-parametric robustness tests using specifications and 
methodology as in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4, and 95% confidence interval. Findings are displayed 
in Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7. 
 
Table 6.5. Proportion of traders with statistically significant within-trader difference between 
Live and Contest per-trade performance for all financial instruments except EUR/USD, and for 




Group 1 (Live < 
Contest) Test 1 Ha 
Group 2 (Live = 
Contest) Test 1&2 H0 
Group 3 (Live > 
Contest) Test 2 Ha 
Non EUR/USD 
currencies 




16% 48% 36% 
Note: The table groups all the traders from the data set in one of three columns subject to the difference between 
their Live and Contest accounts performance. Column 1 combines all the traders who manage to significantly 
outperform on Contest account. Column 3 includes all the traders who outperformed on Live account. Column 2 
comprises all other traders who did not get into either Column 1 or Column 3.  
 
The results do not change significantly: there are still 3 times more people in Group 3 than in 
Group 1. I may conclude that EUR/USD currency pair does not have a complementary influence 
on performance differential, so is the selection of intraday trades only. 
 
Table 6.6. Proportion of traders with statistically significant within-trader difference between 




Group 1 (Live < 
Contest) Test 1 Ha 
Group 2 (Live = 
Contest) Test 1&2 H0 
Group 3 (Live > 
Contest) Test 2 Ha 
Number of 
trades >= 10 
12% 49% 39% 
Number of 
trades >= 25 
12% 48% 40% 
Number of 
trades >= 50 
12% 46% 42% 
P a g e  | 232 
 
Number of 
trades >= 75 
13% 45% 42% 
Number of 
trades >= 100 
 
14% 44% 42% 
Note: The table groups all the traders from the data set in one of three columns subject to the difference between 
their Live and Contest accounts performance. Column 1 combines all the traders who manage to significantly 
outperform on Contest account. Column 3 includes all the traders who outperformed on Live account. Column 2 
comprises all other traders who did not get into either Column 1 or Column 3.  
 
I determine that the minimum number of trades selection criteria is not meaningful for the 
findings. Moreover, Table 6.6 demonstrates that my general discoveries are consistent across 
traders because as the minimum trades requirement is augmented, the number of investors who 
fit into it gradually declines: For 10 trades – 525 traders, 25 trades – 440 traders, 50 trades – 365 
traders, 75 trades – 310 traders, 100 trades – 273 traders. 
 
Table 6.7. Proportion of traders with statistically significant within-trader difference between 
Live and Contest per-trade performance considering the learning effect (time distribution of 




Group 1 (Live < 
Contest) Test 1 Ha 
Group 2 (Live = Contest) 
Test 1&2 H0 
Group 3 (Live > 
Contest) Test 2 Ha 
All trades 
 
12% 49% 39% 
70% of contest 
trading is before 
the first trade 
on live acc. 
8% 57% 35% 
70% of contest 
trading is 
between the 
first and the last 
live trades 
13% 45% 42% 
70% of contest 
trading is after 
the last trade on 
live acc. 
 
9% 50% 41% 
Note: The table groups all the traders from the data set in one of three columns subject to the difference between 
their Live and Contest accounts performance. Column 1 combines all the traders who manage to significantly 
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outperform on Contest account. Column 3 includes all the traders who outperformed on Live account. Column 2 
comprises all other traders who did not get into either Column 1 or Column 3.  
 
The figure of 70% has been selected arbitrarily to represent a time frame during which traders 
can learn how to improve their Live performance based on obtained Contest account training66. 
If learning effect did take place, I would expect that traders with 70% of trades on Contest 
occurring before Live activity should have displayed better Live performance than people from 
other two buckets (simultaneous Live/Contest activity, and 70% of Contest transactions 
occurring after the first Live transaction). However, we can observe a similar outcome for all 
the 3 buckets of traders.  
 
6.3. Summary and discussion of Research Question 1 
results 
 
Traditional financial theory and non-consequentialist models make distinct predictions 
regarding the expected profitability of an individual investor under various conditions. The key 
factor in charge of the discrepancy in theoretical frameworks is the degree of emotional intensity 
relating to the decision making. In the traditional financial perspective, feelings cannot interfere 
with the behaviour and outcomes of judgements, no matter how forceful the emotions are at the 
time of a decision. In the dual-process model perspective, stronger feelings pertaining to a 
decision will cause a larger deviation from outcomes expected under a consequentialist view. In 
other words, if we take a similar set of decisions that vary only in terms of emotional intensity 
and compare respective performance, we should be able to check, which of the models has better 
descriptive capacity.    
 
66 I have also rerun the tests with 60% and 80% time proportions, and got the same result.  
P a g e  | 234 
 
In the analysis above, I compare the performance of traders in two different investment 
environments available in my data set: Contest (paper trading) and Live (real money trading). 
Both settings are identical in terms of investment characteristics, such as trading platform and 
infrastructure, commissions’ structure, the scope of financial instruments, etc. The examination 
is conducted on two levels: macro – aggregated performance of all investors in the data set, and 
micro – individual trader level.  
 
I start with identifying that individual traders exhibit dissimilar behavioural patterns in Live and 
Contest for an array of significant trading variables. For example, Live trading is featured by 
more active involvement in the process with shorter trade duration, more market orders, a higher 
number of trades and generally more trades completed intraday. Next, I find statistically 
significant divergence in trading results for two account types, whereby more ‘emotional’ Live 
accounts outpace less ‘emotional’ Contest performance by 0.022% per the average trade, and 
that on the micro level third part of traders do better when trading with real money and risk 
against only 10% of subjects who do the opposite. This difference is very substantial if we 
consider that most of the trades are conducted using high margins. My findings are in line with 
the non-consequentialist theoretical perspective, which reflects the strand of literature 
supporting the vital role of feelings and their attributes (such as intensity) in financial decision 
making, behaviour and performance.  
 
An essential contribution of my work is the discovery of ‘Live-over-Contest’ outperformance. 
This is direct evidence of the positive role of emotions in financial decision making – an issue 
that is still very much debated in the literature. The meaning of this finding must be carefully 
interpreted in light of the big debate around this topic in the academic literature. The academic 
work that explores the direction of the impact of emotions on decision-making so far has 
produced the results that were highly dependent on the angle of view on the subject. Therefore, 
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to comment on the nature of my result, I first have to define the category of emotions that my 
research can be attributed to.  
Primarily, I must make a distinction between expected and immediate emotions. Expected 
emotions, which are part of the rational decision-making framework, by construct, have a 
positive influence on decisions. Individuals try to forecast their feelings (e.g. regret) derived 
from the outcomes of decisions. Subsequently, they optimise their behaviour by maximising 
positive emotions and minimising negative emotions.  
Immediate emotions are different because the expected consequences of the decisions do not 
determine immediate emotions. Instead, the factors surrounding the decision itself are of critical 
importance. These factors (vividness of the decision's outcome is the most powerful of them – 
I discuss it in details in Section 2.5.1) are quite different from the parameters of the 
consequentialist analysis (used in the expected emotions framework), which are formed by 
beliefs and possible outcomes. As I demonstrated in the empirical analysis, my results (for 
example, the discrepancy between Live and Contest trading) are hardly explainable by the 
rational perspective, which is instrumental for the expected emotions. Yet, they fit well the non-
consequentialist view. Thus, my focus in further discussion is fully concentrated on the category 
of immediate emotions.   
Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) summarise two main types of immediate emotions – 
anticipatory (integral) influences and incidental influences.  
Integral influences are directly connected to decision outcomes. Thinking about possible 
outcomes brings about the palette of immediate (on-line) visceral responses. Depending on the 
valence of the expected outcomes, these responses can be positively or negatively charged. For 
example, choosing the parameters of an investment order before placing it – timing or stop-loss 
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level – can generate thrill from the possible gain. At the same time, potential adverse outcomes 
can beget fear. On top of that, the intensity of anticipatory emotions is correlated with the 
'hedonic significance' of the decision results. The decision to open the door to let your cat in 
will generate zero feelings, while the beloved one not seen for half a year will make the keys 
tremble in hand.   
Incidental influences are unrelated to decision outcomes. Such effects can have dispositional 
nature, for example, an individual fearful of interpersonal contacts deciding to take a particular 
route to work without realising the reason. It can also have situational nature when a good sleep 
at night, followed by a good mood, leads to the decision to buy a lottery ticket on the way to 
work.         
Incidental emotions have been in the focus of scientists for a long time and generally were 
considered as a type of biases that do not allow humans taking rational decisions. The idea that 
emotions are deteriorating performance goes back deep in history. For centuries, it was believed 
that to succeed in various aspects of life, emotions must be contained. This attitude has received 
support in the modern academic research focusing primarily on incidental emotions and 
emotions playing the role of biases that distract attention and distort beliefs and valuations. 
Many academic studies that took this angle of view found the negative role of emotions on 
performance (These studies are almost exclusively designed as experiments where the authors 
directed their subjects into a specific mood and measured the consequences of their decisions. 
This approach may work well with the assessment of judgement quality over short periods but 
is less practical when the goal is to evaluate the role of emotions on some long-lasting sequence 
of decisions, for example, investment decisions made on daily, monthly or less regular basis.   
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Loewenstein et al. (2001) Risk-as-feelings theory that had a big influence on my work, 
accommodates both incidental and integral emotions in their model (see Figure 3 on page 270 
of the original paper, and Figure 2.2. on page 38 of the current thesis) by recognising that 
background moods can play their role on the decisions in multiple ways just as vividness and 
other inherently integral factors. This consideration is later elaborated in Loewenstein and 
Lerner (2003).  
In the current empirical study, the subjects make hundreds of decisions that are reflected in their 
realised trading orders. Of course, it can be suggested that there is a certain degree of incidental 
emotions behind every decision. For example, some of the subjects might have a bad day at 
work, and when they come back home and sit in front of the trading platform that can leave a 
trace on their trading behaviour and performance. Or, on the contrary, they might have learnt 
some excellent news right before placing orders, which also might affect trading performance. 
Besides, individual traders may have various dispositional incidental influences. At the same 
time, it would also be fair to admit that considering so many decisions per subject and variable 
timing of these decisions, positively painted and negatively painted incidental emotions should 
net out. Following this rationale, I can come to the conclusion that the positive difference in the 
return between Live and Contest accounts is mostly credited to anticipatory emotions. It means 
that subjects get emotionally charged when they think about the outcomes of their investment 
decisions during the decision-making process. Live accounts produce more substantial 
emotional charge than Contest accounts. Thus, the outperformance of Live accounts can be 
interpreted as evidence of anticipatory emotions' positive effect on performance.  
So far, empirical findings, which for the most part were obtained through indirect 
methodologies, did not provide any unambiguous conclusion regarding this matter. At the 
industry level, my result can also be considered as surprising. There is a long-established belief 
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around negative connotation of emotions in trading, where they are labelled as bad, destructing 
or disastrous. It is hardly possible to find a popular trading book that would not claim that all 
problems traders have, ensue because they cannot suppress immediate emotions. Nevertheless, 
my analysis of a group of day traders provides an input that may be a step to reconsider the 
impact of emotions on traders, at least in the limited ‘more emotional/less emotional 
environment’ framework.   
 
6.4. Research Question 2 
 
Both consequentialist and non-consequentialist frameworks of decision-making agree that 
outcomes, in this case, changes in performance, are preceded and mediated by risk behaviour. 
Intuitively, if I managed to find so substantial difference in the profitability of Live and Contest 
trading, the roots of this effect may originate in variations of the approach to risk.  
This assumption is corroborated by the outcomes of the theoretical model that I construct in 
Section 2.10. Grounded on the theoretical studies of Barberis and Xiong (2009), Vlcek and Hens 
(2011) and Jakusch et al. (2019), I introduce several types of investors. Each of the stylised 
investors manifests diverse parameters of Prospect Theory-based preferences. For example, 
Investor A in my model exhibits the parameters from the original Prospect Theory model, which 
I presume to be the benchmark for the emotionless decision-making framework design. Further, 
I bring in Investor C, whose parameters of decision processing are matching the real-life 
financial markets environment from the paper of Jakusch et al. (2019). The discrepancy in the 
parameters between the two types of investors is striking pointing to a much stronger curvature 
of the value function of Investor C. The authors do not provide a direct explanation concerning 
the reasons behind such a difference in the parameters. However, the difference can be well 
P a g e  | 239 
 
explained by the dual-process theories of decision-making, for instance, ‘Risk-as-feelings’ 
hypothesis by Loewenstein et al. (2001). This prominent theory postulates that an equivalent 
decision contemplated under risk or uncertainty in the settings with varying degree of emotional 
intensity will be processed differently. The dissimilarity in the treatment will be primarily 
derived from the modified parameters of the value function and decision-weighting function. 
The theoretical model that I create demonstrates that the modification of parameters from 
Investor A to Investor B (this investor has the parameters that reflect the average between 
Investors A and C) to Investor C lead to substantial changes in behaviour.        
As discussed in the literature review, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) established the 
multifaceted nature of risk. In their perspective, there are three risk factors that shape behaviour: 
the form of the value function, the form of the probability (decision) weighting function, and 
loss aversion. Prospect Theory, just as other consequentialist models, maintains that risk 
behaviour is a product of cognitive, algebraic-type processing and integration of beliefs and 
expected outcomes. A growing body of literature assumes that cognition is only part of the story, 
while emotional processing provides at least equally important contribution. My goal is to 
investigate the impact of feelings on the three risk factors using my unique data set and 
determine which of the models can better describe the empirical risk behaviour of investors. I 
formulate my second research question in the following way:    
 
 
What is the effect of emotions on different facets of financial risk exhibited in trading 
behaviour?  
 
Further, in order to thoroughly examine this main question, I will subdivide it into two more 
specific questions: 
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RQ2-1: What is the effect of emotions on the curvature of the value function delineating risk 
averse/risk seeking behaviour? 
RQ2-2: What is the effect of emotions on loss aversion and the probability weighting function? 
 
6.5. Research Question 2-1. Hypothesis development 
 
Earlier reported Figure 2.3. in the literature review section reflects two theoretical views on the 
form of the value function. In Prospect Theory, a convex form of the function in the losses 
domain and concave form in the gains domain are explained by the three key factors: a short-
term perspective of a decision-maker, reference point, and psychophysical account of prospects 
valuation. According to the theory, an individual elicits the psychological value from the 
continuous function of scope (e.g. size of monetary gain or loss) of a stimulus. Consequently, 
increasing scope (i.e. increasing gain or loss) should produce larger psychological value (and 
utility) both in gains and losses domains, though at decreasing pace. In addition, Prospect 
Theory suggests that psychological value derived from a stimulus is independent of the qualities 
and attributes of the stimulus itself. In other words, the value of a ticket to the concert of our 
favourite musician is just the market price of the ticket. This approach was dubbed ‘valuation 
by calculation’ (Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004)).  
Essentially, the proceeds of my theoretical model in Section 2.10, Table 2.3, indicate that the 
parameters used in the original Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1992)) cannot explain 
the behavioural phenomena that were observed empirically in the academic literature. For 
instance, applying these parameters does not expose the disposition effect. In contrast, the result 
is reversed. Nevertheless, when I apply the parameters from the real market study, which are 
naturally more affect-rich, the disposition effect is observable and statistically significant. 
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Furthermore, I discover that the parameters representing affect-rich environment produce a 
visible effect on the form of the value function, i.e. the degree of risk-aversion in gains zone and 
risk-seeking behaviour in the domain of losses. I use these findings as the prediction of my 
empirical study.   
Applying the value function analysis under the original Prospect Theory to my Live and Contest 
modes, I will test several outcomes. First, the concave part of the value function implies that 
when traders experience a gain, they should turn risk-averse and afford less risk. Practically, it 
means that they will close their open positions quicker than if they were risk-neutral or risk-
seeking67, and afford less realised volatility throughout the pool of their trades. In contrast, in 
the losses domain, traders should demonstrate risk-seeking behaviour, affording higher risk, 
stimulating longer holding periods of positions and higher realised volatility. Second, as a 
logical consequence of keeping winning trades shorter than losing positions, I will try to detect 
the disposition effect in my dataset. Third, because the original Prospect Theory does not admit 
the interference of emotions into behaviour, I should not be able to find any significant 
discrepancy in risk-taking practices between Live and Contest. To evaluate these hypotheses, I 
plan to introduce and examine several variables. I will proxy risk with negative semi-deviation 
(for losses domain) and positive semi-deviation (for gains domain). Also, I will compute the 
disposition effect as described in my methodology section. Consequently, null hypotheses take 











67 Technically speaking, if a trader is risk averse she should close a gaining position when the utility of the 
achieved certain gain is larger than the utility of expected future outcomes.   
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𝐻0
𝐷𝐸: 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡, 
where  𝑉𝑎𝑟−
𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒  is negative semi-deviation in Live environment,  𝑉𝑎𝑟+
𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒  is positive semi-
deviation in Live environment, 𝑉𝑎𝑟−
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 is negative semi-deviation in Contest environment, 
𝑉𝑎𝑟+
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡  is positive-semi-deviation in Contest environment, 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒  is Live environment 
Disposition effect, 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 is Contest environment Disposition effect. 
 
An alternative, or rather complementary, set of thinking to the original Prospect Theory is called 
‘valuation by feelings’ ((Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004)) – Investor C in my theoretical model 
in Section 2.10. This model delineates environments by the strength of affective infusion, 
whereby in affect-poor states people behave closer to the parameters described in the original 
Prospect Theory – Investor B in the theoretical model, while under stronger emotions, positive 
or negative, individuals have a propensity towards a more binary-like structure of judgement, 
i.e. everything/nothing, or gains/losses. In other words, the degree of risk aversion and risk-
seeking may get more extreme than suggested by the original Prospect Theory, and most of the 
psychological value is to be derived from the mere appearance of stimuli themselves, tending to 
ignore the pertaining degree of scope. Practically, it means that traders will try to close gaining 
positions very quickly because they will derive most of the utility from very small profits and 
fear the risk of losing what is still unrealised. This behaviour will lead to the declining volatility 
of realised profitable trades. In the same vein, in the losses area, I should expect to detect longer 
time horizon for holding losing positions. Traders placed into the affect-rich setting will elicit 
most of the negative value from unrealised losses very quickly. Hence, they will be much less 
sensitive to the continuing or growing loss as all their mental concentration and ‘prays’ will be 
devoted to getting back to the break-even point. Accordingly, I should witness an extension of 
losing positions holding period, and escalation of variation in realised losses. The resulting 
alternative hypotheses will take the following form: 





𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 (expecting that 𝑉𝑎𝑟−





𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 (expecting that 𝑉𝑎𝑟+
𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒 is smaller than 𝑉𝑎𝑟+
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) 
𝐻𝑎
𝐷𝐸: 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒 ≠ 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 
 
6.6. Research Question 2-1. Empirical Analysis 
 
6.6.1. Analysis of Disposition effect 
 
I start my investigation from the analysis of Disposition effect (DE). The results of DE 
computation are reported in Table 6.8.: 
 
Table 6.8. Disposition effect in Live and Contest settings.  







Live 472.77 minutes 311.95 minutes 160.82 minutes  
Contest 545.05 minutes 509.46 minutes 35.59 minutes  
Difference (Δ) -72.28 minutes -197.51 minutes 125.23 minutes 1.4* (0.084) 
Note: The first column presents the median duration in minutes of closed trading positions that resulted in a loss 
for Live and Contest accounts. The second column displays the median duration for gaining closed trades. The 
third column reflects the difference between Column 1 and Column 2, which is the disposition effect according to 
my methodology. *** Means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% 
level 
 
There are several conclusions that can be made based on the table above. First, I manage to 
show that when switching from Contest to Live setting, Disposition effect increases by more 
than 2 hours (125 minutes). This is a substantial change, considering that 2 hours is 65% of the 
median duration of a trade for an average investor in Live environment. This difference is 
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statistically significant at the 10% level68. Second, median durations in Live setting are shorter 
for negative and positive outcomes of trades. However, the effect is much stronger for gains. 
Third, I spot the presence of DE in both environments, even though in Contest it makes only 
7% of the median duration of a trade for an average investor. Finally, to double-check my 
results, I also apply Wilcoxon paired test to compare distributions of 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒 and 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡, and 
find that they are different with 1% p-value. The graphical analysis is provided in Figure 6.3.  
Figure 6.3. The difference between 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒 and 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 distributions using Wilcoxon test and 
Welch’s t-test. 
 
Note: The figure displays the distribution of differences in Disposition effect between Live and Contest settings 
for each investor, and uses Wilcoxon paired test and Welch’s t-test for the analysis of significance. The difference 
in DE is measured in hours. Hence, for an average investor, the difference equals 2.09 hours.  
 
My results for the Disposition effect support the alternative hypothesis. I find the evidence of 
DE change under the impact of underlying emotional factors when a trader switches from less 
 
68  Prior research of Disposition effect has revealed that the bias tends to disappear at short trading frequencies 
(Kumar and Lim (2008)). Sometimes, it is explained in the vein of positive learning curve as more frequent 
realization of trades helps correcting DE. Moreover, higher frequency lessens the attachment to the traded asset or 
opened position. For example, Daniel Kahneman advises to behave like short-term traders in the sense that they 
can duly handle DE. From this point of view, this is all the more surprising evidencing the presence of Disposition 
effect in my high frequency data set.   
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emotional trading mode to more emotional trading mode. The change takes place even within 
the frameworks of high-frequency intraday trading.   
The findings in this Section also fully support the results of my theoretical model in Section 
2.10. The traders in my empirical dataset exhibited the same behavioural phenomena as the 
stylised Investors B and C in the proceeds of the model. This is an indication that the parameters 
of the original Prospect Theory cannot explain the empirically observed behaviour of investors 
acting in the real financial marketplace. 
 
6.6.2. Analysis of value function and risk-taking behaviour 
 
I continue my study with the examination of risk patterns. I disentangle the total risk of traders 
into two semi-deviations as in Formula 3.1 and Formula 3.2. As suggested by my hypotheses, I 
intend to compare semi-deviations in gains and losses domain for Live and Contest. Under risk-
as-feelings model and the predictions of the theoretical model in Section 2.10, I should expect 
to find that traders get more risk-averse in the zone of gains, and more risk-seeking in the zone 
of losses. In other words, positive semi-deviation in Live should be smaller than in Contest while 
the opposite should hold for negative semi-deviation. Table 6.9 reports average and median 
values for risk parameters for Live and Contest settings: 
Table 6.9. Average and Median values for Total risk, Positive semi-deviation and Negative 
semi-deviation in Live and Contest environments. 
 Live environment Contest environment 








Total risk 0.419% 0.286% 0.438% 0.409% 
Positive semi-deviation 0.318% 0.216% 0.414% 0.384% 
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Negative semi-deviation 0.592% 0.340% 0.472% 0.445% 
Note: The first and second columns display the average and median values of risk factors for Live setting. The third 
and fourth columns show respective values for Contest setting. Positive and negative semi-deviations are computed 
using Formulas 2.4 and 2.5.   
 
It is noticeable at first glance that for both settings, all risk parameters are skewed to the right, 
however, if for Contest this bias is very small, in Live environment, there are more traders with 
considerable exposure to risk on both sides of risk spectrum (i.e. positive and negative). In 
addition, the average difference between total realised risk in the two settings is negligible, while 
median values vary significantly. Based on medians, when traders are in Live context, they turn 
sizeably more risk-averse as risk-as-feelings perspective suggests. Yet, the result for losses 
domain cannot be readily defined because average and median values are contradictory. Another 
conclusion that follows from the table above is the fact that positive semi-deviation is smaller 
than negative semi-deviation across the environments and calculation methods. This is what 
should be expected from an S-shaped value function, which is in line with Prospect Theory and 
non-consequentialist models. However, it is observable that in Live setting, the difference 
between semi-deviations is sharper. This is an additional indication of possible emotional impact 
under more affect-rich environment, which is predicted by my alternative hypotheses.  
Comparing the results in Table 6.9 with the proceeds of the theoretical model in Table 2.3, I can 
conclude about their accordance in almost all aspects. For example, in both instances, I find that 
the average total risk measure is statistically indistinguishable, which is the consequence of 
counterbalancing changes in the dispersion of returns in gains and losses. At the same time, as 
I noted above, in the real investors’ data, the Live results are skewed. It is the indication of 
heterogeneous risk-taking practice by the subjects. I do not model heterogeneity in my 
theoretical framework; yet, this is a perspective topic for future research. Risk measures in 
positive and negative domains also match in the theoretical model and the empirical setting. 
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Positive semi-deviation is significantly higher for Contest (Investor B in my model) than for 
Live (Investor C in the model). In the case of negative semi-deviation, the effect is reversed. 
This fact reflects the upwards shift in risk aversion from affect-poor to affect-rich environment 
in the zone of gains and the opposite upshot in the area of losses.     
To investigate the changes in risk aversion/risk-seeking in more details, I conduct the graphical 
study of semi-deviation distributions of individual investors. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 below use 
kernel density function to depict the distributions of positive and negative semi-deviations in 
Live and Contest settings, where each observation is the designated volatility of a single trader. 
To confirm my alternative hypotheses, I should identify the visible disparity in the distributions 
as negative semi-deviation should be shifted to the right side from positive semi-deviation. What 
is more, this effect should be more intense in Live mode.  
Figure 6.4. Distribution of realised semi-deviations in Contest settings using Kernel Density 
Function. 
 
P a g e  | 248 
 
Note: STDEV_PLUS_C denotes positive semi-deviation in Contest setting. STDEV_MINUS_C denotes negative 
semi-deviation in Contest setting. 
 
Figure 6.5. Distribution of realised risk measured by standard semi-deviation in Live settings 
using Kernel Density Function. 
 
Note: STDEV_PLUS_L denotes positive semi-deviation in Live setting. STDEV_MINUS_L denotes negative 
semi-deviation in Live setting. 
 
From the graphs above, I find that in both settings semi-deviations seem to evolve as described 
in the theoretical framework outlined in Section 2.10, whereby positive semi-deviation is 
smaller than negative, which again highlights the presence of S-shaped value function in Live 
and Contest. Also, visually it appears that the difference in the deviations in the two domains is 
more pronounced in Live compared to the Contest environment. To corroborate the results of 
Table 6.9. and graphical observations, I run two series of statistical tests. In the beginning, I 
compare semi-deviations inside the same setting (within-environment test). If positive semi-
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deviation is smaller than negative semi-deviation traders’ value function is S-shaped along with 
Prospect Theory.  I use Wilcoxon signed-rank statistics to test the null hypothesis of positive 
and negative semi-deviations equality. The results of the tests are presented in Section A of 
Table 6.10. Finally, I compare negative-to-negative and positive-to-positive semi-deviations 
across Live and Contest (cross-environment testing) to check the expectation of more extreme 
risk aversion and risk-seeking behaviour based on the greater curvature of the value function in 
Live trading as compared to Contest activity. As predicted by the alternative hypotheses, 
positive semi-deviation in Live should be smaller than in Contest, while the opposite picture 
should be observed in case of the negative semi-deviation. The results are provided in Section 
B of Table 6.10. 
Table 6.10. Results of comparison of positive and negative semi-deviations using Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test. 
Section A. Within-environment analysis of semi-deviations 
Setting Value of statistic P-value 
Live 27381 0.0000 
Contest 49334 0.0000 
Section B. Cross-environment analysis of semi-deviations 
Domain Value of statistic P-value 
Positive 32511 0.0000 
Negative 64390 0.2300 
Note: The tables show the results of Wilcoxon test. Section A provides the statistics for the within-setting analysis 
of semi-deviations, where positive and negative semi-deviations are compared for Live and Contest environments 
independently. Section B displays the statistics for comparison of positive (negative) semi-deviation in Live and 
positive (negative) semi-deviation in Contest.  
 
Based on Table 6.10. Section A results, I can state that negative and positive distributions of 
semi-deviations are different both in Live and Contest environments with the 1% p-value. 
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However, in Live, the discrepancy of distributions is larger according to statistic values. This 
outcome reinforces my graphical analysis and the output for Disposition effect in Live and 
Contest, implying that the value function in the Live setting is more S-shaped than in Contest. 
Yet, the cross-environment analysis of risk that I present in section B of Table 6.10. provides a 
clear indication that sharper divergence between positive and negative semi-deviations in Live, 
is due to the changes in gains valuations (positive semi-deviations) rather than losses valuations 
(negative semi-deviations).  
Overall, my results suggest that participants turned substantially more risk-averse for gains 
trades when changing from Contest to Live trading, in line with the predictions of the alternate 
hypothesis. At the same time, their risk behaviour did not change (statistically significantly) in 
the losses domain when they switched from Contest to Live. Even though, according to my 
alternative hypothesis, the subjects should have become more risk-seeking. As a result, I can 
reject only two null hypotheses out of three.  
As a concluding remark, the findings and the statistical tests that I obtain in this section match 
well with the conclusions and predictions of the theoretical model outlined in Section 2.10. All 
of the relations between the volatility in gains and losses domains for Live and Contest 
correspond to the observed predictions for Investor B and Investor C in the model.  
 
6.6.3. Robustness analysis using the individual trader-level 
data 
 
To get a better understanding of risk behaviour and verify my conclusions, I shift down from 
the aggregate level of risk analysis to the scale of an individual trader as I did with returns in 
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the Research Question 1. First, I break up individual traders’ total risk into positive and negative 






















𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 is the proportion of negative semi-deviation in Live to negative semi-
deviation in Contest. 
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Figure 6.6. The ratio of positive and negative semi-deviations in Live and Contest settings. 
 
Note: Negative semi-deviation ratio demonstrates the individual trader’s multiple of negative semi-deviation In 
Live account to negative semi-deviation in Contest account. Positive semi-deviation ratio is the respective multiple 
for positive semi-deviations.  
 
For 72% of investors, positive semi-deviation in Live is smaller than in Contest, and this is in 
line with my findings: traders tend to cut their gains faster in a more emotional environment. 
However, a similar figure for negative semi-deviation conflicts with the concept of risk-seeking 
behaviour in a more emotional Live environment. 57% of traders actually prefer to take more 
realised risk in the Contest setting. This result shows that individuals are more risk-averse on 
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both sides of the risk spectrum in Live setting, nevertheless, they turn comparatively more 
aversive to positive deviations in return than to negative.    
Further, I conduct the statistical tests of within-subject risk behaviour by applying the 
methodology that I used in performance analysis. I formulate and implement two statistical tests 
to explore within-subject paired differences in variance of per-trade returns just as I did with 
performance (see Tables 6.3 and 6.4).    
 
Table 6.11. Statistical tests formulation on the within-subject difference between Live and 
Contest realised variance.  












Once again, I use a 95% confidence interval and apply the same methodology to place all 
subjects into 3 groups as with profitability difference. I employ F-test to carry out the analysis.  
 
 
Table 6.12. Proportion of traders with statistically significant within-trader difference between 
Live and Contest per-trade variance. 
Test name Group 1 (Live < 
Contest) Test 1 Ha 
Group 2 (Live = 
Contest) Test 1&2 
H0 
Group 3 (Live > 
Contest) Test 2 Ha 
F-Test 80% 9% 11% 
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The data illustrates that 80% of all traders react to the hike in emotional intensity by significantly 
curbing bearable volatility of their returns, i.e. turning more risk-averse. Only one in 10 
investors exhibit altered behaviour.  
The evidence collected from the analysis above guides to believe that in addition to the changes 
in behaviour dictated by the shifts in the curvature of the value function, there are other 
psychological forces or factors that impact traders’ revealed actions when placed into the 
environments of varying emotional intensity. These factors are especially influential in the 
domain of losses.  I assume that these factors could be loss aversion and the changes in 
probability (decision) weighting function.  
 
6.7. Research Question 2-2. Hypotheses development 
 
6.7.1. Hypotheses development for loss aversion 
 
The theoretical model constructed in Section 2.10 does not provide much information about 
such elements of risk behaviour as loss aversion and the form of the decision-weighting 
function. The evidence that I obtain from the model as regards loss aversion is that this bias has 
no much impact on the variables that I try to assess. Investor D modelled as Investor C with a 
much stronger loss aversion coefficient, does not exhibit a significantly distinct patterns of 
behaviour except stronger risk aversion in the losses domain. My empirical dataset provides for 
the indirect analysis of loss aversion in Contest and Live. The possible findings may give a 
clearer direction regarding the enhancement of the theoretical model and future empirical 
research. 
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I construct my hypotheses based on earlier figures 2.4 and 2.5, which reflect the theoretical view 
of the non-consequentialist model on the expression of loss aversion and decision weighting 
function. In both figures, I designate affect-poor stimulus processing to represent the shape of 
functions for the Contest account of my data set, while affect-rich stimulus processing denotes 
the trading on Live account. As in the case with the value function, if emotions have no impact 
on behaviour, as argued by consequentialist theories, there should be no statistically significant 
difference between Live and Contest. I will use this baseline scenario as the null hypotheses. 
Such a baseline scenario also corresponds to my theoretical model results. In contrast, 
alternative hypotheses will imply the statistically significant difference following ‘Risk-as-
Feelings’ perspective or another related model.     
To explore the role of feelings in the preference for loss aversion and the shape of the weighting 
function, I will employ the data on conditional close orders – stop-loss and take-profit – that 
have been successfully executed and changed the position’s status from open to closed. 
Conditional orders may serve as a valuable tool to measure loss aversion because by placing 
them traders deliberately and unequivocally demonstrate their future expectations of traded 
instrument’s price development and their attitude towards potential risk.   
I approach the study of loss aversion in Live and Contest settings firstly determining the 
presence of the bias in my data. I develop the analysis framework and hypotheses based on two 
categories of data: the returns of conditional orders and the share of each type of conditional 
orders. For the null hypothesis, I assume that the main driving force behind the profitability and 
number of conditional orders is the form of the value function. In the domain of gains people 
face concave function, which propels risk-averse behaviour, i.e. individuals strive to secure the 
positive result sooner rather than later. This is the same theoretical implication that produces 
disposition effect, which I explored in the first part of Research Question 2. Yet, with respect to 
P a g e  | 256 
 
conditional orders, it means that people should be inclined to place take-profit orders closer to 
the market price and have them executed swiftly. With losses, it is different, as people tend to 
put them off to some distant time. Stop-loss orders should be realised less frequently based on 
this logic because they will be placed further from the market price. Therefore, I should expect 
to find two things: first, that the absolute return of stop-loss orders is higher than the absolute 
return of take-profit orders; and second, that the number of realised conditional stop-loss orders 




𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝑎𝑏𝑠_𝑟(𝑆𝐿) ≥ 𝑟𝑇𝑃 
𝐻0
𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝑛_𝑡𝑟𝑆𝐿 ≤ 𝑛_𝑡𝑟𝑇𝑃 
 
where abs_r(SL) means absolute return of stop-loss orders, rTP means the return of take-profit 
orders, n_trSL means number of realised stop-loss transactions, and n_trTP means number of 
realised take-profit transactions. 
 
The alternative situation will take place if loss aversion is a relatively more influential factor 
impacting traders’ preferences regarding the number of conditional orders. In this case, traders 
are supposed to demonstrate the lower absolute return of stop-loss orders than take-profit orders’ 
return, and opt for proportionally more stop-loss orders than take-profit orders because losses 
generate more anxiety than changes in unrealised gains. The prevention or limitation of negative 
price developments becomes a more important psychological necessity. Again, I extend the 
same approach to Live and Contest environments: 
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𝐻a
𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝑎𝑏𝑠_𝑟(𝑆𝐿) < 𝑟𝑇𝑃 
𝐻0
𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝑛_𝑡𝑟𝑆𝐿 > 𝑛_𝑡𝑟𝑇𝑃 
where abs_r(SL) means absolute return of stop-loss orders, rTP means the return of take-profit 
orders, n_trSL means number of realised stop-loss transactions, and n_trTP means number of 
realised take-profit transactions. 
 
After that, I compare loss aversion in both environments. As put forth by the consequentialist 
perspective, the null hypothesis reflects the view that feelings have no impact on this risk factor, 
hence loss aversion in Live should not exceed the one in Contest environment. In contrast, my 
alternative hypothesis supports the standpoint of the part of literature exposing the higher degree 
of loss aversion in more emotional settings (see Figure 6.4). 
 
𝐻0: 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒 ≤ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 
𝐻𝑎: 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒 > 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 
 
6.7.2. Hypotheses development for probability weighting 
function 
 
The family of theoretical models that I discuss in Section 2.10.1 attempt to test and confirm the 
predictions of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1992)). Specifically, they focus on the 
elicitation and analysis of the disposition effect, which is recognised as one of the natural 
products of Prospect Theory (Barberis and Xiong (2009)). However, the disposition effect has 
mainly to do with the value function’s parameters – the extent of risk-aversion, risk-seeking, 
and loss aversion. Probability weighting function, even though exploited as in the original 
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Prospect Theory model, largely remains out of the analytical framework. It is not surprising 
because the non-linear characteristics of the decision weighting function are most vividly 
manifested for extreme probabilities, i.e. around certainty (100%) and impossibility (0%). The 
two-step theoretical models (e.g. Barberis and Xiong (2009), Vlcek and Hens (2011)) that 
examine the consequences of small variations in a risky asset around the reference price cannot 
detect the effect of the decision weighting function properly. Thus, the main tools for the study 
of the decision weighting function are the parameters elicitation techniques offered by 
Abdellaoui and his co-authors (e.g. Abdellaoui (2000), Abdellaoui et al. (2005)), Gonzalez and 
Wu (1999) and others. Consequently, in my investigation of the impact of emotions under risk 
and uncertainty on the decision weighting function, I will rely not on my theoretical model in 
Section 2.10 but on the literature that I explore in Section 2.6.3.  
To examine how emotions under risk and uncertainty impact the probability weighting function, 
I focus on the between-setting segment of the conditional orders-related behaviour. I implement 
this by evaluating and comparing distributions of stop-loss and take-profit conditional orders’ 
returns for Live and Contest settings.  
 
The literature generally refers to four possible reactions of the probability weighting function to 
affective stimuli: no reaction (cognitive consequential theories like the Prospect Theory); more 
emphasised inverse S-shaped functional form (curvature-related changes, e.g. Rottenstreich and 
Hsee (2001)); more optimism or savouring (elevation-related changes, e.g. Abdellaoui et al. 
(2005)); more pessimism or dread (elevation-related changes, e.g. Abdellaoui et al. (2005)). In 
my analysis, I concentrate on ‘more savouring’ and ‘more dread’ reactions and hypothesise how 
it should translate into stop-loss and take profit orders’ returns in Live and Contest. 
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My assumption is that if the reaction to the more affect-rich stimulus is more optimism with 
respect to probabilities evaluation, a trader will tend to place take profit orders further away 
from the current price, and further away from the level preferred in the affect-poor environment. 
Having the price hit this higher level in a more emotional (Live) environment, a higher return 
on take-profit orders in Live setting should be expected. Analogically, in the losses domain, 
more optimistic reaction to a more intensive emotion will motivate a trader to place stop-losses 
order further away from the current price and from the level in the less affective setting. This 
will cause underperformance of stop-loss orders’ return in the Live environment. In line with 
the assumptions of more optimistic reaction, my null hypotheses are: 
 
𝐻0
𝑆𝐿: 𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒 < 𝑆𝐿𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 
𝐻0
𝑇𝑃: 𝑇𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒 ≥ 𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 
where SL stands for stop-loss conditional orders return, and TP stands for take-profit conditional 
orders return.  
 
If the elevation of the probability function is affected by the dread sensations (that is, function 
in Live is above the function in Contest for losses domain, and reversed for gains domain), I 
assume that both, take-profit orders and stop-loss orders will be placed closer to the current price 
in the Live environment resulting in a higher return of stop-loss orders and lower return of take-
profit orders. My alternative hypotheses follow the more pessimistic reaction perspective:     
 
𝐻a
𝑆𝐿: 𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒 ≥ 𝑆𝐿𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 
𝐻a
𝑇𝑃: 𝑇𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒 < 𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 
where SL stands for stop-loss conditional orders return, and TP stands for take-profit conditional 
orders return.  
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6.8. Research Question 2-2. Empirical analysis 
 
6.8.1. Analysis of loss aversion based on profitability of 
conditional orders 
 
Starting from the examination of returns of conditional orders, I expect that if investors attach 
more value to losses than to gains, i.e. they are loss averse, it should be exhibited in the distance 
from the prevailing market price to the conditional order’s execution price. Specifically, traders 
are assumed to place stop-loss orders closer to the actual market price of traded instruments than 
take-profit orders. In this case, it must translate into smaller (absolute, ignoring the sign) returns 
for stop-loss orders compared to take-profit orders. This rationale should equally hold for Live 
and Contest settings.     
 
Table 6.13. summarises conditional returns in Live and Contest: 
 
Table 6.13. Average per-transaction return by the type of conditional order generated by traders 
in Live and Contest settings. 
Setting/Order type Stop-loss Take-profit Difference (p-value) 
Live 0.18%-׀ ׀    0.25% -0.07%*** (- 0.002) 
Contest 0.30%- ׀ ׀    0.49% -0.19%*** (0.000) 
  Note: Column two displays the returns of stop-loss conditional orders. Stop-loss orders’ goal is to limit the amount 
of losses, hence the negative sign. In my analysis, I am interested in the absolute return, ignoring the sign that is 
why I take the stop-loss return by the modulus. To analyse the difference in returns I use Welch’s t-test. *** Means 
significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level 
 
The average per-transaction loss generated by stop-loss orders in Live and Contest is 
respectively 0.18% and 0.30%. It means that an average stop-loss order that is finally hit by the 
price and gets realised results in such substantial loss for an investor. On the take-profit order 
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side the returns are 0.25% per average realised take-profit trade in Live, and 0.49% in Contest. 
My results show that the absolute performance figure for stop-loss orders is smaller than its 
take-profit vis-à-vis for both instances – Live and Contest. Both differences are statistically 
significant with 1% p-value. This corresponds to my alternative hypotheses, implying the 
presence of loss aversion in the traders’ behaviour. Traders tend to place stop-loss orders closer 
to current market values of open positions than take-profit orders, which would be a natural 
behaviour if traders were subject to loss aversion. That is, they would value the disutility of a 
unit of loss higher than the utility of the unit of gain. Also, if computed as average returns, the 
loss aversion for Contest accounts is more pronounced that for Live. For Live setting, the 
difference between the conditional order types is only 0.07% or 39% when calculated as Take-
profit-to-Stop-loss ratio. For Contest, the respective figures are 0.19% and 63%. This outcome 
complies with my null hypothesis about the role of emotions in loss aversion.    
 
6.8.2. Robustness analysis of loss aversion using the 
individual-trader data 
 
To investigate these aspects in more details, I turn to the level of an individual trader and 
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Figure 6.7. Ratio of average stop-loss return to average take-profit return in Live and Contest 
modes. 
 
Note: Contest conditional close return ratio represents the multiple of individual trader’s Contest account average 
stop-loss return to take profit return. Live conditional close return ratio is the same representation for Live account.   
 
The outcome demonstrates high heterogeneity among traders. Nevertheless, 63% of traders in 
Live and 69% in Contest manifest inclination towards loss aversion. Once again, loss aversion 
pattern measured as the ratio at the individual level is at minimum equally large in Contest 
setting as it is in Live. This fact may be a testimony of how innate loss aversion behavioural 
pattern is. Again, this result yields the support for the null hypothesis regarding the impact of 
feelings on loss aversive behaviour. The analysis of the profitability of conditional orders cannot 
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provide the evidence of more pronounced reaction of loss aversion to the rise in emotional 
intensity.  
 
6.8.3. Analysis of loss aversion based on the quantity of 
conditional orders 
 
Next, I turn to the quantity of conditional orders realised by traders. In the data set, I have more 
than 103,000 realised Live conditional orders (22.5% of 458,000 total Live orders) and more 
than 100,000 realised Contest conditional orders (43.1% of 234,000 total Contest orders) spread 
across all the subjects. My analysis is summarised in Table 6.14. The findings confirm the 
alternative hypothesis for both settings, as the number of stop-loss orders exceeds the quantity 
of take-profit orders by approximately two times. The effect is surprisingly homogeneous in 
Live and Contest, repeating a similar phenomenon of similarity from the return analysis 
measured as the ratio (Figure 6.7).  
 
Table 6.14. Proportion of stop-loss and take-profit orders in Live and Contest settings averaged 
across the pool of traders.  
 Stop-loss orders 
(%of all positions) 
Take-Profit orders 
(%of all positions) 
p-value for 
difference 
Live 66.1% 33.9% 0.000 
Contest 69.5% 30.5% 0.000 
Note: The second column presents the share of stop-loss orders in all conditional orders. The third column presents 
the share of take-profit orders in all conditional orders. To compute the statistical significance of the difference 
between two types of conditional orders, I employ Welch’s t-test analysis. 
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Just as in my prior examination, I complement the aggregate results with the individual level 
study. Table 6.15 below provides the breakdown of two ratio intervals, where each ratio 
represents the composition of Stop-loss/Take-profit number of executed orders per each trader: 
 
Table 6.15. Stop-loss/Take-profit executed orders ratio per each trader aggregated by setting 
and ratio magnitude. 
Setting/Ratio Interval <1 >1 
Live 27.32% 72.67% 
Contest 15.82% 84.18% 
Note: For each individual trader I compute the ratio of stop-loss-to-take-profit orders. The ratio shows the 
preference of one conditional order type over another. The first column indicates the share of investors preferring 
take-profit orders to stop-loss orders. The second column shows the share of investors preferring stop-loss orders 
over take-profit orders. 
Most traders clearly prefer stop-loss orders to take-profit orders. These findings support my 
alternative hypotheses, meaning that loss aversion is present in my high frequency trading data. 
Yet, when comparing two trading modes, Live and Contest, for the manifestation of loss 
aversion, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis on the role of emotions in this behavioural 
bias. My subjects are equally loss averse in both environments. This conclusion follows from 
both approaches that I applied: returns of conditional orders, and preferences for the specific 
type of conditional orders. 
 
6.8.4. Analysis of probability weighting function 
 
To conduct the testing of the hypotheses concerning the probability weighting function outlined 
in section 6.7.2., I compute the difference between stop-loss order per-trade returns in Live and 
Contest for each trader in the data set. As can be seen in Figure 6.8, the mean divergence is 
substantial: for an average transaction closed by the stop-loss order, Live outperforms Contest 
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setting by 0.1%. We need to recall here that an average transaction return differential, which I 
calculate in Table 6.2., and which includes all types of orders, is only 0.022%, that is 4.5 times 
smaller. The stop-loss returns mean differential is also highly statistically significant as 
corroborated by the t-test (t-stat = 7.16; p-value = 0.000). I also conduct Wilcoxon test to 
compare the whole distributions, and find that distributions are also statistically dissimilar (W 
= 86918; p-value = 0.000).  
 
Figure 6.8. The distribution of per-trader disparity between stop-loss returns in Live and Contest 
per average transaction.  
 
Next, I repeat the same approach with take-profit orders return as exhibited in Figure 6.9. Here 
the discrepancy between Live and Contest is even more striking. On average, every Live 
transaction of an average trader involving take-profit conditional order underperformed Contest 
by 0.21% (t-stat = -10.5; p-value = 0.000). Distributions of the per-trader difference between 
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Figure 6.9 The distribution of per-trader disparity between take-profit returns in Live and 
Contest per average transaction.  
 
 
The findings in Figures 6.8 and 6.9 support my alternative hypotheses, which bolster the 
pessimistic account in the impact of emotions on probability weighting. In a more affect-rich 
environment, traders tend to place conditional orders of both types much closer to the current 
price. This type of behaviour is exactly what should be expected if the decision weighting 
function is shifted downwards for gains and upwards for losses. In this case, a decision-maker 
would underestimate (beyond curvature) objective probabilities for gains, and overestimate 
objective probabilities for losses by making more conservative bets on future price change on 
both sides of the return spectrum.        
 
Further, I notice that the difference in mean returns between Live and Contest settings for both 
order types is approximately twofold (if we ignore the sign). That is, 0.1% per average trade for 
stop-loss orders, and 0.2% per average trade for take-profit orders. I assume that this is the 
evidence of the fact that in the losses domain traders are confronted with a harsh psychological 
dilemma as their trading turns more emotional (i.e., when they switch from Contest to Live 
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modes). On the one hand, they experience an ardent desire to keep the losing position until 
reaching the break-even point, which propels an intense risk-seeking behaviour. On the other 
hand, a more pessimistic perception of probabilities creates the dread perspective of the 
consequences of keeping the losing position, which in turn produces risk aversive behaviour. I 
can imagine that this inner conflict of two counteracting forces is dealt with by investors very 
heterogeneously depending on personal psychological profiles. Indirect evidence of this 
assumption can be found in Figure 6.5. As it can be observed, risk-taking in gains domain is far 
more consistent than in losses domain, and the right tail of the returns distribution in losses 
domain is much fatter indicating less homogeneity. However, this interesting finding should be 
investigated more thoroughly in a separate study.     
 
6.9. Summary and discussion of Research Question 2 
results  
 
The main goal of the analysis conducted in the Research Question 2 was to investigate if the 
difference in trading performance in Live and Contest environments could be explained by risk-
taking praxis of investors under concern. Following this purpose, I examined the variance of 
returns of individual traders to verify if the form of the utility function corresponds to the 
consequentialist models and the predictions of my theoretical model outlined in Section 2.10. If 
that was the case, the deviation of return in the gains (concave) domain would be higher than 
the deviation of returns in the losses (convex) section of the function. That was exactly the case. 
Moreover, as the main outcome, I also evidenced that the degree of distinction between positive 
and negative semi-deviations of returns is more pronounced in Live than in Contest mode. I 
believe that this serves as a substantiation of the role that feelings play in risky behaviour, and 
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how they shape the value function of a decision-maker. Mediated by the vividness of real losses, 
traders become increasingly sensitive to any minor deviations from the status quo (zero return), 
which, eventually leads to a higher level of risk aversion in Live environment. I complemented 
my investigation with the analysis of disposition effect, a well-studied behavioural bias. It is 
known that high trading frequency is an offsetting factor for the bias. Yet, I managed to reveal 
it in both settings, though insignificant at 95% confidence interval. Importantly, the difference 
between Live and Contest metrics of disposition effect was still significant at 10% level. One 
of my findings challenged the predictions of ‘risk-as-feelings’ hypothesis. I discovered that in 
Live and Contest investors were aligned, at least statistically, in terms of the degree of risk-
seeking behaviour in the losses domain. However, the non-consequentialist perspective suggests 
higher risk-seeking in a more affect-rich environment.  I hypothesised that this might be the 
impact of two other facets of risk, loss aversion and probability weighting function.  
 
Loss aversion is another well-studied phenomenon, which implies greater psychological weight 
and more value derived from losses than from gains of equal magnitude in mixed gambles. To 
evaluate this bias, I employed returns and quantity of conditional orders used by traders. The 
presence of loss aversion would be manifested if investors put stop-loss orders closer to the 
market price than take-profit orders. It would mean that for the same amount of money (same 
magnitude) they are afraid of losses more than they passion for gains. Essentially, it means that 
the absolute returns of stop-loss orders should be smaller than the returns of take-profit orders. 
Computing the returns statistics, I figured out that in Live and Contest settings investors do 
place stop-loss conditional orders closer to the spot price than take-profit orders, as stop-loss 
orders are featured by smaller absolute returns, just as expected. Next, I compared the preference 
towards both types of conditional orders by calculating the number of executed orders given to 
the broker. I hypothesised that more explicit fear of losses should make investors focus too much 
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on stop-loss orders, and as a result, stop-loss orders should outnumber take-profit orders.  My 
analysis demonstrated that stop-loss orders turned out to be two times more frequently selected, 
again pointing to the presence of loss aversion among my subjects. Finally, I compared my loss 
aversion indicators for Live and Contest to verify the hypothesis that loss aversion is impacted 
by the growth in emotional intensity, and that loss aversion in Live should be more prominent 
than in Contest. This perspective found support in prior literature. Surprisingly, I found that the 
results for loss aversion were coherent and indistinguishable for both trading environments. 
With my data set I failed to confirm the hypothesis that emotional intensity has an impact on 
loss aversion. It meant that loss aversion bias could not explain the difference in risk behaviour 
that I discovered in the value function analysis.  
 
I also used the statistics on conditional orders to gauge how affect influences the decision 
weighting function. For that, I compared the returns of same type conditional orders in the two 
trading modes. The literature on the probability weighting function discusses two fashions in 
which the function can evolve in response to affective stimuli: change in curvature (e.g. 
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001)) and a shift (e.g. Abdellaoui et al. (2005)). My special focus was 
on the latter. The theory implies that the shift of the weighting function can occur as a result of 
pessimism (dread) factor influence or optimism (savouring) factor influence. I managed to 
explicitly validate an upward shift in the losses section and the downward shift in the gains 
section of the probability function, which denote more pessimism or dread in the evaluation of 
probabilities for both sides of the spectrum. Consequently, I believe that the similar degree of 
risk-seeking behaviour in the losses domain in Live and Contest that I discovered may be caused 
by the two counteracting psychological forces. The interplay of these two forces fits well into 
the theoretical framework of the role of affect in risky behaviour, set forth by recent literature 
(e.g. Loewenstein et al. (2001), Slovic et al. (2002), Kahneman (2003), Pfister and Bohm (2008), 
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Mukherjee (2010) among others):  on one side, an average trader experiencing a loss on his open 
position has a strong disposition towards not closing it until the loss is recovered (i.e. sharp 
convexity of the value function expressed in explicit risk-seeking); on the other side, the ‘more 
dread’ psychological account from escalating loss brings in a more pessimistic stance in the 
valuation of probabilities, which leads to the desire to cut the loss quickly. In a more affect-rich 
environment, the two counteracting forces pick up, and their resolution might depend on 
investor’s personality qualities and traits, for example, degree of neuroticism or other 
personality attributes.  
 
6.10. Research Question 3 
 
In the previous two research questions, I have identified a meaningful difference in returns and 
risk behaviour between the two trading environments. In the last step, I will try to investigate 
how my profitability and risk variables interact. As I mentioned before, the theoretical 
framework reflected in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 imply that performance follows from the risk 
behaviour. Therefore, knowing about the implied dependence, it is logical to use multiple 
regression analysis techniques to examine the relation between risk and return, and use 
profitability as the dependent variable. In addition to risk variables, prior research considered 
other categories of variables to explain investment returns. I managed to extract from the data 
set an array of some of these variables that could help explain the difference in performance 
between Live and Contest. I arbitrarily split these variables into three groups: personal, 
behavioural and trading. I formulate my third research questions in the following way: 
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How do risk, personal, behavioural, and trading variables explain the difference between Live 
and Contest settings returns?  
 
All the variables that I use in this research question can be inspected in Table 6.16. Section A 
includes the variables that describe the investment characteristics of the subjects. For example, 
it covers investors’ trading activity, use of different types of orders, profitability and volatility 
of performance. To compare how live and contest trading were distributed in time, the following 
additional characteristics were computed: portions of the contest trades that were made before 
the first, after the last or between the first and the last trades on live account. These variables 
are observable in Section B. In addition, I obtained person-specific data set on each trader 
containing the age, gender, marital status, domicile, occupation, and the origin of investment. 
These variables are available in Section C. Most traders in the sample were unmarried (77%) 
men (93%) living in developed countries (83%) and aged between 26 and 48 (80%). 
Additionally, 83% of analysed traders worked in non-financial field and 57% use their earnings 
as an investment for trading. Largely, these attributes match the ones in the big dataset that 
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Table 6.16. Descriptive statistics of traders’ data set. 
Section A. Descriptive statistics for the set of major trading variables for Live and Contest accounts 
across the pool of investors 
  
LIVE ACCOUNTS CONTEST ACCOUNTS 
Variable name AVG MEDIAN MIN MAX AVG MEDIAN MIN MAX 
BALANCE 2834 920 40 234323 107154 101613 0 321310 
INTRADAY 78% 83% 6% 100% 65% 67% 0% 100% 
TRADES 877 350 10 16426 448 202 10 8689 
INSTRUMENT 14.6 12.0 1.0 52.0 18.3 17.0 1.0 49.0 
ORDERS 23% 19% 0% 84% 43% 40% 0% 100% 
STRATEGY 4.81% 0% 0% 100% 0.06% 0% 0% 14% 
TURNOVER 52 14 0.06 1504 2801 1318 3 40820 
DURATION 248 62 0.01 10008 469 270 2 13558 
MO 87% 96% 1% 100% 69% 81% 0% 100% 
CO 13% 4% 0% 99% 31% 19% 0% 100% 
MC 68% 71% 0% 100% 46% 45% 0% 100% 
SLC 23% 18% 0% 99% 38% 38% 0% 100% 
TPC 10% 5% 0% 84% 16% 13% 0% 71% 
STDEV 0.4195% 0.2856% 0.0020% 8.5054% 0.4376% 0.4086% 0.0615% 1.7695% 
STDEV_PLUS 0.3185% 0.2164% 0.0016% 4.2694% 0.4139% 0.3840% 0.0000% 1.4505% 
STDEV_MINUS 0.5923% 0.3405% 0.0000% 20.7084% 0.4719% 0.4451% 0.0683% 2.3586% 
RETURNS -0.02% -0.01% -1.68% 1.05% -0.03% -0.02% -0.99% 0.29% 
DEffect -10784 103 -2104132 660794 -1283 523 -1328432 262176 
         
Section B. The set of behavioural and personal variables descriptive statistics 
 
Variable name AVG MEDIAN MIN MAX     
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BEFORE 30% 12% 0% 100% 
    
COINCIDE 54% 60% 0% 100% 
    
AFTER 16% 0% 0% 100% 
    
CONT_LIVEp 5519 6911 -781921 280624 
    
CONT_LIVEm -3981 6016 -2073711 1390491 
    
AGE 36.5 35 21 71 
    
         
Section C. The set of personal variables descriptive statistics 
 








      
MARRIED 122 23% 




      
FEMALE 38 7% 
      
         
Note:  All the variables are calculated per an investor (or an account). The decoding and meaning of variables: Section A: BALANCE (USD) – average daily balance of the 
account (computed as 0.5*(ending daily balance - initial daily balance)); INTRADAY(%) – share of trades completed within a trading day; TRADES (N) – total number of 
transactions made on the account; INSTRUMENT (N) – number of trading instruments used by investors; ORDERS (%) – share of conditional orders as part of all orders placed; 
STRATEGY (%) – share of automated trades as part of all trades completed; TURNOVER (mln USD) – aggregated turnover on the account; DURATION (min) – median 
duration of an average trade on the account; MO (%) – share of trades initiated with a market order; CO (%) – share of trades initiated with a conditional order; MC (%) – share 
of trades closed with a market order; SLC (%) – share of trades closed with a stop-loss order; TPC (%) – share of trades closed with a take-profit order; STDEV (%) – standard 
deviation of the trading positions return (return calculated as return/position_volume); STDEV_PLUS (%) – standard deviation of positive positions return; STDEV_MINUS (%) 
– standard deviation of negative positions return; RETURNS (%) – average return on an account (calculated as return/position_volume); DEffect (sec) – disposition effect 
computed as difference between median durations of winning and losing positions. Section B: BEFORE (%) - the portion of the subject’s trades on contest account, which were 
made before the subject’s first trade on live account; COINCIDE (%) - the portion of the contest’s trades, which were made between the first and the last trade on live account; 
AFTER (%) - the portion of the contest’s trades, which were made after the last subject’s trade on live account; CONT_LIVEp (sec) - difference between median durations of 
winning positions on contest and live accounts; CONT_LIVEm (sec) -  difference between median durations of losing positions on contest and live accounts; AGE – investor’s 
age. Section C: DOM_DEVELOPED – investors with the domicile in developed countries; INVEST_EARNINGS – investors specifying earnings (regular income) as the source 
of their investment capital; MARRIED – investors who chose their family status as married; OCCUPATION_FINANCE – investors specifying that they work in financial 
industry; FEMALE – investors specifying their gender as female.  
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6.11. Research Question 3. Hypotheses development 
 
 The full list of variables that I plan to use in my analysis is presented below with explanations. 
As far as I know, the existing literature does not provide straightforward evidence of the impact 
of these variables on the possible difference between two diverse emotional contexts, especially 
in the financial domain. Therefore, it is hard to make qualified literature-based predictions of 
the possible impact on the dependent variable, which is the difference in return between Live 





1. Risk variables: 
a. Positive standard semi-deviation in Contest – calculated according to Formula 
3.2. Shows the second parameter of the distribution of positive returns in the 
Contest setting.  
b. Negative standard semi-deviation in Contest - calculated according to 
Formula 3.1. Shows the second parameter of the distribution of negative returns 
in the Contest setting.  
c. Positive standard semi-deviation in Live - calculated according to Formula 3.2. 
Shows the second parameter of the distribution of positive returns in the Live 
setting.  
d. Negative standard semi-deviation in Live – calculated according to Formula 
3.1. Shows the second parameter of the distribution of negative returns in the 
Live setting.  
Expected sign: One of the cornerstones of financial theory is the relation between risk and 
performance. At the same time, according to ‘Risk-as-Feelings’ theory, risk behaviour is directly 
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connected to emotional states. Consequently, when comparing affect-poor environment 
(Contest) with affect-rich environment (Live) the shift in risk behaviour, gauged by the change 
in risk variables, should not only demonstrate high impact on performance variables but also 
explain a great deal of the difference in performance. Another important consideration is the 
fact that traditional finance believes in direct relation between risk and return. Therefore, for 
Live risk variables I expect a positive impact on the differential between Live and Contest 
performance, while for Contest risk variables it should be negative.   
2. Personal variables69: 
Age – minimum age to participate in the financial market is 18. The maximum 
age is not limited.  
Gender – there is an overwhelming dominance of males in our data set. Only 
3.5% of all traders (18 people) who had two types of accounts were females70.    
Country of domicile – I split the traders into two categories: living in developed 
and developing countries71.  
Marital status – I split the traders into two categories: married and non-
married72.  
Professional occupation – I split the traders into two categories: working in 
finance and taking non-financial positions.  
 
69 From all the personal variables we use in the study, only Age, Gender and Country of Domicile are obligatory 
verified by the brokerage house (through passport data and proof of address). Marital status and Professional 
occupation are self-reported and not validated. Source of income is verified on selective basis.  
70 According to the brokerage house that provided the data set, the very tiny representation of women is traditional 
for this industry. It is well-known from the research in various domains, financial and non-financial, that women 
are much less aggressive and risk-loving than men. Considering the very high degree of risk in marginal day-
trading, the small portion of women in this market should come as a little surprise. Effectively, this tiny share of 
female day-traders is by itself a reliable proof of the difference in the level of risk appetite between the genders.  
71 The selection of developed countries was based on the OECD member state list.  
72 The non-married traders are detailed in the data set as divorced, single and widowed. 
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Source of Income – I divide traders into two categories: earnings and other 
sources73.  
Expected sign: Personal variables that I analyse are related to experience with financial 
decisions. From this viewpoint, more experience should be associated with less difference 
between Live and Contest return, as more experienced individuals are believed to better control 
their emotions. Hence, higher age and professional occupation in finance should be negatively 
related to the dependent variable. Other variables are less tightly connected to the experience. I 
hypothesise that investors from developed countries should be more trained in financial 
decisions all else being equal because they more frequently come across such decisions and 
financial education information in their daily routine. Also, financial market participation ratio 
is much higher in the developed countries. The same should regard males from ‘gender’ 
variable, married from ‘marital status’ variable, and investors with earnings as the main source 
of income.  
3. Behavioural variables: 
Learning effect – the variable compares the trading time frames in Live and 
Contest and reflects the proportion of overlapping and non-overlapping trading. 
There are three sub-variables included: 1) Time proportion when Live trading 
occurred before Contest trading; 2) Time proportion when Live trading 
overlapped with Contest trading; 3) Time proportion when Live trading occurred 
after Contest trading.        
Disposition effect – there are two sub-variables included in the analysis: 1) 
disposition effect in Live, and 2) disposition effect in Contest. Disposition effect 
 
73 The other defined sources of income category include Heritage and Savings. 
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was computed as the difference between median durations of winning and losing 
positions (in minutes).  
Expected sign: Learning effect is associated with experience obtained in one of the settings 
before the other, or simultaneously in both. My expectation is that if an investor had a 
preliminary training in one of the settings, the results on the other should improve. Therefore, 
trading in Contest before or simultaneously with Live should be negatively related to the 
difference in Live and Contest performance. The literature on disposition effect clearly 
highlights its negative role for performance.  
4. Trading variables74: 
Account balance – the average daily balance of Live and Contest accounts. 
Intraday trades – the difference between the portion of intraday trades on Live 
and Contest accounts. 
Number of trades – the difference between the number of transactions made by 
a trader in Live and Contest.  
Number of instruments – the difference between the number of trading 
instruments used by a trader during investment period in Live and Contest. 
Conditional orders – the difference between the portion of conditional orders 
in Live and Contest trading. I used ten sub-variables that described five various 
types of conditional orders: 1) Market open – portion of trades opened with a 
market order; 2) Market close – portion of trades closed with a market order; 3) 
Conditional open – portion of traders opened with a conditional order; 4) Stop-
 
74 All trading variables are duplicated for Live and Contest accounts. 
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loss close – portion of trades closed with a stop-loss order; 5) Take-profit close 
– portion of trades closed with a take-profit order.  
Strategy – the difference between the portion of automated trades initiated by 
the trading algorithm employed by a trader in Live and Contest. 
Turnover – the difference between the aggregated turnover on Live and Contest 
accounts 
Duration – the difference between the median duration of trades on Live and 
Contest accounts.  
Expected sign: Except for the size of the account balance, all other variables are constructed as 
the difference between the value in Live and Contest settings. Account balance in Live 
environment is associated with the trading success and wealth of investors. As is known from 
the literature, wealthier investors are generally more skilful in terms of financial decisions. 
Therefore, it is expected to have positive relation with the dependent variable. In Contest, 
investors are provided with the paper capital, hence this variable is only about the trading skill 
but not wealth. Still, I expect this variable to be negatively correlated with the dependent 
variable.  Hence, disposition effect in Live should have negative correlation with the dependent 
variable, and disposition effect in Contest should have positive correlation with the dependent 
variable. Intraday trades, Number of trades, Conditional orders, Number of instruments, 
Strategy, Duration, and Turnover represent the group of variables attributed to trading activity. 
My suggestion is that higher difference between Live and Contest in trading activity is an 
indication of larger susceptibility of individual traders to emotional reaction. As I discovered in 
Research Question 1, profitability in more emotional Live environment exceeds Contest, that is 
why my expectation for these variables is a positive impact on the dependent variable.   
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6.12. Research Question 3. Empirical analysis 
 
I run two regression models. The first model does not include variation parameters, while they 
are included in the second model. I take this step in order to explore my hypothesis about the 
impact of risk variables on the difference between Live and Contest returns.  
 
Table 6.16. The impact of personal, behavioural and trading variables on the difference between 
Live and Contest returns 
Variable name Model 1 Model 2 
(Intercept) 1414 (0.000)*** 853 (0.001)*** 
AGE (Years) -6.39 (0.814) -2.75 (0.472) 
ACCOUNT_BALANCE_LIVE ($) 0.039 (0.000)*** 0.0343 (0.000)*** 
ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CONTEST ($) -0.0096 (0.000)*** -0.0082 (0.000)*** 
INTRADAY_TRADES (%) 885.2 (0.034)** 317.8 (0.272) 
NUMBER_OF_TRADES (N) 0.0049 (0.873) -0.0192 (0.407) 
NUMBER_OF_INSTRUMENTS (N) 11.70 (0.017)** 8.44 (0.028)** 
CONDITIONAL_ORDERS (%) 205.1 (0.810) 145.9 (0.850) 
STRATEGY (%) -207.1 (0.263) -470.2 (0.052)* 
TURNOVER ($) -0.0055 (0.646) 0.00238 (0.772) 
DURATION (min) 0.0661 (0.712) -0.138 (0.332) 
MARKET_OPEN (%) -43 (0.905) -41 (0.359) 
MARKET_CLOSE (%) 67.7 (0.889) -465.9 (0.749) 
STOP_LOSS_CLOSE (%) -723.9 (0.038)** -1643.1 (0.000)*** 
LEARNING_BEFORE (%) -121.7 (0.379) -44.8 (0.726) 
LEARNING_COINCIDE (%) -313.3 (0.041)** -185 (0.074)* 
DISPOSITION_CONTEST (min) -25.67 (0.000)*** -11.48 (0.019)** 
DISPOSITION_LIVE (min) 4.36 (0.268) 0.18 (0.912) 
DEVELOPED (binary) 595.2 (0.184) -19.9 (0.960) 
SOURCE_EARNINGS (binary) -249.2 (0.018)** -103.6 (0.145) 
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STATUS_MARRIED (binary) -137.60 (0.263) -120.5 (0.223) 
OCCUPATION_FINANCE (binary) 129.9 (0.492) 100.7 (0.799) 









STDEV_PLUS_LIVE (return/position volume) 
 
0.1261 (0.000)*** 
STDEV_MINUS_LIVE (return/position volume) 
 
-0.0729 (0.000)*** 
   
Adjusted R^2 0.3212 0.6694 
F-statistic 11.74 40.150 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
df 522 522 
Note: The dependent variable is the difference between the performance in Live and Contest accounts. Variables 
are calculated per $1 mln position size. *** Means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * 
means significant at 10% level. Disposition effect (in Live and Contest) variables are measured in hours. Huber-
White consistent p-values are provided in the parenthesis.  Age is measured in years; Account balance in Live and 
Contest, and Turnover are measured in monetary (USD) value; Intraday trades, Conditional orders, Strategy, 
Market open, Market close, Stop-loss close, Learning variables are measured as percentage differential between 
Live and Contest; Number of trades and Number of instruments are measured as absolute difference between Live 
and Contest; Duration and Disposition effect are measured in minutes; Personal variables except age are denoted 
as binary variables. Risk variables (standard deviations) are measured as absolute return weighted by position size.  
 
The magnitude of the variables is calculated per the trading position size of USD 1 million. The 
minimum trader’s capital that is required to open and keep the position of that size is 100 times 
smaller, i.e. USD 10,00075. As was mentioned earlier, according to the information from the 
brokerage house, the average leverage used by the traders is around 33. Consequently, taking 
an intercept for the Model 1, which is USD 1,414 it may be inferred that the turnover of USD 
30,300 of trader’s own funds on average generates the difference of 4.7% (USD 1,414/USD 
30,300) between trader’s Live and Contest accounts that are unexplained by the Model 1 
independent factors.   
 
 
75 The leverage of 1:100 is a standard condition for the retail Forex brokerage industry. 
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The variables in Model 1 explain 32% of the variation in the performance differential between 
Live and Contest settings. According to Model 1, the following variables have an impact on the 
difference between Live and Contest performance: 
 
Table 6.17. The influence of statistically significant variables on the difference between Live 
and Contest accounts’ performance according to Model 1 specification. 
Variable Impact on differential 
between Live and Contest 
Significance 
Account Balance Live Rise *** 
Account Balance Contest Drop *** 
Δ Intraday trades Rise ** 
Number of instruments Rise ** 
Δ Stop-loss orders close Drop ** 
Learning effect (Coincide) Drop ** 
Disposition effect (Contest) Drop *** 
Source of Income 
(Earnings) 
Drop ** 
Note: *** Means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level 
 
The variables of Account balances in Live and Contest behave in line with my prediction. Higher 
balances reflect more successful investors. Every $1,000 in Live account yields an extra $39 of 
the difference between Live and Contest return (per $1,000,000 turnover). For trading activity 
variables, only the difference in Intraday trades and Number of instruments have a significant 
impact on the dependent variable. Yet, the impact is as predicted. For example, each per cent of 
the difference in the Intraday trading between Live and Contest results in $885 outperformance 
of Live account (per $1,000,000 turnover). The regression shows that a higher percentage of 
stop-loss orders in Live has a negative role in Live/Contest performance differential. 
Interestingly, the disposition effect variable is only significant in Contest environment, even 
though it is in line with my expectation. Personal variables are all statistically insignificant, 
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except for the Source of Income, which states that Earnings (as a source of income) play a 
negative role in the dependent variable. It seems that for my subjects regular income, in contrast 
to irregular one, provides for better quality decisions in Contest that in Live.   
 
Adding risk factors to the array of variables from Model 1 significantly improves the 
explanatory power, which grows twofold. Additionally, there are minor changes in the list of 
statistically significant independent variables: 
 
Table 6.18. The influence of statistically significant variables on the difference between Live 
and Contest accounts’ performance according to Model 2 specification. 
Variable Impact on differential 
between Live and 
Contest 
Significance 
Account Balance Live Rise *** 
Account Balance Contest Drop *** 
Δ Strategy Drop * 
Number of instruments Rise ** 
Δ Stop-loss orders close Drop *** 
Learning effect (Coincide) Drop * 
Disposition effect (Contest) Drop ** 
Standard deviation PLUS 
Contest 
Drop *** 
Standard deviation Minus 
Contest 
Rise *** 
Standard deviation PLUS 
Live 
Rise *** 
Standard deviation Minus 
Live 
Drop *** 
Note: *** Means significant at 1% level, ** means significant at 5% level, * means significant at 10% level 
 
I should also note that even though adding risk variables reduces the intercept almost twofold, 
it is still significant in Model 2. I can estimate that for the average trader, even accounting for 
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risk (as I measured it) still leaves the room for approximately 2.8% (of the own capital turnover) 
differential between Live and Contest trading76.  
 
6.13. Summary and discussion of Research Question 
3 results 
 
The main outcome of the regression analysis is that I found direct empirical evidence supporting 
the concepts laid out in the non-consequentialist theories by Loewenstein et al. (2001), Slovic 
et al. (2002), Kahneman (2003) and others on the emotional nature of risky behaviour. As 
implied by these theories, individuals should react to affective stimuli by significantly 
modifying their behavioural risk-taking patterns, which should impact the performance of their 
activity. My results show that risk variables indeed provide for a substantial (both economically 
and statistically) explanation of the variation in performance observed for two differently 
emotionally-charged trading environments.  
I discovered that even after controlling for personal, trading, and other variables, there is a still 
room for significant outperformance of Live over Contest for an average investor. Effectively, 
when calculated based on investor’s own funds turnover, the difference was 2.6% to 4.3% in 
favour of the Live setting. In my view, there is a high chance that the unexplained part of the 
variation could be progressively explicated using more advanced risk measures that I could not 
apply in the current research because I only possessed data on the realised transactions. It may 
be the case that a very large part of variance impacting behaviour remains hidden in the non-
 
76 The value of 2.8% from the own capital of an investor is based on the average leverage multiple taken by 
investors, which is known to equal 33. Considering that I compute the intercept of the Model 2 based on the trading 
turnover of USD 1,000,000, the amount of own capital required by investor to generate such trading turnover equals 
to USD 30,300 ($1,000,000/33). The intercept in Model 2 ($853) divided by the own capital ($30,300) gives 
approximately 2.8%  
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realised component of a trade. Nevertheless, even realised transactions shed light on the 
necessity to develop and involve emotional factors into financial models to better understand 
and forecast the decisions made by individual investors.  
I also found that larger size of Live Account Balance (an indirect indication of wealth), the 
higher share of intraday trades in Live trading, and more instruments used in Live trading, all 
result in better individual Live performance as compared to Contest trading.  
Simultaneously, traders with the larger size of Contest Account Balance, the larger share of 
executed Stop-loss orders, Earnings as a source of investment capital, higher disposition effect 
on Contest account, and concurrent trading period in both settings, are capable of decreasing the 
performance differential in Live and Contest.   
I could not confirm that variables found influential for performance in other studies, such as 
Age, Gender, trading frequency (number of trades) or Turnover influenced the Live-Contest 
performance variation.   
Fenton-O'Creevy et al. (2012) stipulate that emotion regulation may play an essential role in 
tempering emotions' impact on performance. The authors find proof in favour of their hypothesis 
by identifying the positive correlation between traders' experience and heart rate variability 
(HRV). In my research setting, I could not test the assumption directly. Nevertheless, my 
findings that some investors reveal an outperformance of Live accounts over Contest, while 
another group of investors demonstrate the opposite phenomenon, may indicate that there are 
factors that help some investors in emotions regulation. In Research Question 3, I test several 
possible factors for such a role, for example, experience, age, gender. I do not find direct 
evidence that performance differential between Live and Contest is somehow impacted by any 
of these factors. However, emotions regulation can find its way to performance via other factors, 
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such as personality traits, which can influence performance by mediating trading behaviour. It 
is definitely one of the interesting topics for future research.                
 
7. Conclusions and Discussion 
 
7.2. General summary and discussion of the thesis 
 
There is increasing evidence in academic research that traditional approach to decision-making 
under risk and uncertainty fails to explain and predict individual behaviour correctly. In lots of 
real-life scenarios, the observed economic choices deviate from the prescriptions of Expected 
Utility Theory, sometimes even turning upside down. During decades of studies, virtually all 
main principles of neoclassic economic perspective got challenged, which has put under 
question the consistency of the belief in rational economic agents as well as their rational 
expectations. A seminal work by Tversky and Kahneman has offered a psychologically more 
coherent framework of human behaviour that was called Prospect Theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman (1979)). In this model, individuals are not fully rational in the sense of traditional 
theory, rather they are striving their best to reach some level of wealth maximisation and self-
interest under the severe limitation of their imperfect information and cognitive capacity. There 
are important implications that follow from the disagreement between traditional and 
behavioural explanations of economic choice because all key fundamental theories in finance 
are established on the base of the neoclassic assumption of rationality. Hence, the analysis of 
rational behaviour becomes one of the keys to understanding the future development of modern 
finance. Unfortunately, one of the biggest challenges on the way to testing rationality of 
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individuals is the lack of naturally observed empirical data that record human behaviour in an 
unconstructed environment of real-life economic decisions with readily available objective 
results of these decisions. Luckily, after the massive spread of the Internet and IT, the number 
of electronic registers that record human behaviour have largely increased. In the investments 
industry, IT innovation has created a new industry of online retail electronic investment 
platforms, which provide STP brokerage services77. Such companies log in very small details 
every investor’s move as well as a huge amount of metadata that, for example, document when 
and how each of the investment decisions has been taken and how frequently a person has 
accessed the account.  
In Section 2.10, I develop a theoretical framework following the models of Barberis and Xiong 
(2009), Vlcek and Hens (2011), Jakusch et al. (2019). My model pursues several goals. First, I 
analyse the theoretical implications and predictions of Prospect Theory for the relation between 
risk and return, which up to date was not thoroughly covered by the academic research. Second, 
I examine how distinct parameters of the utility function can be associated with different degree 
of affect surrounding the decision-making environment. I introduce three stylised types of 
investors, each featured with diverse coefficients of utility function’s curvature and loss 
aversion. Based on the modelling results, I make a series of predictions that I further integrate 




77 STP brokerage stands for straight-through processing brokerage and denotes the case when upon receipt of 
client’s order, a broker will immediately and automatically pass it over for execution at the marketplace or with 
external liquidity provider in case of OTC transaction.    
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7.2.1. Summary and discussion of the first empirical chapter 
 
In the first empirical chapter, I am using one of such databases from a large online brokerage 
house that contains the trading statistics of 8,000 investors to investigate the following research 
question: Do individual investors change their risk behaviour subject to positive or negative 
trading results? If they do, this would be a direct confirmation of Prospect Theory assumptions. 
If they do not and remain risk-averse independent of performance, this would highlight their 
inherently rational behaviour in line with Expected Utility Theory. To evaluate the form of the 
value function and the degree of rationality, I employ correlation analysis between risk and 
return. The positive correlation between these two variables should point to the concave form 
of the function, meaning that investors bear additional risk in exchange for a positive risk 
premium. In turn, negative linear relation would expose convex value function and the fact that 
investors are ready to consume additional risk and experience negative risk premium. In the case 
of zero correlation coefficient, risk neutrality is to be confirmed. Besides, I assume that the 
strength of linear relation is a good indicator of the persistence of rationality. A relatively more 
positive correlation between risk and return should be reliable evidence of stronger risk 
aversion, hence rationality level. The same can be told about a relatively more negative 
correlation, which would outline a sharper degree of irrationality.     
My results show an unambiguous confirmation of the hypothesis supporting behavioural 
theory’s explanations of choice. Using parametric and non-parametric methods to compute the 
correlation, I find that aggregating investors’ risk and return measures, there exists a statistically 
significant positive correlation between these two variables in the gains domain and significant 
negative correlation in the losses domain, respectively 0.07 and -0.30 using Spearman method. 
The fact that the negative coefficient is noticeably larger than a positive one, may reflect the 
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greater psychological weight of losses for a decision-maker that is predicted by Prospect Theory 
and dubbed ‘loss aversion’ bias. As a result of the bias, the relation between total risk and return 
is negative and equals to -0.23 under Spearman approach.  
Next, I divide my dataset into two groups, according to the overall profitability of the subjects. 
‘Gainers’ group involves traders, whose results are above zero after realisation of all transaction 
under review. ‘Losers’ group comprises all underperformers with the same threshold of zero 
return. With this bifurcation, I explore if good performance is related to a higher degree of 
rationality. In other words, if outperformers would have a higher level of correlation between 
risk and return. This is just another angle of view on the research question. I expect that 
‘Gainers’ who more frequently would experience profitable trades, should demonstrate more 
risk-averse behaviour resulting in a positive correlation between risk and return variables. The 
reverse scenario is anticipated for ‘Losers’. The results verify my hypotheses: Spearman rank 
correlation between total risk and return for ‘Gainers’ equals to 0.58 and for ‘Losers’ it is -0.70. 
The same situation is found using coefficients in regression analysis: 1% of return is ‘priced’ at 
28% of standard deviation for ‘Losers’ and 14% for ‘Gainers’. Again, I reveal that the 
psychological factor of loss aversion with its stronger impact of risk in losses domain is playing 
its role in behaviour.  
The approach above exhibits only gross evidence of investors’ choices uncovered by risk/return 
correlation. It does not allow to explore the heterogeneity of individual risk preferences and 
value functions. To make the respective investigation, I obtain a specific correlation measure 
for each individual investor by breaking their trading history into even series of 20 transactions 
in each of minimum 10 sequences. For each of such sequences, I calculate average return and 
positive and negative realised volatility (positive and negative semi-deviation of returns), which 
provide for the estimation of a personal correlation coefficient. My findings demonstrate a vast 
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dispersion of individual coefficients. The average correlation for all subjects equals to -0.07 and 
is statistically significant at 1% level. Standard deviation is 0.38, while 59% of investors have 
their coefficient below zero. For hypothesis testing purposes, I again break all traders into 
‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ groups. For outperforming investors, the average of individual 
correlation coefficients equals 0.09 (41% of observations fall below zero), significant at 1% 
level. For underperformers, the mean coefficient is -0.15 (68% investors hitting below zero 
correlation), also significant at 1%. This outcome substantiates the initial assumption of more 
aligned risk aversion among ‘Gainers’ and risk-seeking pattern among ‘Losers’. Further, inside 
each performance group, I independently evaluate the relation between return and positive risk 
(positive semi-deviation) and return and negative risk (negative semi-deviation). As expected, 
in both groups, investors exhibit risk aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses. 
Nevertheless, ‘Gainers’ prove a far stronger positive correlation in gains domain than ‘Losers’ 
– 0.47 against 0.27, and less strong correlation in losses domain - -0.33 versus -0.45.  
As a next step, I use a univariate regression technique with return as independent variable and 
risk (positive and negative) as the dependent variable to construct a risk-return relation model 
autonomously in losses and gains sections of the value function for each individual investor. 
Based on this analysis, I attribute the subjects to a specific pattern of behaviour. For instance, a 
trader having positive risk/return correlation in gains domain and negative correlation in losses 
domain may be ascribed to S-type behaviour that is predicted by Prospect Theory. The other 
patterns include universal risk aversion prescribed by Expected Utility Theory and universal 
risk-seeking that does not have a clear theoretical attribution. In addition, I introduce the concept 
of weak and strong forms of each behavioural model. To take the strong form, a correlation 
coefficient has to be statistically significant at least at 5% level. Otherwise, I designate it to be 
weak. Using this method, several noteworthy conclusions can be made. Most investors are 
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inclined to Prospect Theory’s backed S-type behaviour – 72% of my subjects exhibited this 
pattern in a weak form and almost a quarter had it in a strong form. This is by far the most 
popular model. The second place is occupied by weak (20%) and strong (5%) forms of universal 
risk-seeking pattern, which is surprising considering that there is no theory to support it. Finally, 
plain risk aversion is exhibited by only 8% of investors in a weak form and 1% in a strong form. 
I also reveal that 12% of traders have insignificant correlation coefficient in gains and losses 
domains. This case can be labelled as risk-neutral behaviour. On top of that, I discover that 
outperforming investors are substantially more predisposed to plain rational behaviour and less 
to being fully risk-seeking than underperformers. For example, 16% of ‘Gainers’ prove to have 
a weak form of risk aversion against only 4% of ‘Losers’. In contrast, 26% of ‘Losers’ unveil 
the weak form of plain risk-seeking pattern versus only 7% of ‘Gainers’.                          
In general, in the first empirical chapter, I establish that the vast majority of individual investors 
change their risk behaviour conditional on their profitability in line with my research question 
and hypothesis. At the between-subject analysis scale, outperforming traders exhibit a higher 
degree of rationality comprised in a positive correlation between risk and return that points to 
the concave form of the decision valuation function. At the within-subject level, investors tend 
to be risk-averse in the gains domain and risk-seeking in losses domain. Besides, there is an 
undoubted proof of loss aversion bias that impacts investor’s choice. Throughout my analysis, 
investors tend to outweigh loss over gain that is observable in sharper correlation coefficients 
for the former. This evidence supports the predictions of Prospect Theory. I also identify the 
link between profitability and rationality. Rational behaviour that is represented by positive 
relation between risk and return, remains a largely unattainable goal for individual investors, 
however, striving towards it makes a lot of practical sense as this aspect quite well delineates 
good and bad trading results. Another essential question is what impacts the degree of 
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rationality. I try to examine it by regressing the set of trading and personal variables collected 
from the data set on risk/return correlation. Surprisingly, age has a negative effect on rationality 
level. This is against intuition and the academic research that puts forth the experience principle 
that should propel human performance in different aspects of life. The other variables that 
happen to be significant for rationality are explicitly and implicitly connected to risk-taking 
patterns. For example, negative and positive semi-deviations of return, various activity-related 
factors like turnover and number of trades, as well as the use of different conditional orders. 
This fact guides me to believe that there may be hidden variable or variables that stand behind 
the risk-related factors in explaining the degree of rationality and human choice. In addition, my 
discovery of a large group of investors that fit neither Expected Utility nor behavioural 
theoretical frameworks and demonstrate plain risk-seeking leads to the search of alternative 
explanations of investors’ behaviour. In the second and third empirical chapters, I test the factor 
of emotions as a potential hidden variable that can fill the gap in understanding the mechanics 
of economic decisions.        
Both Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory fall under the category of consequentialist 
perspective, which implies that a decision-maker configures her choice by multiplying the value 
of each outcome by its subjective probability. The greatest difficulties for consequentialist 
theories occur when decisions are taken ‘in the heat of the moment’. It is hardly possible to 
ignore this fact, because, as discussed in Kahneman (2003), and Kahneman (2011), the majority 
of decisions in many spheres of human life are taken under harsh pressure of time or other 
circumstances. Financial trading as one of the social sides of human activity is not an exception. 
Thousands of books and specialised online forums discussing the trading experience are filled 
with the highly emotionally-charged language of thrill, fear or disappointment. Without 
understanding the role of feelings in the decision-making process, it will be hard to produce 
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models that could carefully deal with a vast category of individual behaviour. Several models 
and theories strive to incorporate affect. The featured ones include Loewenstein (1996), Sloman 
(1996), Loewenstein et al. (2001), Slovic et al. (2002), Mukherjee (2010). However, evidence, 
especially the empirical verification of the impact of feelings, is still extremely scarce. For the 
most part, it comes from non-financial areas, for example, sports (Pope and Shweitzer (2011)).  
 
7.2.2. Summary and discussion of the second empirical 
chapter 
 
In the second empirical chapter, I explore how emotions may impact the correlation between 
risk and return. I collect unique data on the selection of 618 investors who have a trading track 
record on two types of accounts: Live and Contest. The live account involves investing own 
funds, while Contest represents a trading game that is operated with virtual money. Both 
environments are similar in all the aspects, for instance, commissions, market access, market 
microstructure, etc. The only critical difference is the natural feelings elicited when risking own 
capital and paper capital. Confirming my hypothesis, I identify the disparity in the relation 
between risk and return in both settings that highlight the dissimilarity of the form of investors’ 
value functions. I replicate the methodological approach of the first chapter and study 
correlations on macro and micro levels. At the macro (pooled-data) level, I find a statistically 
significant negative correlation between risk and return variables on both account types. For 
Live mode, Pearson correlation coefficient is -0.42 (Spearman = -0.23), significant at 1%. For 
Contest mode, Pearson correlation coefficient equals to -0.17 (Spearman = -0.03), though only 
Pearson correlation is significant. The difference between the environments is also statistically 
significant at 1% level substantiating my expectations. Moreover, the disparity between Live 
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and Contest correlation coefficients remains after I substitute total risk with positive and 
negative semi-deviations and repeat the analysis of risk/return correlations.  
At the micro-level of correlation analysis, in order to compute individual correlations as I did in 
the first empirical chapter, I select the investors having a minimum of 200 transactions in both 
account types. This leaves me with only 166 subjects, yet with reliably compelling trading 
history. Next, I split these investors into ‘Gainers’ and ‘Losers’ groups relative to their 
performance above or below the threshold of zero accumulated return. I hypothesise that 
correlation between risk and return for the two groups should be stronger in modulo in Live than 
in Contest, which would corroborate the ‘emotional gap’ concept. I again find evidence of my 
expectations – all pairs of correlation are indeed statistically stronger in Live mode, except for 
the relation between positive risk and return for ‘Gainers’ group, which would fit the 
significance criteria in case of a larger number of analysed subjects.  
 
7.2.3. Summary and discussion of the third empirical chapter 
 
Considering that I discover the supporting evidence of the input of feelings into risk and return 
relation, in the third empirical chapter I extend the research question aiming to fill the gap in the 
empirical research of emotions’ impact on the explicit manifestations of financial behaviour, 
performance and risk-taking practices of individual investors. I continue employing the data set 
of 618 traders and the two account types: affect-poor Contest (virtual trading competition) 
account and affect-rich Live (real money) account. From this data set, I extract and evaluate 
return and risk variables in multiple perspectives, for example, by order types and trading 
frequency. The empirical chapter is split into three parts. In the first part, I explore the change 
in trading behaviour and performance in response to switching between Live and Contest 
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settings. The second part is devoted to the study of the three facets of financial risk – changes 
in the shape of the value function, loss aversion, and decision weighting function, and how they 
react to the degree of affect. Finally, the third part examines if risk variables and the set of other 
trader-specific variables can explain the individual difference in variation of Live and Contest 
returns.  
The main finding of the first part is that investors demonstrate unequal profitability in the two 
emotionally disparate trading modes that I attribute to the emotional influence. On average, a 
single trade in Live outperforms a Contest trade by 0.022% of the transaction volume. 
Translated into the trader’s own equity terms, the difference is close to 0.7% per the invested 
dollar. Furthermore, traders display a clear distinction in their investment behaviour in Live and 
Contest. I reveal an essential, almost twofold, shift in the four key variables: a) Share of non-
intraday trades, b) Number of trades (trading frequency); c) Share of conditional orders; d) 
Duration of trades. When in Live setting, investors prefer spending more time in front of the 
electronic trading platform generating new transactions and following existing ones. This 
inclination is strongly significant statistically and economically. Moreover, it also proves to be 
consistent among investors, despite high individual heterogeneity.  
In the second part, addressing the facets of financial risk, I confirm my hypothesis based on the 
ideas laid out in Rottenstreich and Hsee (2004) stating that for more affect-rich decisions, the 
value function for prospects should be more curved, i.e. proportionally more value should be 
obtained by the activation of a stimulus itself. Indeed, I uncover that the disparity between the 
distributions of positive and negative semi-deviations is substantially sharper in Live 
environment compared to Contest (significant at 1% level). This should be the case if investors 
are progressively more risk-averse in the gains domain and risk-seeking in the losses domain. 
Yet, I discover that the difference in semi-deviations mainly ensues from the positive section of 
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the value function. Surprisingly, negative semi-deviations are statistically indistinct. Thus, in 
the losses domain, the value/utility function does not react to the shift in affect level. I reinforce 
the analysis of variance with the examination of the disposition effect in the two account types 
suggesting that a trader with steeper value function for gains and losses should expressly 
demonstrate the tendency towards higher disposition bias in the Live setting. Prior research has 
identified that disposition effect tends to abate with the hike in trading frequency. I manage to 
substantiate this assumption by failing to find statistically significant disposition bias in Live or 
Contest, even though, in absolute terms, I witness sizeable traders’ inclination towards 
overholding losing positions (statistical insignificance was mainly due to large individual 
heterogeneity). Nevertheless, the difference between disposition effect in both trading modes 
proves to be significant at 10% level and equals to 2 hours and 5 minutes on average. It means 
that in Live an average trader’s holding balance is 2 hours longer in favour of losing trades than 
in Contest (this is significant keeping in mind that average realised trade’s duration is 4.11 hours 
in Live mode and 7.82 hours in Contest mode). I believe that this result serves as additional 
validation of the disparate Live/Contest value function curvature hypothesis.  
Further, I focus on the other two facets of risk – loss aversion bias and the form of the probability 
weighting function. For that, I use conditional orders’ profitability statistics. I assume that 
conditional orders should better reflect the implicit beliefs of investors than market orders when 
it comes to the expression of loss aversion and judgement of probabilities. I measure loss 
aversion by the distance of conditional orders to the prevailing market price. On average, the 
closer a trader places the conditional order, the smaller should be the gain (loss) of respective 
realised take-profit (stop-loss) order. It is hypothesised that with loss aversion present, traders 
should be prone to keeping their stop-loss orders significantly closer to the spot price than take-
profit orders. Indeed, I identify clear evidence of loss aversion expressed this way in both 
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settings: on Live accounts, the return of an average transaction closed with a take-profit order 
equals to 0.25% compared to respective loss of 0.18% for a trade closed with a stop-loss order. 
For Contest accounts, the result is similar on a relative basis – take-profit order’s gain of 0.49%, 
and stop-loss order’s loss of 0.30%. The difference is statistically significant in both settings at 
1% level. The most intriguing and unexpected finding is the fact that loss aversion bias turns 
out to be stable across the trading modes. When evaluated on an individual trader level, I find 
that 63% of investors exhibit loss aversion in Live, which compares to 69% in Contest. 
Moreover, I also measure the absolute preference of traders to each of the order types and 
discovered a similar twofold dominance of stop-loss orders in both environments: 66% (69%) 
of realised conditional orders in Live (Contest) are stop-loss orders. This is an obvious indication 
that the subjects are more concerned with limiting their losses than with ensuring their gains.  
The final attribute of risk behaviour that I analyse is the decision weighting function. Again, as 
in the study of loss aversion, I exploit the conditional orders’ returns data set. With the special 
emphasis on the losses domain, I test the assumption regarding the shift of the probability 
weighting function discussed in the literature (e.g. Gonzalez and Wu (1999), Abdellaoui et al. 
(2005)) that is associated either with the pessimistic account (downward shift) or optimistic 
account (upward shift). I hypothesise that the surge of pessimism (or dread sensations) in Live 
trading compared to Contest should generate more conservative placement of conditional orders 
keeping the objective change of the value of stimuli constant for both settings78. I manage to 
find support for the assumption concerning the losses domain of returns that are associated with 
stop-loss conditional orders. The disparity between the profitability of trades realised by stop-
 
78 Knowing that investors use the same financial instruments set in Live and Contest, and having thousands of 
transactions in the data set, allows me assuming that in an average trade decision an investor faces similar 
objective distribution of outcomes and probabilities. On top of that, I also do consider the expected difference in 
the subjective valuation of the outcomes, whereby the small loss (gain) brings about more psychological damage 
(benefit) in more affect-rich (Live) environment reflecting on a more S-shaped form of the value function. 
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loss orders in Live and Contest was highly economically and statistically significant (on average 
Live account outperformed Contest by 0.1% of position’s value per single transaction). I believe 
that such difference in stop-loss orders positioning is primarily explained by the systematic 
pessimism of traders – overvaluation of probabilities in the losses domain. For gains domain, I 
also identify the signs of dread account, however, my data did not make it possible to separate 
the elevation of the probability function from other alterations in the functional shape (change 
in curvature or no change at all). In my view, the results help understand why I failed to find the 
difference in negative semi-deviations in Live and Contest in the first part of the empirical 
chapter. The dread of expected catastrophic losses that distorts objective probability weighting 
comes into conflict with the inclination towards risk-seeking behaviour when the loss is 
experienced. The value function account urges an investor to keep a losing position as long as 
it returns to break even, while the probability weighting function account propels the feeling of 
fear of an unbearable loss that forces an investor to close a losing trade at a certain psychological 
threshold. The larger is the size of the mounting losing position relative to a person’s capital, 
the stronger is the role of dread experience. This is the empirical evidence of the effect of the 
fourfold pattern of risk attitude that has been predicted by Prospect Theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979, 1992)). I only observe it in losses domain and not in gains because, seemingly, 
for losses, this phenomenon is far stronger and it is identifiable even in high frequency/low-
value intraday data set that I examine in the study.    
Pursuant to the silo-based investigation of the role of emotions in risk and return, I explore how 
risk variables help explain the variation in performance in Contest and Live settings. The 
regression analysis demonstrates that adding risk factors to the array of behavioural, personal 
and trading parameters raises the explanatory power of the model (measured as adjusted R2) 
twofold from 32% to 67%. Essentially, at least one-third of the difference in Live and Contest 
P a g e  | 298 
 
profitability is associated with the change in risk behaviour – the degree of risk aversion, 
measured as the standard deviation of returns. I believe that this result corroborates the main 
idea of Loewenstein et al. (2001) and other researchers advocating the ‘risk-as-feelings’ 
framework. Risk behaviour is not merely the product of thought through cognitively-processed 
investment decisions. The great deal of it ensues from immediate affective implications. I 
examine two trading environments that, being similar otherwise, are critically distinct by the 
level of emotional charge. I find that individual traders do change their risk attitude, most 
probably, unconsciously, and this change materially impacts performance. In the same vein, I 
confirm the empirical premise, summarised in Kahneman (2011) that negative realisations, in 
general, are more important for humans, and they play a greater role in shaping our decisions, 
and the consequences of these decisions. For investors, it means that the overall success of 
trading activity primarily lies in their ability to make good decisions for bad trades.  
I also would like to make few notes about the observations that have not been in the focus of 
the current study but that are noteworthy. First, following multiple research of investors 
performance and behaviour, I witness significant heterogeneity in the data and the proceeds of 
analysis. For example, the statistics of traders’ profitability, disposition effect, loss aversion, 
usage of conditional orders or portion of intraday trades varies widely across the subjects. 
Consequently, the notion of an average individual should be considered with great care in 
financial research. Second, my study continues the line of research highlighting the fact that 
gross of fees average trader’s returns hover around zero, and any pick-ups in trading activity 
translate into losses net of fees.    
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7.2.4. Limitations of the research 
 
My research has certain limitations. Primarily, these are data set related limitations. I explore a 
very limited section of the financial markets, which concerns individual, non-professional 
investors that for the most part, do not do finance or investments for a living. Also, my data set 
covers a specific type of financial instruments that includes high frequency, intraday currency 
pairs trading at high leverage. Therefore, the results that I obtain need further verification using 
other groups of investors and different types of instruments. Additionally, my dataset represents 
a cross-section of returns, not time-series data. Consequently, I cannot apply more advanced 
econometric methods, such as GMM (Generalised Method of Moments) or SDF (Stochastic 
Discount Factor) to elicit the parameters of the utility function and decision-weighting function 
or develop a more advanced measure of risk.  
Further, in the current research, I study realised behaviour, not the expected one. It is more 
aligned with Prospect Theory or ‘Risk-as-Feelings’ framework than Expected Utility Theory. 
Yet, this is part of a larger debate of whether it is correct to compare prescriptive type theory 
with descriptive one, or in other words, how people should behave with how they really behave. 
In essence, ‘Risk-as-Feelings’ hypothesis states that human actions are frequently hidden even 
from our own understanding and sometimes can harm our well-being. From this perspective, 
analysing what people say that would do in a certain scenario is a weak indicator of how realised 
behaviour would look like. Another important issue is the use of proxies to test risk behaviour. 
All of the aspects of risk preferences and their manifestations are very hard to measure directly 
in the empirical setting. Almost always, various facets of risk would interact and mix together. 
That is why my methodology to evaluate the changes in the form of the value function, 
probability weighting function or the presence of loss aversion bias should be regarded as an 
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attempt to proxy these phenomena and distinguish between them. Undoubtedly, there are other 
approaches and approximations to elicit risk behaviour from the empirical data.   
On top of that, there is a limitation associated with the methodology that I use in Chapter 1. In 
this chapter, I study the relation between risk and performance of investors and also try to 
differentiate between investors based on the demonstrated risk/return relation. For this purpose, 
I employ correlation analysis and complement it with a linear one-factor regression model. 
However, it is widely accepted in finance to use more sophisticated models in such analytical 
frameworks, for example, Fama-French multi-factor model (Fama and French (2015)) as the 
most widespread example for the research of equity instruments. Extant literature also proposes 
some relevant global risk factors for the FX market and currency instruments that form the core 
of my dataset. I can mention the carry trade factor (Lustig et al. (2011)), global FX volatility 
factor (Menkhoff et al. (2012)) or commodity factor (e.g. Ready et al. (2013)) among others. 
Nevertheless, considering the very high frequency of the dataset, it is doubtful that any of these 
risk factors could have a significant impact on my results. Normally, these factors’ role should 
grow with the elongation of observation periods to weeks, months or even years. I assume that 
on the scale of days and even hours the variations in investors’ performance are mostly 
influenced by pure luck or innate investors’ qualities and skills rather than the fundamental 
forces standing behind the values of financial instruments. Therefore, the simple approach to 
the measurement of risk is suitable to elicit the differences in the behaviour of investors without 
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7.2.5. Implications and contribution of the research 
 
My research contributes to the academic literature in a number of ways. The primary input 
concerns the fields of behavioural finance, investments and the nascent discipline of emotional 
finance. In the first empirical chapter, I bridge the gap of empirical testing of rational behaviour 
by individual investors. For that, I develop a new methodology that proxies the degree of 
rationality with the level of the linear relation between risk and return. This approach provides 
for the first-of-a-kind comparison between two major theories of decision making – traditional 
Expected Utility Theory and behavioural Prospect Theory. In the framework of this study, I find 
a confirmation of the extant experimental literature that the majority of individuals are inclined 
to be risk-seekers in the domain of losses and averse to risk in the area of gains as predicted by 
Prospect Theory. Furthermore, I provide empirical evidence that rationality is positively 
associated with profitability.     
 
In the second and third empirical chapters, I employ a unique dataset that comprises complete 
trading statistics from two types of investment accounts – Live and Contest – for the same group 
of 618 investors. The two accounts are identical in all aspects except for the degree of emotional 
charge associated with the investment process. Exploiting such natural control of emotional 
implications of decision-making, I develop a methodological approach to explore the impact of 
feelings on the correlation between risk and return, and further to study how feelings 
independently interact with the profitability of investors as well as the three facets of risk 
behaviour – a form of the value function, a form of the probability weighting function and loss 
aversion bias. My findings contribute to the empirical confirmation of ‘Risk-as-Feelings’ 
hypothesis and other dual-process theories.    
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The results of my research provide some useful implications for investors in financial markets. 
The confirmation of ‘Risk-as-Feelings’ hypothesis gives an idea of the limited role of financial 
knowledge and skill in trading success. I manage to demonstrate that feelings elicited during the 
investment process are by themselves a powerful factor that influences investors performance. 
It leads to the conclusion that contributing to the self-training in emotions management and 
analysing own behaviour from the angle of emotions may improve trading results. However, it 
still remains unknown to what extent such self-analysis and self-training can help investors to 
outperform. 
 
7.2.6. Future research 
 
My analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 is grounded on the comparison of the behaviour of the same 
economic agents in different environments. Such an approach is appealing because it allows 
offsetting some of the main criticism of experimental research design and, at the same time, 
control for the array of disturbing factors. The possibility to obtain scientifically significant 
findings from such cross-setting analysis makes it an attractive and reasonable goal for future 
research. The main challenge that arises for the prospective studies is the scarcity of empirical 
datasets. However, modern financial services get more and more electronic, which leaves hope 
that more multi-domain data may become available for academics. One example of the dataset 
to look after is the history of individual financial decisions when using credit cards and making 
investments. Such data is already available with the so-called challenger banks like Revolut or 
N26. 
 
An intriguing domain for future research may be based on my findings that the degree of 
rationality is related to the level of profitability of individual investors. A critical aspect of this 
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relationship is whether the degree of rationality can be trained or this is instead an inborn quality. 
In other words, is it true that good investors are born like that and certain psychological 
characteristics, like superior emotional intelligence, help them outperform while others are fated 
to losses? Answering this question assertively may trigger important consequences for the asset 
management industry and the financial industry in general. Nevertheless, the future study of the 
link between emotions and performance is aggravated by the complexity of data collection. It is 
difficult to incentivise real investors to answer tens of psychological questions.     
 
Another prospective future research should further investigate the connection between emotions 
and various behavioural biases. It is widely accepted in academia and the industry that the 
emotional origin of biases is much harder to deal with and to correct. I discovered that the 
disposition effect might be rooted in emotional implications. However, a more thorough study 
of this and other behavioural caveats is required.  
In Chapter 4, I examine the relation between rationality and the investment performance of 
individual investors. Chapters 5 and 6 extend this study to add another angle of the role of 
emotions in rationality, performance and behaviour. Following my research, I discovered that 
some traders in my dataset managed to demonstrate systematic outperformance, while the others 
(the largest part by far) had poor results. My empirical dataset could not help me to shed light 
on the source of such consistent outperformance or underperformance, even though I established 
connections between performance and emotions. The question to be answered here is whether 
successful individual investors can be trained, for example, by learning some emotions 
regulation strategies (e.g. Fenton-O'Creevy et al. (2012)) or born with some inherent qualities 
that allow making the right wealth-maximising investment decisions (most of the time). 
Why is this problem significant? Nowadays, more and more small individual investors get 
engaged in investments in the financial markets. The majority of them lose money. Sometimes 
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these losses are significant even at the national scale (Barber et al. (2017)). The ex-ante 
knowledge about one's skills and predispositions could potentially prevent individuals from the 
direct involvement in something they cannot properly handle, but motivate them to choose other 
gateways, for example, professional fund managers or advisers. 
Even the richest empirical dataset cannot provide the answer to the question about the inborn or 
trained investment skills alone without the aid of neurophysiological, experimental and 
interview research methods. Excellent guidelines for future research in this area are provided by 
Scherer (2005) for the measurement of emotions using questionnaires. Fenton-O'Creevy et al. 
(2012), Lo et al. (2005) and Coates et al. (2008, 2009) provide a starting point for the 
neurophysiological study design. Taffler and Tuckett (2015) introduce the way for the 
interview-type research design of the role of emotions in decision-making, which can be 
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